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Introduction
Marriage is one of the most private and critical decisions a person makes in their
life. This has far reaching effects on an individual, their average quality of life and
most importantly on the lives of their children. The development of young children,
in terms of emotional, physical, social and learning skills, has a direct effect on their
overall development and on the adults they will become. Comprehending the role
played by marital unions and the elements that potentially shape childrens human
capital formation is intriguing and important, to acquire knowledge on where new
initiatives are needed and how to design the optimal policies.
This thesis consists of three enclosed chapters that all empirically investigate issues
related to how families function in different environments, in order to understand
the nature, causes and consequences of disparities in children’s human capital. The
first chapter focuses on India, while the second and third chapters are centred on the
United States. Although different environments, different histories, varied cultures
and different backgrounds, yet the one common theme of this thesis is the way in
which families are rational players within households.
The first chapter, “The Effect of Arranged Marriages on Child Development”, is
motivated by the findings in Heckman (2000), which argues that role of the family is
crucial to the formation of learning skills in children. This paper used the India Human
Development Survey (IHDS), a new dataset, with the first wave starting in 2004—05.
India is a country where marriages are still arranged by members of the bride and
groom’s family, gradually it is leading to marriages where the bride and groom choose
each other with little or no parental involvement. Marital relations between spouses
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considerably affect their quality of life and development of their children and contribute
to the intergenerational transmission of human capital. This paper sheds light on
an ever present yet neglected aspect of women’s lives in India. My work is a novel
effort to explain whether consent within marriage has a causal impact on responses of
women to violence and if there are any effects on cognitive test scores of children. To
identify causal effect of consent in marriage within households, I exploit variations in
sex ratios across districts in India using an instrumental variable approach. I find that
women in marriages without their consent report higher incidences of violence and
their children perform worse in cognitive tests than those women in partial or fully
consensual marriages. The effect is strong and persistent for children from low-income
households, rural and lower caste categories.
“Assortative Mating, Marital Dissolution and the Role of Business Cycles” is the
second chapter in this thesis. It uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
data from the US, to test the association between assortative mating and marital
dissolution of couples in the context of business cycles. Assortative mating is along
the dimensions of age at marriage, educational attainment, ethnicity and religiosity
(Kalmijn, 1998). Research has long speculated the effect of economic changes on
social conditions. Children are the most vulnerable and greatly affected members
of the society when marriages breakdown. It was noted by Willcox early in 1893
that divorce rate is influenced by business conditions. For example, low divorce rates
observed in 1873–79 and 1884–86 were periods of depression in trade for the United
States. However, there is little empirical evidence on whether such a link exists for
assortatively mated couples. Using a duration model strategy, this work contributes to
an existing strand of literature which has not been studied in depth. Findings suggest
that higher education of the wife at marriage and mixed ethnicity greatly increases
the couples hazard of ending their marriages. Furthermore, race and religiousness
have a very stabilising effect on the hazard of dissolution.
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The third chapter, “Parental Education and Child Development: Long and Short
term Outcomes” using the PSID dataset, examines the relationship between edu-
cational homogamy of spouses on child’s outcomes which is measured by college
enrollments and college graduation for children between 18-28 years of age. There has
been growing evidence of educational attainment of spouses on marriage, dissolution
and fertility patterns, economic well-being, family investments in children as well as
parenting practises and standards. Although, countries spend a large share of their
investment in the education sector and on building their labour force, there is almost
no evidence of how educational similarity of parents can impact on college outcomes of
young adults. Using variation in the timing of implementation of joint child custody
and unilateral divorce laws across the United States as instruments, the findings from
this analysis indicate that if the spouses are similar in their educational attainment
levels, the propensity of their children enrolling in college increases. Thus, suggesting
that spouses with similar educational levels are perhaps less likely to face frictions in
terms of household management and therefore more likely to strategically invest in
their children’s future.
Chapter 1
The Effect of Arranged Marriages
on Child Development: Evidence
from India
1.1 Introduction
Children of today are the future of tomorrow. Almost three decades ago it was
widely acknowledged that a low human capital base is the most serious developmental
constraint in developing countries (World Development Report, 1980 ). Several studies
have emerged since then which demonstrated the importance of investment in human
capital formation of children in the context of developing countries.1
The families that these children come from has vital implications for their health,
behavioural and labour market outcomes. Families are formed by marital unions.
Historically, the elder members of a family or community played an important role
in arranging marriages, however, over time the role of the bride and the groom has
increased. In the West, romantic love is a primary basis for marriages where mate
selection is autonomous. However, arranged marriages characterized by strong parental
control over mate choice continue to be an accepted mode of mate selection in South
1See among others Frankenberg et al. (2005); Haddad, L. and Bouis (1991); Paxson and Schady
(2005); Psacharopoulos and Arriagada (1989); Rogers (2010); Strauss (1986); Thomas and Strauss
(1997)
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and East Asia, Turkey, Middle East and several parts of Africa (Hamon and Ingoldsby,
2003). There is plentiful sociological evidence in this context and in economics, Ed-
lund and Lagerlöf (2006) discuss the role of consent in marriage for intra-household
allocation of resources and growth.
This paper, for the first time, examines the effect of the type of marriage, in
particular non-consensual marriage on cognitive achievement of children in India,
thereby contributes to the growing early child development literature. It has atleast
two original data features. First, it relies on data from the India Human Development
Survey of 2004-2005, which is a relatively new, large-scale national survey that includes
specific questions on marital history for eligible women. Second, the paper tests the
association between non-consensual marriage and cognitive achievement of children
and empirically examines whether this association represents a causal mechanism, by
exploiting the variation in the type of marriage through the variation in sex ratio
at the time of marriage of women. A higher sex ratio (more males than females)
at the time of marriage, is indicative of a son preference attitude and lower female
autonomy in the natal household. This may expose her to an increased risk of having
a non-consensual marriage. The instrumental variable estimates suggests, that the
probability of the mother being in a non-consensual marriage, decreases the probability
of the children obtaining higher test scores. Moreover, this study also shows that
women in non-consensual marriages are more likely to answer “yes” to questions on
potential situations that may result in wife beating at the community level (see section
1.3 for more). These questions are not reported incidences of wife beating, but they
provide an assessment of gender-role attitudes among women.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the
literature on early human capital formation and a background on arranged marriages
in India. Section 3 describes the data and section 4 presents the estimation strategy.
Section 5 reports the results and section 6 concludes.
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1.2 Literature Review
Human capital is a general notion of the knowledge and skills embodied in human
beings, which plays an important role in determining their labour productivity and
their ability to absorb new knowledge and master new technologies (Becker, 1962;
Schultz, 1961, 1975). At the core of acquisition of knowledge and skills, education plays
a vital role, while human health determines labour productivity (Strauss and Thomas,
1995). Health capital measures physical development and conditions in children such
as height, weight and health status (Cunha et al., 2006). Human capital formation
takes time and takes different forms, starting before childbirth when parents’ decisions
and behaviour determine birth outcomes, then passes through various stages with the
human life cycle. Family environments during early years are major determinants of
human development since they shape the foundation for lifetime skill development
formed before children enter formal schooling (Francesconi and Heckman, 2016). Child
growth affects outcomes during schooling which subsequently influence labour market
outcomes (Alderman et al., 2000).
Cognitive ability and human capital formation
Emerging developmental literature demonstrates the importance of early environmen-
tal conditions on the evolution of adolescent and adult cognitive and non-cognitive
skills (Cunha and Heckman 2007;Knudsen et al. 2006). Cognitive as well as non-
cognitive skills affect the evolution of health capital through choices made by parents
and children. Heckman et al. (2006) and Ryff and Singer. (2005) have shown the
importance of personality and cognition in directly affecting educational choices and
their role in affecting health and healthy behaviours.2 Non-cognitive skills (such
as motivation, perseverance, time preference, risk aversion, self-esteem, self-control
and preference for leisure) have direct effect on wages, schooling, teenage pregnancy,
smoking, crime, social life, performance in tests and health choices.3These are the
2See Heckman et al. (2006), Murnane et al. (1995), Auld and Sidhu (2005)
3See Borghans et al. (2007), Bowles et al. (2001), Heckman et al. (2006), Grossman (2000)
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important determinants of success and can be improved more successfully at later
stages in life than basic cognitive skills (Heckman, 2000).
An extensive multidisciplinary literature studies the determinants of cognitive
achievements in children and this is divided into two branches: The early childhood
development (ECD) branch and the education production function (EPF). The ECD
branch seeks to understand the role of parental characteristics and early home envi-
ronments in producing cognitive skills. The EPF branch examines the productivity
relationship between schooling inputs and test score outcomes for school-age children.
This paper focuses mainly in contributing to the ECD branch. There is evidence which
shows early test scores are predictive of future labour market success. Robertson and
Symons (1990) and Currie and Thomas (2012) based on data from the British National
Child Development Survey have found that test scores at age 7 predict occupational
choices and are correlated with education and earnings.
Research in psychology demonstrates the vital importance of the early pre-school
years for skill formation, when human ability and motivation are shaped by families
and non-institutional environments. Although formal education is only one important
aspect of the learning process, it is not necessarily the most important one (Heckman,
2000). Coleman et al. (1966) has shown that families and environments play the
crucial role in motivating and producing educational success as measured by test
scores. Families are formed by marital unions and the quality of relationship between
the husband and the wife affects the parenting behaviour of both parents (Lamb,
2002). By investing in their children parents are able to shape the preferences that
govern the choices of children in a spectrum of health, labour market and behavioural
outcomes (Heckman, 2007). Moreover, recent studies have shown the importance of
parental time inputs on child cognitive and emotional skill development (Del Bono
et al. 2012, Fiorini and Keane 2014, Boca et al. 2014). These studies lend support to
my research hypothesis, that non consensual marriages is likely to affect quality of life
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and child’s cognitive ability.
In analysing cognitive achievement it would be ideal to have access to data on
all past and present family and school inputs as well as information about children’s
heritable endowment. This is because theoretically, child development is a cumulative
process that depends on the history of family and school inputs as well as inherited
endowments. However, existing datasets lack information in one or more of these
areas and therefore researchers in this field have to face the problems of missing or
imprecisely measured variables (Todd and Wolpin, 2007).
Background on Arranged Marriages
Historically, matrimonial alliances were arranged by parents and elders in the family.
Around the 8th century, individual consent marriages were introduced in Europe at
the instigation of the Catholic Church (Goody, 1983). Although the family still played
an important role in the marriage and mate choice, the involvement of the bride and
groom increased.
In India the institution of arranged marriages is accepted as the legitimate way of
finding a mate, and continues to survive to this day. Over the years, this institution
has become accomodating in nature such that, there is considerable variation in the
extent of parental involvement. Traditionally, arranged marriages relied exclusively
on parental judgment in the selection of a spouse and premarital interaction and
courtship was limited; in some cases the couple met on the wedding day. The modern
version of the arranged marriage is characterized by greater collaboration between the
parents and the children. Parents search and shortlist prospective candidates, children
are encouraged to meet them, interact and veto shortlisted candidates. Gradually it is
giving way to love marriages, especially among the middle and upper class in urban
India in which mates select each other with little or no parental involvement, and
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decide to get married usually after a period of courtship or dating. 4
Arranged marriages reflect the importance of the family and co-dependence be-
tween the parents and the children, wherein the family’ s needs, goals and interests
supersede those of the individual. The joint or extended family remains an important
institution in India. It is common to find three generations living together in the
same household or multiple brothers forming a joint household with their wives and
children. Family owned business is often a single source of household income, although
income may also be pooled within the household and then reallocated by the head
of the household, typically the eldest brother, father or grandfather (Nanda, 1995).
Strong family ties imply greater reliance on family as an economic unit and less on
the market or the government (Alesina and Giuliano, 2007b).
One of the ways in which the type of marriage could affect child development is
through the equality of autonomy between sexes which implies equal decision-making
in the household. Marital relations are associated with the type of marriage, and
self-arranged marriages are more egalitarian than parent-arranged ones. In the lat-
ter, because family members play an important role in spouse selection process, the
husband-wife relationship is de-emphasized. Instead, as Blood (1967) suggests, greater
emphasis is placed on the “individual’s vertical linkage with and responsibility to
antecedent kinsmen and his progeny”. On the contrary, self-arranged marriages are
based on personal qualities and the quality of inter-personal relationships. There-
fore, it is likely that such marriages emphasize a “horizontal bond” between marital
partners (Fox, 1975). Household gender relations are related to fertility levels and
intra-household resource allocation. Several authors such as Dyson and Moore (1983),
Miles-Doan and Bisharat (1990) and Basu (1992) have found that egalitarian relations
within a household are associated with low fertility levels and equal resource allocation.
In marriages with egalitarian relations between spouses, investments in children are
likely to be high since mothers have greater bargaining power in the household. This
has been empirically demonstrated by Attanasio and Lechene (2002); Bobonis (2009);
4See Xiaohe and Whyte (1990), Mullatti (1995), Nanda (1995), Medora (2003), Jana (2000)
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Lundberg et al. (1997); Thomas (1990).
Lack of female autonomy in marriage, could lead to low education and age at female
marriage; restrictions on the ability of women to control their fertility, arising due to
the need to produce a male heir; restricted freedom of movement characterised by low
labour force participation of women (Dyson and Moore, 1983). In many instances,
the husband’s family may resort to domestic violence which clearly reduces women’s
welfare and affects children born to her through various mechanisms (Nasir and Hyder
2003; Campbell et al. 1999).
1.3 Data
Data used in this paper is publicly available from the India Human Development
Survey (IHDS) conducted in 2004-2005, by the National Council of Applied Eco-
nomic Research, New Delhi, India, in collaboration with the University of Maryland.
The survey is micro unit recorded, nationally representative, based on a multistage
sampling procedure. It is spread over 41,554 households across 33 states in India.
Of the total 612 districts in India in 2001, 382 are included in the sample. The
sample is spread across 1503 villages and 971 urban blocks. The districts were selected
using a stratified random sampling to represent a range of socio-economic conditions.
Villages, urban centres and households were selected using a cluster sampling technique.
The survey was carried out in face-to-face interviews with the questions organized
into two separate questionnaires, household and women. Two one-hour interviews
in each household covered health, education, employment, economic status, mar-
riage, fertility, gender relations and social capital. The household questionnaires were
administered to the individual most knowledgeable about income and expenditure,
frequently the male head of the household. The questionnaire on health and education
was administered to an married woman in the household aged 15-49, often the spouse
of the household head. Data presented in this paper are drawn from a sub sample of
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8, 880 married women aged 18-49 at the time of the interview and their children aged
8-11 years who took the test.
Cognitive Skills: Test Scores Children aged 8-11 completed short reading,
writing and arithmetic tests. The objective was to measure basic skills using standard-
ised tests that can be administered relatively easily and causing low anxiety levels
on the part of children. Also, it was administered at the children’s homes in order
not to miss those who were absent from school. These tests were simple, intuitive
and were translated into 13 languages in addition to English, and the children were
asked to take the test in whichever language they were most comfortable. The focus
was on children aged 8 to 11 years because “all of these children should have acquired
the basic skills" (Desai et al., 2010). The three outcome variables for children in this
analysis are: scores of children in reading, mathematics and writing tests. In the
survey, scores on reading skills are divided into the following five categories:
• 0: Child cannot read at all (9%)
• 1: Can identify letters (13%)
• 2: Can identify words (20%)
• 3: Can read paragraphs (22%)
• 4: Can read stories (35%)
Mathematics skills is the second outcome variable and the scores are categorised as
follows:
• 0: No recognition of written numbers (17%)
• 1: Can identify numbers (32%)
• 2: Can subtract a two-digit number from another (28%)
1.3 Data | 19
• 3: Can divide a three digit number with a one digit number (23%)
Writing scores are dichotomous in nature, where 1 indicates whether the child is
able to write a simple sentence with two or less mistakes (69%) and 0, if the child
cannot write (30%). For estimation, I construct binary indicators for reading and
mathematics scores. Therefore, reading score, takes the value 0 if the score is either 0,
1, 2 and it takes the value 1, if the reading score is 3 or 4. Similarly, another binary
indicator for maths scores is generated, which takes the value 0, if the maths score is
either 0, 1 and it takes the value 1, if the score is 2 or 3. In all cases, higher scores
indicate higher levels of achievement.
Marriage Type and Other Covariates Central to the analysis in this paper,
the survey asks married women in the age group 15-49 years questions on the mate
selection process. Married women were asked the following question: “Who chose your
husband?” Their responses are divided into four categories:
1. Arranged by respondent herself
2. Arranged by respondent and parents together
3. Arranged by parents
4. Arranged by others i.e extended family members played a role in choosing a
spouse
Women with responses (3) and (4) were further asked: “Did you have any say in
choosing him?” to which they responded either Yes or No. Based on these responses, I
categorize marriage type as a dichotomous variable where 1 represents a non-consensual
marriage and 0 indicates a consensual one. The sample shows 41% of women in a
non-consensual marriage.
Drawing from the literature on determinants of cognitive outcomes among chil-
dren, I allow for a number of controls. These controls are divided as Household
1.3 Data | 20
Table 1.1 Percentage of women who reported experiences related to marriage planning
Measure
Marriage Planning and choice:
Woman herself chose husband 4.48
Woman and parents together 35.57
Parents alone: with woman’s approval 18.91
Parents alone: without woman’s approval 41.03
N=8813
characteristics: total household income in logarithms (Rs/month), whether piped wa-
ter, whether own dwelling, number of children; Home environment: household members
read/watch/listen to radio,television or newspaper, if parents discuss work/farm/politics;
Marital history: includes responses to questions such as, whether husband is from the
same village, same caste, whether first marriage, if husband was related to the respon-
dent, economic status of the natal family at the time of marriage; Child characteristics:
such as age and gender of children; Parental education: measured by years of schooling.
Also included are dummy variables for region, religion and caste. The Constitution of
India officially recognizes the Scheduled Caste (SC) and the Scheduled Tribes (ST) as
two groups of historically disadvantaged people. In addition, the Central Government
of India has grouped many other castes and communities as Other Backward Classes
(OBC) and describes them as “the socially and educationally backward classes”. Thus,
four caste categories are included: SC, ST, OBC and Others where Others includes
all other caste groups and the general caste. To control for geographical variation,
Indian states and union territories are classified into the following five regions: North
(Jammu and Kashmir; Himachal Pradesh; Punjab; Chandigarh; Uttaranchal; Haryana;
Delhi; Rajasthan), Central (Uttar Pradesh; Chhatishgarh; Madhya Pradesh), East (Bi-
har; Sikkim; Arunachal Pradesh; Nagaland; Manipur; Mizoram; Tripura; Meghalaya;
Assam; West Bengal; Jharkhand; Orissa), West (Gujarat; Daman & Diu; Dadra and
Nagar Haveli; Maharashtra; Goa) and South (Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka; Kerala;
Tamil Nadu; Pondicherry). Furthermore, there are five religious categories: Hindu,
Muslim, Sikh, Christians and Others where Others includes all other religions and
those who identify themselves without a religion, which constitutes an extremely small
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proportion.
Descriptive Statistics
Data presented in this paper are drawn from a sub sample of 8880 married women
aged 18-49 at the time of the interview and their children aged 8-11 years who took
the test. Table 1.2 presents descriptive statistics for this sample. The average age
of a female respondent in the sample is 34 years and the average age at marriage is
17 years. 47% of them are literate and have low educational attainment. 52% report
having no education while 16% attained primary education, 26% and 7% attained
secondary and higher education. Among the male cohort, 71% are literate and have
on average completed six years of schooling. 19% attained primary schooling while
40% and 15% have obtained secondary and high education and 28% have no education.
About 69% of individuals reside in rural areas, roughly 79% are Hindus and 14%
Muslims, 23% belong to a scheduled caste while 8% belong to scheduled tribe and
39% into other backward classes. Among the children in the age group 8-11 years,
roughly 47% are girls and 93% are literate. 98% of the girls and 99% of the boys
report attending school at the time of the survey. 2.68% have atleast one child, 22.05%
have two children, 29.79% have three children, while 45.38% have four or more children.
To measure women’s involvement in partner choice I examine their responses to
questions on marriage choice and whether the respondent’s parents (including extended
family members) had sought her opinion about whom to marry. Respondent’s who
chose their spouses themselves, jointly decided or had answered yes to parents choice
of spouse are classified as being in a consensual marriage. In the sample, 4% of the
respondents had themselves chosen their spouses, 35% sought their spouses together
with their parents, 19% had given their consent to marry a person chosen by their
parents and 41% had no consent while choosing their spouses.
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Table 1.2 Summary Statistics of Selected Sample, IHDS
Year of survey 2004 - 2005 No obs. 8880
Characteristic Mean St.dev. Min. Max. N
Child: 8-11 years
Read(0-1) 0.572 0.495 0 1 8866
Maths(0-1) 0.508 0.5 0 1 8827
Write(0-1) 0.694 0.461 0 1 8787
Age 9.467 1.061 8 11 8880
Female 0.471 0.499 0 1 8880
Mother:
Non-Consentual marriage 0.41 0.492 0 1 8813
Age at first birth 24.438 5.093 9 41 8876
Age at marriage 16.86 3.57 1 40 8866
Mother’s age 33.905 5.156 18 49 8876
Literate 0.47 0.499 0 1 8869
Yrs of educ 3.531 4.394 0 15 8847
No education 0.526 0.499 0 1 8712
Prim education 0.165 0.371 0 1 8712
Sec education 0.263 0.441 0 1 7913
High education 0.07 0.255 0 1 8712
Father:
Age 38.98 5.918 23 70 8463
Yrs of educ 5.938 4.797 0 15 8440
Literate 0.717 0.451 0 1 8456
No education 0.284 0.451 0 1 8440
Prim education 0.193 0.395 0 1 8440
Sec education 0.403 0.49 0 1 7714
High education 0.154 0.361 0 1 8440
Mother’s outcomes:
Beat leave 0.387 0.487 0 1 8840
Beat cash/jewelry 0.274 0.446 0 1 8842
Beat badcook 0.287 0.452 0 1 8849
Beat neglect home 0.335 0.472 0 1 8849
Beat xtrmarr 0.864 0.342 0 1 8831
Beat all 5 0.166 0.372 0 1 8845
Beat any 5 0.882 0.322 0 1 8840
Instruments:
Sex ratio 91 892.648 59.313 388 1141 8701
Fem. pols 91 0.869 1.107 0 9 6989
Household:
No. of children 3.64 1.576 0 13 8874
Discuss any 0.92 0.271 0 1 8774
Income (Logs/Rs.) 10.256 0.934 3.912 14.075 8757
Own home 0.896 0.305 0 1 8880
Piped Water 0.41 0.492 0 1 8880
Rural 0.689 0.463 0 1 8880
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I examine broad aspects of the female respondent’s marital relationship. Spousal
communication on general matters examines whether the woman and her husband
usually discussed issues related to work or farm, expenditure and community related
issues such as elections or politics. This includes a question on whether the respondent
and her husband go out to eat, visit fairs or the cinema. Questions related to women’s
participation in decision making reveal if she has the most say in what to cook; whether
to buy expensive items such as TV/fridge; how many children to have; what to do if
the child falls sick and to whom children should marry. I consider affirmative answers
to the following questions, which were asked to assess the respondent’s gender-role
attitudes. A summary of these is shown in Table 1.3. In the survey women were
asked: “In your community, is it usual for husbands to beat their wives in the following
situations:
• If she goes without telling him
• If her natal family does not give expected money, jewellery or other items
• If she neglects the house or the children
• If she does not cook food properly
• If he suspects her of having relations with other men. ”
Table 1.3 Summary of women who reported experiences after marriage
Measure All married women Consent No consent Difference
Marital relationship:
Spousal communication on general matters
Usually discuss things happened at work/farm 0.809 0.821 0.791 0.03
Usually discuss what to spend money on 0.900 0.909 0.888 0.021
Usually discuss community issues , elections/politics 0.867 0.882 0.845 0.037
Usually discuss all three topics 0.920 0.926 0.911 0.015
Go out to eat, watch movies, fairs/ festivals 0.490 0.589 0.349 0.24
Decision making:
What to cook daily? 0.807 0.813 0.798 0.015
Whether to buy expensive items- fridge/TV? 0.099 0.111 0.082 0.029
Number of children to have 0.181 0.182 0.179 0.003
What to do if child falls sick? 0.302 0.321 0.276 0.045
Whom children should marry? 0.084 0.099 0.063 0.036
Spousal violence:
Usual to beat if woman goes without telling husband 0.386 0.347 0.442 -0.095
Usual to beat if natal family does not give expected money/ jewelry/other items 0.274 0.251 0.307 -0.056
Usual to beat if she neglects house or children 0.333 0.316 0.358 -0.042
Usual to beat if food not properly cooked 0.284 0.262 0.317 -0.055
Usual to beat if he suspects her of having extra-marital affairs 0.864 0.821 0.926 -0.105
Usual to beat if all five 0.164 0.150 0.184 -0.034
Usual to beat if any five 0.882 0.844 0.936 -0.092
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In Table 1.3, prevalence of each outcome is compared for women who are in
consensual and those in non-consensual marriages. Overall, the share of women in
non-consensual marriages reporting on the likelihood of spousal violence is higher
compared to those in a consensual one. Although, it is lower on issues relating to
communication and decision making. Separate multivariate regression analyses are
conducted to ascertain the relationship between the type of marriage and each of the
indicators for violence after adjustment for factors such as woman’s age at marriage,
years of schooling, if husband is from the same village, age of husband at the time
of survey, his years of schooling, total income of the household, residence, caste and
religion. These are shown in Table 1.4.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Identification
The key empirical issue being addressed in this paper is that, women in non-consensual
marriages would have a higher probability to respond affirmatively to questions on
domestic violence because factors such as home environment, inegalitarian gender
relations, family structure and individual traits or personality factors such as level of
confidence, and events that occur within a person’s lifetime could shape an individual’s
responses to situations. These are likely to affect their responses to questions assessing
gender relations. The prevalence of domestic violence in the context of India has been
documented in the sociological literature by Jejeebhoy (1998), Martin et al. (1999),
Ouattara et al. (1998) and Koenig et al. (2006) among others. Gender-based violence
including wife-beating, rape, sexual abuse and dowry-related murder are prevalent
in India. Amongst these, wife-beating and intimidation are the most endemic and
widespread forms of violence, although most of these are unreported or under-reported.
The very same unobservable factors (as just mentioned above) together with chil-
dren’s heritable endowments, mother’s nurturing skills, early life conditions also affect
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test scores of children, as demonstrated in the literature on cognitive achievement.
In the study of cognitive achievement it is ideal to have access to all past, present
family and school inputs about the child because child development is a cumulative
process that depends on the history of family and school inputs as well as on inherited
endowments. However, since most datasets including this one are not so comprehensive,
I face the problem of endogeneity which may render OLS estimates biased.
Therefore, in this study, endogeneity may arise due to the following: First, omitted
variable bias, caused due to missing information on child’s cognitive achievement and
on responses to gender-role questions. Second, measurement error which may arise
from under-reporting of violence among women and the possibility of withholding
information while assessing attitudes on gender. To correct for this, I use instrumental
variable strategy for the endogenous variable marriage type, which is a binary variable
and takes the value 1 if the mother is in a non-consensual marriage and 0 if it is
consensual. Sex ratios and number of female politicians are the two instruments
considered in this paper and in what follows, I provide arguments for their relevance
and validity.
Sex ratios: is the relative number of men and women, which can affect marriage
prospects, labour force participation and other social and economic variables (Angrist,
2002). It can be determined by biological as well as economic and cultural factors. In
parts of Asia where male sex-bias is prevalent, biological factors are likely to play a
minor role in determining sex ratios.
Chiappori et al. (2002) show that sex ratios and divorce laws favourable to women
have a sizeable impact on labour supply behaviour and decision processes. Grossbard-
Shechtman and Neideffer (1997) found that an increase in sex ratio (more males than
females) reduces the labour force participation of married women and their hours
worked. Similarly, Angrist (2002) using data on immigrants to the United States found
that higher sex ratios had a large positive effect on the likelihood of female marriage
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and a large negative effect on female labour force participation. Edlund (1999) models
endogenous sex choice and shows that unbalanced sex ratios are one of the possible
consequences of a preference for sons which is widespread in many Asian countries
such as India, China and South Korea. Using annual province-level data from China
Edlund et al. (2013) show that higher sex ratios imply fewer married men and thus, is
associated with rise in crime rates.
In the context of India, Visaria (1961), one of the earliest studies into India’s
demography, revealed that there was a persistent rise in sex ratios between 1901
and 1961, in the northern states, and lower in the south (Dyson and Moore, 1983).
Chakraborty and Sukkoo (2008) have argued that kinship systems played an important
role in determining sex ratios in India. They also observe that sex ratio is lowest (less
females than males) in the North, where kinship system provided the least autonomy
of women, intermediate in the East and highest in the South where women’s autonomy
was believed to have been the strongest.
From a regional perspective, Karve (1990), Dyson and Moore (1983) have argued
that distinct differences in kinship organization, that is, patrilineal or patrilocal system
in the northern states and matrilineal or matrilocal system in the southern states,
which have led to women in the north having significantly lower autonomy than those
in the south.5 Female autonomy, sexual freedom, land ownership rights are closely
related with kinship and inheritance systems where women’s rights were stronger, as
found by Agarwal (1994). Several studies have shown that the upper social strata
mainly indulge in son preference.6 Discrimination of girls has been found to increase
with prosperity and education level of mothers in India. Extremely male biased
sex ratios at birth have been largely a phenomenon confined to high-caste groups in
the north-west of India and female infanticide is known to be a high-caste phenomenon.
5These differences, arising due to village female exogamy, male household cooperation, male-only
property inheritance, marriage based on inter-group alliance and low parental benefit from daughters,
all contributed towards poor treatment of girls and women
6Tambiah and Goody (1973); Dreze and Sen (1995); Bhalotra and Cochrane (2010)
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Fig. 1.1 India Sex ratios, Source: Census of India
Angrist (2002) has argued that lower sex ratio, or more males for every female
may increase female bargaining power in the marriage market and this would shift
resources and family structures so as to favour women. However, this has not been
the case in India (Amaral and Bhalotra, 2016). Either men take much younger women
as wives, therefore the spousal age gap is higher Anukriti et al. (2015). Another
less well known phenomenon is women trafficking across India to make up for the
resulting shortages.7 On the contrary, a vast literature documents the various ways in
which Indian (and, in particular, Hindu) families exercise their preference for sons, for
instance, through differential fertility stopping (Bhalotra and van Soest, 2008), female
foeticide (Jha et al. 2006, Bhalotra and Cochrane 2010), and gender-differentiated
7See also: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21648715-distorted-sex-ratios-birth-generation-
ago-are-changing-marriage-and-damaging-societies-asias
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-20938125
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parental investments in antenatal care, breastfeeding, nutrition and immunization
(Bharadwaj and Lakdawala 2013; Jayachandran and Kuziemko 2011; Chakravarty
2010; Oster 2009).
More recently, Bhalotra et al. (2016) have provided evidence that son preference be-
haviours of Indian parents respond to changes in the cost of dowry and have shown that
pre-ultrasound, gold price variation is reflected in differences in postnatal mortality,
while, post-ultrasound, it is reflected in the sex ratio at birth. This is consistent with
Anukriti et al. (2015) who show that after the introduction of prenatal sex detection
technologies in the mid-1980s in India, postnatal excess girl mortality declined sharply,
which suggests that parents have been substituting postnatal neglect with female
foeticide, which is a more deliberate choice than the former. Moreover, the availability
of ultrasound has granted access to cheap, often unsafe abortion clinics which has
lowered the financial and psychic costs.
Throughout this paper, sex ratio is defined as the number of females per thousand
males as outlined by the Census of India. In my knowledge, this is the first paper that
uses sex ratio as an instrument. I obtained district-wise data on sex ratio from the
1981, 1991 and 2001 Census of India for the whole population and this is shown in
Figure 1.1. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of sex ratio from 1901 to 2011. In 1991,
the number of females per thousand males was the lowest at 927, following which, it
is shown to be rising steadily.
Arranging a marriage requires many decisions, such as when to begin the proceed-
ings, suggestions of who might be eligible, enlisting others who might be helpful in
finding a partner, characteristics of the potential spouse that might be important
and evaluations of the potential spouses that may arise. In this sample, the age at
marriage for the female respondent is 17 years and the mean age at the time of survey
is 34 years. Men and women enter the marriage market at different time periods
and vary in age. Since the survey takes place in 2004-2005, presumably these women
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Fig. 1.2 Sex ratios 1901-2011, Source: Census of India
entered the marriage market around the year 1987. For this reason, sex ratios of the
population above age 7 and/or around age 15, in the years close to 1987, would be a
good representative of the prevalent gender-bias against girls and take into account,
the existing son preference phenomena in various parts across the country. From
the Census of India, I was able to obtain district-data on sex ratios at birth for the
years 1981, 1991 and 2001. The relevant variation in sex ratio occurs soon after birth,
therefore I use sex ratios for 1981 and 1991, with approximately a twenty year lag
as these would be the closest possible match. A potential drawback of using sex
ratio at birth is that, it does not account for infant child mortality which could be a
consequence of gender discrimination of the girl child, among other reasons such as,
post-natal health of the mother and child. Thus, in this analysis, I make use of sex
ratio at birth in 1981 and 1991 as potential candidates for instruments, because the
sex ratios for these years would capture the marriage market situation for the women
in the sample used in this study.
Number of female politicians: Another possible instrumental variable is the
number of female representatives in politics. Existing literature on women’s representa-
tion in politics has shown that women support liberal policies, child care spending and
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use their income towards spending on education, health, nutrition in the household
and other expenditures benefiting women.8 Thomas (1990) and Duflo (2003) have
also shown that increase in women’s incomes improve girl’s well-being in the family.
According to Banerjee and Somanathan (2001) female policy makers also affect the
participation of other women in the political process, encouraging women to raise issues
and express their concerns. Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras (2014) identify significant
causal impacts of women’s political representation on neonatal survival, indicators of
prenatal and early postnatal care and the village level public health infrastructure.
Women’s political representation leads to reduction in neonatal mortality, they are
more likely to build public health facilities and encourage antenatal care, institutional
delivery and immunization.
Clots-Figueras (2012) using political data from India shows that female politicians
have a larger effect than male politicians on the education received by individuals living
in urban areas, but not on the education of those living in rural areas. This difference
between rural and urban areas is possibly due to female politicians investing more
in education in areas where women can gain benefit more from it or by educational
investments being more visible to voters in urban areas. Female politicians also have
an effect on the number of primary schools per village at the district level, especially
more in urban areas. Moreover, they are likely to be more sensitive to women’s needs
and women may be more likely to express their needs and interests if their legislator
in the constituency is a woman.
These findings imply that the presence of female politicians could therefore lead to
policies which are more favourable for the well-being of women and children. This is
because the number of female politicians in the district would encourage women to
express their concerns, participate in the political process, increase women’s education
and well-being. As a result, it would lower the probability of women having a marriage
without their consent by giving them confidence to raise issues affecting them in their
8See among others Lott and Kenny (1999), Edlund and Pande (2001), Edlund, Lena, Laila Haider
and Pande (2005), Lundberg et al. (1997)
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natal households and also increase children’s well-being in terms of education, health
facilities and early childhood care.
Data for female politicians is obtained from different volumes of the Statistical
Reports on General (Lok Sabha) Elections from the website of the Election Commis-
sion of India. I obtained constituency data for the years 1980, 1991 and 2004. For
aggregation of the constituency data to the district level, I use the State Elections in
India, a publication of the Election Commission which lists the constituencies included
in each district in each year. Some districts have been newly created and others have
disappeared during the period of 1980-2004. I use the 2001 census district definition
and match the districts with those as in the sample. I include all districts that were
present in 2001 as intact or even divided. The districts not included are those of
Andaman and Nicobar islands because these are not in the surveyed sample. As
instruments, I use the presence of female politicians in the year 1980 and 1991, in
accordance with an approximate twenty year lag from the survey year of 2004-05.
1.4.2 Regression Specifications
Women in consensual marriages, on average tend to report in a positive way on
experiences related to decision making such as number of children to have or whether
to buy expensive items for the house. Moreover, their responses are positive on various
aspects of marital relationship such as discussion about everday affairs as well family
outings to the cinema, fairs or festivals. On the contrary, women in non-consensual
marriages are more likely to respond affirmatively to questions about the likelihood of
violence in their community, on average, while their responses to aspects of marital
relationship and decision making are lower compared to their consensual counterparts
(see also Table 1.4). Furthermore, OLS estimates show that there are strong negative
associations between non-consensual marriage and cognitive achievement in children.
These are very interesting correlations in themselves, but can these associations be
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given a causal interpretation?
The strong positive association between non-consensual marriage and responses to
questions on violence (Table 1.15) as well as the strong negative effects on childrens
cognitive achievement (Table 1.6, 1.16) suggests that they can, because such an associ-
ation would be absent if there were no forces to drive the different types of marriages
and their effects on mothers and children.
Mother’s outcomes
I investigate if non-consensual marriage has a causal impact on women’s attitude to
gender-role questions about domestic violence. Different versions of equation (1.1)
are estimated depending upon the questions asked to the respondent and I call these
Mother’s outcomes.
Yj = β0 + β1Mj + β2X + ζj (1.1)
where Yj is the share of women in the community who respond ‘yes’ to ques-
tions on incidences of domestic violence. Mj is a binary variable which takes the
value of one if the respondent was in a non-consensual marriage and zero otherwise.
Vector X includes extensive information about marital history of the mother such
as age at marriage, if husband is from the same village, same caste, if husband is
related and economic status of the natal family at the time of marriage whether
same, better or worse. It also includes age at the time of survey of both partners,
their educational attainment, number of children, total household income (in logs)
and dummies for residence in rural area, religion (Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh,
Others is reference category), caste (SC, ST, OBC, General is reference category) and
region(North, South, East, West, Central is reference category). The idiosyncratic
error term, ζj includes unobserved characteristics such as genetic traits or personality
of the mother, family structure that determine the type of marriage of the mother.
Parameter β1 measures the effect of being in a non-consensual marriage on the posi-
1.4 Empirical Strategy | 33
tive response to the incidence of violence by the share of women at the community level.
Estimation of equation (1.1) may be biased because women in non-consensual
marriages are likely to have different unobserved characteristics compared to those
women in consensual marriages, which would result in the variable Mj and the error
term ζj being correlated. Women who had no say in the choice of their spouse were
probably raised in a more patriarchal family or environment where inequality in gender
relations affects their responses to questions on incidence of violence. To address the
potential endogeneity of Mj, I use district-wise sex ratio in 1991 as instrument. The
first stage equation concerning mother’s marriage choice is represented as:
Mj = α0 + α1Zd + α2X + ωj (1.2)
where the set of instruments Z is aggregated at district level d. Vector X is the
same as in equation (1.1) and ωj is the error term.
Child’s outcomes
Next, I examine whether non-consensual marriage of the mother has an impact on
the cognitive skills of her child. Cognitive achievement of a child is measured by test
scores on reading, writing and mathematics. Three versions of equation (1.3) are
estimated which I call Child outcomes:
Ti = γ0 + γ1Mj + γ2X + ϵi (1.3)
where Ti is the test score of child i, Mj is a binary variable which takes the value
of 1, if the respondent was in a non-consensual marriage and 0 otherwise. The vector
X includes observed child-specific factors: child’s age and gender; marital history
of the mother: age at marriage, whether it was first marriage, if husband is from
the same village, same caste, if husband is related and economic status of the natal
family at the time of marriage whether same, better or worse with same being the
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reference category. I control for whether mother reads newspaper and if parents
discuss work, expenditure or politics to capture home environment. Also included are
parental-specific factors: their age at the time of survey, highest education attained,
number of children, total household income (in logs), if house is owned and has piped
water facility and demographic variables such as residence in rural area, religion, caste
and region dummies. The error term, ϵi includes time-invariant unobserved child
and maternal factors that can affect a child’s test score. These can include home
environment, familial structure, genetic traits or personality, nurturing skills of the
mother and children’s heritable endowments, in addition to other factors.
Since these unobservable characteristics impact test scores of children (Ti) and
could be correlated with Mj, equation (1.3) is estimated using set of instrumental
variables, Zd where marriage type is instrumented by district-wise sex ratio at birth
in 1991. The first stage equation concerning mother’s marriage choice is similar to
equation (1.2).
Mj = α0 + α1Zd + α2X + ωj (1.4)
where vector X is the same as in equation (1.3) and ωj is the error term which
also includes unobserved time-invariant maternal or child factors such as genetic traits
or personality of the mother and family structure that determine the type of marriage
of the mother. In all equations I use robust standard errors clustered at household level.
In equations (1.1) and (1.3), β1 and γ1 represent the causal effect of Mj on Yj and
of Mj on Ti respectively. The key assumptions that are required to identify β1 and γ1
are the following:
1. Cov(Zd, ζj)=0 and Cov(Zd, ϵi)=0. The instrument Zd is uncorrelated with the
disturbances ζj from equation (1.1) and ϵi from equation (1.3).
2. The covariance between endogenous variable Mj and instrument Zd must be
different from zero, that is, Cov(Mj, Zd) ̸= 0. This requires that α1 statistically
differs from 0.
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If Zd satisfies these assumptions, then it is considered an instrumental variable in this
model. First stage regressions presented in Table 1.5 indicate that the instruments
being used are relevant.
1.4.3 Estimation
First, I estimate equations (1.1) and (1.3) using Ordinary Least Squares to establish
baseline estimates, as this is the standard procedure in most studies using instrumental
variable regressions. These are presented in Table 1.4 for Mothers outcomes and in
Table 1.7 for Child outcomes. Using instrumental variables I estimate (1.1) and (1.3),
I present estimates using IV 2SLS as popularized by Angrist and Imbens (1994). The
following is the estimated first stage equation:
M̂j = α̂0 + α̂1 Zd + α̂2X + ωj (1.5)
In the second step, estimates of β1 and γ1 are obtained by adding the predicted values
from the first stage to the existing set of regressors given in equation (1.1) and (1.3).
However, there are a number of problems with the above approach, which is the
Linear Probability Model (LPM), estimated in the usual way using OLS (Wooldridge,
2002). I avoid these problems by following a two-stage instrumental variable approach
illustrated by Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997). I follow Wooldridge (2002, p. 623),
where in the first stage I estimate a non-linear Probit model of Mj over X and the set
of instruments Zd. The fitted probabilities are defined as:
M̂j = Φ [ α̂0 + α̂1 Zd + α̂2X ] (1.6)
where α̂0 , α̂1, α̂2, are the Probit estimates from equation (1.2) and Φ[.] is the cumu-
lative distribution of the standardized normal.
Next, I estimate equation (1.1) and (1.3) by the two-step efficient generalised
method of moments estimator (GMM). This is more efficient than 2SLS and robust
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to heteroskedasticity of unknown form, as well as to arbitrary intra-cluster corre-
lation (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 193). I use X and fitted value, M̂j as instruments to
identify the causal effects of non-consensual marriage on responses to violence and
cognitive outcomes of children. The important advantage of this approach is that the
predicted values from the first-stage Probit model provides a better approximation
to Mj than the linear model, therefore the resulting IV estimates are more efficient
than those that use a linear first stage model (Newey, 1990). This method uses
non-linearities in the first stage as a source of identifying information. Moreover, as
illustrated by Windmeijer and Santos Silva (1997) the consistency of this non-linear
IV estimator does not depend on the correct specification of the Probit model in
the first stage and IV standard errors do not need to be corrected (Wooldridge, 2002).9.
Validity of the exclusion restriction
The identification strategy relies on the prevalence of gender discrimination towards
women in India. Son preference bias continues to widely exist in various parts of
the country and regional patterns can be observed. The average female-to-male sex
ratio by region, in Table 1.24, for the years 1981, 1991 and 2001 shows that states
in the northern and central regions experience greater shortage of women, in other
words, greater son preference, compared to the southern states. Thus, the variation
in sex ratio reflects the patrilineal culture that is prevalent in various parts across
India. Low female-to-male sex ratios at birth and during childhood are rooted in a
patriarchal culture that extols the economic and familial contributions of boys and
men over the contributions of girls and women (Das Gupta 1987; Malhotra et al. 1995).
Since the introduction of prenatal sex detection technology, it has become easier
for Indian couples to manipulate the sex ratio of surviving children. Families that
conceive because they want a son but not a daughter can now detect the sex of the
foetus and conduct sex-selective abortion. Street advertisements in India encourage
9An early application of this estimator within a count data model is by Windmeijer and Santos
Silva (1997). For recent applications see O.Attanasio (2013)
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families to seek sex-selective abortion to avoid dowry costs. For instance, Desai (1994)
reports that abortion clinics in Mumbai had posters with slogans such as “Better pay
Rs 500 now than Rs 50,000 later”. The Rs 500 is the cost of abortion and the Rs
50,000 refers to the future cost of dowry.
The sex ratios in India, simply reflects the fact that, there might be a departure
from a natural course of events as a result of human choices or actions. Indeed, if there
was no variation in sex ratio or the variation was just random, then one would observe
a sex ratio that favours girls, as much as boys. However, since people are making
choices about the gender of children (through pre-diagnostic tools and sex-selective
abortion), one can observe variation in sex ratios, in other words a manipulated sex
ratio, which reflects expectations, customs and financial constraints among other
factors. If there is a specific environment in which boys and girls grow up, then the
custom of arranging marriages is very likely to be affected and it is this environment
that the women must have grown up witnessing when they were in the marriage
market. This is precisely the reason why this paper uses sex ratio as an instrument,
to capture these prevailing cultural norms, historical and institutional beliefs about
gender roles, as a way to proxy for the type of marriage that a marriage-eligible woman
had. Historical evidence also sugegsts that women in the south enjoy greater autonomy
and freedom of movement as well inherit property rights, in contrast with women in
the north where this is restricted (Dyson and Moore, 1983). In this sample (Table
1.23), I find evidence of the same occurrence: women in the northern and central parts
of India are more likely to be in non-consensual marriages, compared to women in
the east, west and south, with the southern region experiencing far less women in
non-consensual marriages.
There is no reason to believe that those indulging in sex-selective behaviour are
more farsighted than the rest of the Indian populace. Even though they may believe
that boys contribute more than girls to the family, yet, they may not fully take
into account or foresee that the imbalance in sex ratio caused by their actions, will
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ultimately affect their sons marital chances. If sons are preferred over girls and
everyone has sons then clearly, at a future time, these sons will face a shortage of
marriageable daughters, but, parents are not necessarily thinking about the future
consequences of their actions when they choose to opt for abortions and sex-selective
methods. Thus, this paper believes that the historical and deeply rooted culture
and traditions about gender norms and patriarchy, supersedes, leading parents into
falsely believe that boys will always stand better chances than girls in all aspects of life.
1.5 Results
The OLS estimates presented in Table 1.4 for Mothers outcomes show a highly signifi-
cant and positive effect of non-consensual marriage type on the likelihood of women
responding “yes” to instances of wife-beating. These questions were asked to assess
gender-role attitudes among women. Two groups of estimates are presented. The first,
group A estimates are excluding any predetermined variables such as household income
or number of children. While group B estimates are conditional on these factors.
These effects are positive and sizeable, the magnitude of estimates from the two groups
are similar. The likelihood of violence ranges from 9.3% points, if the wife leaves home
without permission from her husband; 7.9% points for not receiving cash or jewellery
from wife’s natal family to 6.1% points if the wife responds affirmatively to violence
in all the possible cases. Table 1.17 in appendix A.1., presents estimates conditioning
on state-year and district fixed effects. These estimates show that non-consensual
marriage is positively correlated with responses to violence and the incidences of
violence would increase by 8.2% points if the wife leave, 6% points if cash/jewellry is
not received, 4% points if she neglects the home or does not cook properly and 4.6%
if the husband is supicious of his wife. These effect sizes are smaller than those shown
in Table 1.4.
In Table 1.8, I present OLS estimates and Probit marginal effects for the Child
outcomes, which show that the probability of being in a non-consensual marriage
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decreases the likelihood of achieving higher scores in cognitive tests of reading and
mathematics by 2.5 and 2.9% points (OLS) and by 3.3 and 3.5% points (Probit),
respectively. Then, I estimate these equations after conditioning on state-year and
district fixed effects among other controls and these results are shown in Table 1.18, ap-
pendix A.1. for child outcomes. These estimates are similar in sign and the magnitude
of these effects is slightly higher in comparison to the estimates in 1.8, obtained without
conditioning on state-year and district fixed effects. Results in Table 1.18 show that
mother’s non-consensual marriage negatively affects the child’s probability to perform
better on all three dimensions of cognitive skills by 2.7, 3.5 and 2.8% points (OLS)in rea.
First Stage Estimation
Table 1.5 shows the results of OLS and Probit regressions of NCM over the set of
instruments Zd and the set of covariates, X, estimated over the sample of married
women. As instruments, I include the average of Sexratio.1981 and Sexratio.1991,
female politicians in 1991 and 1980, Sexratio.1981 and its squared term, (to capture
the non-linearity in the sex ratio observed in Figure 1.2). The average Sexratio.1981-
1991 is significant at the 10% level. An increase in the average sex ratio leads to 0.1%
point decline in the probability of non-consensual marriage. This would seem plausible
since the increase in the number of girls (per thousand boys) would imply lower son
preference bias and may lead to decline in non-consensual marriage for women.
Female politicians.1991 is statistically significant at the 10% level as shown in
Table 1.5, columns (1b)-(2b). An increase in the number of female politicians decreases
the probability of non-consensual marriages of women. The F-test of joint significance
in columns (1b)-(2b) is 1.34 and 1.18 which is below the critical values reported in
Stock et al. (2002) which may be a cause of concern due to the loss of precision in IV
estimates. However, studies by Hahn and Hausman (2003), Cruz and Moreira (2005)
and Angrist and Pischke (2008, p. 215) have acknowledged that the use of first stage
F-statistic to assess the quality of the instruments has important limitations. The
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size and power of the test are sensitive to the explanatory power of the instruments
and also to the degree of endogeneity of the explanatory variable (Hall et al., 1996).
The critical values obtained in Stock et al. (2002) are for a continuous endogenous
variable using two-stage least squares estimation. While in my case, I have a binary
endogenous variable and the non-linear two stage IV approach (explained earlier) is
the favoured approach. For this case, the predicted value, M̂j is used as an instrument
and it is statistically significant at 5%, 10% and 1% and the first stage F-statistic is
10.47.
Mother’s Outcomes
The sample used in this analysis is restricted to women in the age group 18-49.
Mother’s outcomes are womens responses to questions on violence, asked to assess
gender roles in the community. These questions are at the community level, where
the female respondent is asked whether it is usual for husbands to beat their wives
in the following situations: (i) if she goes without telling him; (ii) if her natal family
does not give expected money, jewellery or other items; (iii) if she neglects the house
or the children; (iv) if she does not cook food properly; (v) if he suspects her of
having relations with other men. Two aggregated indicators for beating are: (vi)
if any of the five incidences of violence occurs and (vii) if it is usual for all five
incidences to occur. In all regressions, I control for individual covariates such as age
at marriage, whether first marriage, if husband is from the same village, same caste,
whether husband is related, education and age of the respondent and her husband,
number of children, total income, residence and demographic controls such as caste, re-
ligion and region. Standard errors are clustered at the household level for all equations.
In Table 1.6, IV-2SLS and non linear IV-GMM estimates for Mother’s outcomes
are reported. The optimal Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is applied with a
weighting matrix that is optimal when the error term is heteroskedastic. Effects are
presented in terms of coefficient estimates and their standard errors. The primary
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variable of interest is non-consensual marriage denoted NCM, and IV-GMM estimates
differ substantially from 2SLS in terms of coefficients as well as standard errors. 2SLS
exhibits very large standard errors, almost more than twice those of IV-GMM which
shows that IV-GMM has gains in precision. These two sets of estimates will not be
similar since the IV-GMM estimates are obtained from a slightly different procedure
which involves a non-linear first stage, whereas the 2SLS estimates are from the
standard IV procedure with a linear first stage.
I find significant effects of non-consensual marriage on women’s responses for all
incidences of violence, including the aggregated indicators based on the non-linear
IV-GMM estimates. The probability of the respondent being in a non-consensual
marriage raises her probability of answering ‘yes’ to questions on incidences of violence
at the community level. This increase in probability of an affirmative response is
particularly higher for the question which asks if it is usual to beat in case of not re-
ceiving cash or jewellery from her natal family. This is indicative of a lower bargaining
position of the women, through not receiving any unearned income from her natal
family. The effect on whether it is usual to beat if the wife leaves is 24% points (pp),
58.6% points if she does not receive cash or jewellery from her natal family, 23.4%
points if the husband suspects her of having relations with other men. Aggregated
responses indicate that the probability of a woman to experience violence from her
husband, increases by almost 22.6% points if women are in a non-consensual marriage.
The standard 2SLS estimates show that being in a non-consensual marriage raises the
probability of violence by a 91% point if the cash or jewellery is not received from
the wife’s natal family and by 65% point if the husband suspects her of having any
extra-marital affair. However, these estimates show that the probability of violence if
the wife does not cook food properly decreases which is very different in terms of sign,
from OLS and non-linear IV-GMM estimates. Overall the IV estimates are very large
with large standard errors which may reflect limited variation in the instrumental
variables.
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Reduced form estimates in Table 1.7 show a negative effect of sex ratio on the
responses to violence by 0.1% points. On comparison of the IV with OLS (Table
1.4), the baseline OLS estimates are statistically significant throughout and much
lower than the IV estimates. OLS estimates show a positive bias, that women in a
non-consensual marriage are prone to violence for reasons other than non-consensual
marriage.
Child Outcomes
Table 1.9 presents IV estimates for non-consensual marriage which is instrumented
using the average sex ratio for 1981 and 1991. The dependent variables are child
outcomes in reading, maths and writing. In the surveyed sample, reading, maths and
writing tests were administered to children in the age group 8-11 years. The test
score outcomes (except writing score) have been divided into two categories where 0
indicates a low score and 1 indicates a high score.
The IV-2SLS results show that the probability of a mother being in a non-consensual
marital union has no significant impact on the probability of her child achieving a
high score in reading, maths or even writing tests. Certainly these are very different
from the nonlinear IV-GMM estimates since they are obtained by different procedures.
Columns (4-6) of Table 1.9 shows that mothers being in a non-consensual marriage
decreases the probability of securing a high score in reading by almost 21% points,
maths by 35% points and writing by 17% points. Same as before, the non-linear
IV-GMM estimates are lower and gives more compact standard errors.
In comparison, the baseline OLS results in Table 1.8 indicate a significantly nega-
tive impact of the probability of being in a non-consensual marriage on the propensity
to achieve a high score in maths and reading for children. The IV estimates are larger
than the OLS ones both in terms of coefficients and standard errors and this finding
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is consistent with the literature on instrumental variable regressions.
There will be families which will always be heavily biased towards sons and there-
fore will not be affected by declining trends in sex ratios (caused by female foeticide
or neglect of girls) or even the number of female politicians in their constituency.
These could be families with highly patriarchal mindsets. On the other hand, there
are families which are open to having girls, irrespective of trends in sex ratios or
number of female politicians. Thus, the changes in sex ratios would only affect a
part of the population whose attitudes towards females is positively influenced by the
increase in sex ratios (more women than men) or by the presence of female politicians
in their constituency, but would otherwise favour males. Therefore, these are the
set of compliers, that is, the families where girls and women in general are perhaps
given an almost equal say as men, and the female gender is not discriminated against.
Using an instrumental variable strategy has allowed for the identification of a local
average treatment effects relating to the set of female respondents affected by the
instrument which are the “compliers”. The IV estimates reveal that those respondents
in a non-consensual marriage are the ones who presumably grew up experiencing
gender bias or discrimination in their households, the same attitudes that must have
led to manipulation of sex ratio. A lower sex ratio (more males than females) implies
greater preference for the male child and this could reflect in the orientation towards
women in the household, manifesting itself through the responses to questions on
violence.
IV estimates for Child Outcomes reveals that children of mothers in non-consensual
marriages face a lower probability to achieve higher score in mathematics. Thus, a
marriage without consent on the choice of spouse for the female respondents (i.e
mothers) represents a vital input into their child’s cognitive development, particularly
from this analysis, it affects their ability to perform well in tests, especially maths
and reading. Further comparison, with estimates for the effect of fully-consensual
marriages (Tables 1.19, 1.20) and partial consensual marriages (Tables 1.21, 1.22) on
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mothers and child outcomes reveal a contrasting evidence. Women in fully consensual
marriages (FCM ) and partial-consensual marriages (PCM ) are less likely to answer
affirmatively to questions on gender-violence. Moreover, their children from mothers
in these marriages have a higher probability to obtain higher scores in cognitive tests
of reading, maths and writing.
Robustness Exercises
Stability of results: I examine stability of the results by using other potential in-
struments and report results in Table 1.11. In Panel A, non-consensual marriage is
instrumented using the set of instruments for 1991, which are sex ratio at birth in 1991
and the number of female politicians in 1991. Panel B presents estimates using sex
ratio at birth in 1981 and number of female politicians in 1980. Both sets of results
demonstrate a positive effect of non-consensual marriage on affirmative reponses to
instances of wife-beating. Furthermore, in Table 1.12 columns (1-3) and columns (4-6)
show estimates using the set of instruments for 1991 and 1981, respectively. These
results show a negative effect of non-consensual marriage on cognitive outcomes of
children particularly in mathematics by almost 30% points, while there are no effects
observed in reading or writing. This confirms the main results and provides support to
the widely held phenomenon of son preference bias that is reflected in the manipulated
sex ratios at birth across India.
In another related exercise, I control for state fixed effects and present estimates
in Tables 1.13 and 1.14, repectively. The probability of being in a non-consensual
marriage increases the likelihood of wife-beating, if cash or jewellery are not received
from the natal home. This supports the earlier findings, however, no effects are
observed on cognitive achievement of children.
Falsification Test: A paper by Pizer (2015) recommends using a falsification test
to check if it is likely that the exclusion restriction holds. By using a predetermined
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variable such as the womens age at menarche, this test can be performed which is
shown in Table 1.15. Menarche, is perceived as the marker of a girl’s readiness for
marriage and motherhood. A higher sex ratio at the time of marriage may induce
families to give their daughters in marriage earlier, especially if the girl had already
experienced menarche. I test the relationship and find no association between sex
ratio and age at menarche (Table 1.15). This lends some support to the hypothesis
that the exclusion restriction holds in this case.
Heterogenous Effects
I investigate whether the effect on non-consensual marriage on cognitive outcomes of
children, varies depending upon child’s gender, caste, place of residence, whether rural
or urban, and socio-economic status of the household. Table 1.16 presents instrumental
variable results for these aforementioned sub-samples.
Child’s gender: Panel A shows the results for girls and boys separately. Estimates
are obtained by executing the IV equation1.3 for Child outcomes separately for both
genders. Girls have a greater likelihood of performing poorly on the overall cognitive
tests. The magnitude of these effects is large. Mother being in a non-consensual
marriage reduces their probability of obtaining higher scores in reading, maths and
writing, by 30% points, 38% points and 24% points, respectively. In contrast, boys
have a lower likelihood of performing well in mathematics, and there are no effects on
reading or writing scores. Also, the decrease in probability of achieving high scores
in maths for girls is much higher than that for boys (23.3% points). This suggests
that girls are particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of non-consensual marriage.
Caste: The caste system in India exists across societies all over India. Panel B
shows results by four caste groups where the lower most caste groups are those of
scheduled castes (SC), scheduled tribes (ST) and other backward classes (OBC), while
the general category includes the high caste groups and all the other caste categories.
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Children from lower caste groups, especially SC and OBC have a lower propensity to
perform well in maths. This decrease is of almost 40% points for those from SC and
27% points for those from OBC. Reading scores are also negatively affected, by 20%
points for those belonging to OBC. However, there are no effects observed for those
classified in the general caste category.
Residence: There are considerable differences between rural and urban areas within
India. Children from households located in rural areas have a lower tendency to
achieve higher scores in mathematics by almost 35% points. There are no significant
effects for children from urban areas. This could be because children from urban areas
have access to better learning resources and this could have weakened the negative
effect of non-consensual marriages on these children.
Socio-economic status (SES): The IHDS provides information on population by
income quintiles, ranked from 0 (negative income); 1 (poorest) to 5 (affluent). I classify
the bottom two quintiles as low-SES, the third and fourth quintiles as medium-SES
and two highest quintiles as high-SES. 45.2% of those in non-consensual marriage
belong to low-SES and 45.6% are in medium-SES households, while 33% are from
high-SES homes. Children from families in low and medium SES households have
lower propensity to perform well in maths, with the decrease in low-SES families
(61.3% points) observed to be much higher and stronger as compared to medium-SES
households (23.2% points), but there are no effects for those from high-SES families.
This provides support to the earlier finding on rural households, which taken together
may be driven by children in high-SES and urban families having access to avail-
able assets that children living in rural and low, medium-SES households cannot afford.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper offers a novel investigation of the effects of arranged marriages on marital
life and child development. In India, the practise of arranged marriages is a legitimate
way of finding a mate. Nevertheless, over time there has been a considerable variation
in the extent of parental involvement. The paper delivers estimates on the effects of
non-consensual marital union of women on children’s cognitive development, and the
effect on womens responses to questions on domestic violence. In doing so, it exploits
the variation in sex ratio as a way to proxy for the type of marriage. Male biased sex
ratios are a cause of concern in India, due to the son preference behaviours of parents,
mainly arising from the costs of dowry10, which have led to the manipulation of sex
ratio. By capturing the gender-role attitudes, sex ratios are informative of whether
a society is patrilocal or not, and this would certainly affect the type of marriage
arrangements.
Using the India Human Development Survey (IHDS) dataset for 2004-2005, I
find supportive evidence of non-consensual marriage on positive responses to possible
incidences of wife-beating among women. In particular, the estimated impact on
violence associated with not receiving cash or jewellery from the wife’s natal family
is higher, relative to other cases (fully consensual or partially consensual marriages).
Effects on cognitive development of children mainly indicate the decreasing likelihood
of them achieving a high score in reading, mathematics and writing if their mothers
are in a non-consensual marital union. The effects on children are observed to be
stronger for daughters rather than sons, families belonging to low caste groups, living
in rural areas and from low and medium socioeconomic households. On the other
hand, results differ for women who are in a fully consensual marriage or in a partially
consensual marriage. Women in partially consensual marriage or fully consensual
marriages show a positive effect on childrens likelihood to perform better at tests,
while a negative effect is observed on their responses to violence.
10as shown by Bhalotra et al. (2016)
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Although this study is one of the first attempts to estimate the effects of arranged
marriages on child development for India, there are a few valuable extensions that rely
on data improvements. First, this study disregards the role played by fathers, this
is due to data unavailability, as the IHDS does not collect marital history data for
men. Knowing the involvement of fathers would further the understanding on early
child development. Second, the current study uses cross-section information from
the first wave of the IHDS, one of the desirable extensions would be to include the
recent wave, as well as examine the impact of child outcomes beyong age 11. Third,
an individual’s height has been linked to life expectancy, cognitive performance and
socioeconomic status (Thomas and Strauss, 1997) as well as health and survival of
children (Bhalotra and Rawlings, 2011). Future work would like to examine the impact
of type of marriage on stature.
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Table 1.5 First Stage Regressions, Dependent variable: No Consent Marriage
OLS Probit
Variables (1a) (2a) (1b) (2b)
Sex ratio 81_91 -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female Pols. 1991 -0.011 -0.011 -0.011* -0.011*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Sex ratio.1981 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Sex ratio.19812 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Female Pols. 1980 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Marriage age -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.018***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First marriage 0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.005
(0.070) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066)
Mother 18-25 yrs -0.053 -0.054 -0.045 -0.045
(0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058)
Mother 26-33 yrs -0.026 -0.028 -0.023 -0.023
(0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
Mother 34-41 yrs -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
No.of children 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Prim.Educ mother -0.023 -0.024 -0.013 -0.013
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
Sec.Educ mother -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.084*** -0.084***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
High.Educ mother -0.099*** -0.100*** -0.111*** -0.111***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037)
Same village -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.083*** -0.083***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Same caste 0.015 0.014 0.007 0.007
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Husband-related 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.121*** 0.121***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022)
Econ. status better -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Econ. status worse -0.094*** -0.095*** -0.081*** -0.080***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Father 23-33 yrs 0.147 0.147 0.123 0.123
(0.103) (0.103) (0.096) (0.096)
Father 34-44 yrs 0.141 0.141 0.119 0.119
(0.101) (0.101) (0.094) (0.094)
Father 45-55 yrs 0.163 0.161 0.142 0.142
(0.101) (0.101) (0.093) (0.093)
Prim.Educ father -0.027 -0.027 -0.019 -0.019
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Sec.Educ father 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
High.Educ father 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.009
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Total Income(Logs) -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.040***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Rural 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Other controls y y y y
Observations 4,974 4,974 4,974 4,974
F-stat 1.34 1.18 10.47
Log likelihood -2808 -2808 -2643 -2618
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Probit estimates are marginal effects and their standard
errors. The F-stat figures in columns 1b and 2b are for the predicted M̂j . Other controls include dummies for
region-north, south, east, west and central (central as the reference category); religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh
and Others (Others as the reference category); caste-SC, ST, OBC, General and Others (general as the reference
category).
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Table 1.7 Reduced form: Mother’s Outcomes, OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-Marital All 5 Any 5
Sex Ratio 81_91 -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female Pols. 1991 0.008 0.007 0.017** 0.028*** -0.003 -0.001 0.016***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Sex Ratio 1981 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002** -0.003*** 0.004*** 0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sex Ratio 19812 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000* -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female Pols. 1980 -0.001 0.042*** -0.012 0.007 0.014 0.012 -0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
Observations 4,988 4,987 4,992 4,992 4,980 4,988 4,989
All other controls y y y y y y y
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All controls included such as marital history of mother, couple-
specific factors and other demographic controls. Marital history of the mother includes- age at marriage, if first marriage,
whether husband is from the same village, same caste, if husband is related and economic status of the natal family at
the time of marriage whether same, better or worse with same as the reference category. Demographic controls include
residence-whether rural or urban, dummies for region-north, south, east, west and central (central as the reference category);
religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others (Others as the reference category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others
(Others as the reference category).
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Table 1.8 Baseline Results: Child Outcomes
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.025* -0.029** -0.007 -0.033** -0.035** -0.006
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014)
Age 9 0.151*** 0.128*** 0.111*** 0.184*** 0.160*** 0.126***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Age 10 0.232*** 0.204*** 0.168*** 0.277*** 0.254*** 0.187***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Age 11 0.311*** 0.275*** 0.203*** 0.369*** 0.339*** 0.225***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Female -0.019* -0.041*** -0.028*** -0.024* -0.054*** -0.033***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Marriage age 0.004* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004* 0.005** 0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
1st marriage 0.044 0.104* 0.073 0.059 0.143* 0.080
(0.058) (0.057) (0.062) (0.067) (0.075) (0.058)
Mother 18-25 yrs -0.004 -0.022 0.027 0.001 -0.026 0.024
(0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.059) (0.063) (0.051)
Mother 26-33 yrs 0.017 -0.009 0.022 0.017 -0.021 0.020
(0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.037) (0.038) (0.032)
Mother 34-41 yrs 0.014 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.014
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.032) (0.034) (0.028)
No.of children -0.032*** -0.036*** -0.021*** -0.038*** -0.046*** -0.022***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Prim.Educ mother 0.092*** 0.045* 0.061*** 0.100*** 0.049* 0.060**
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024)
Sec.Educ mother 0.160*** 0.141*** 0.111*** 0.187*** 0.159*** 0.130***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
High.Educ mother 0.196*** 0.173*** 0.139*** 0.273*** 0.231*** 0.226***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.023) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
Same village -0.061*** -0.030* -0.020 -0.074*** -0.036 -0.023
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Same caste 0.037 -0.052** -0.018 0.044 -0.065** -0.021
(0.027) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033) (0.028)
Husband-related -0.014 -0.008 -0.035** -0.020 -0.010 -0.045**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
Econ. status better -0.018 -0.006 -0.001 -0.023 -0.006 -0.002
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016)
Econ. status worse 0.005 -0.021 -0.015 0.002 -0.026 -0.015
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.023)
Father 23-33 yrs 0.026 0.046 -0.044 0.053 0.067 -0.047
(0.083) (0.085) (0.077) (0.100) (0.108) (0.080)
Father 34-44 yrs 0.046 0.060 -0.039 0.075 0.083 -0.041
(0.081) (0.084) (0.075) (0.098) (0.106) (0.078)
Father 45-55 yrs 0.094 0.101 -0.001 0.138 0.137 0.003
(0.080) (0.083) (0.074) (0.097) (0.105) (0.077)
Prim.Educ father 0.049** 0.022 0.046** 0.050** 0.026 0.037*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021)
Sec.Educ father 0.098*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.103*** 0.099*** 0.083***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.016)
High.Educ father 0.133*** 0.145*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 0.181*** 0.166***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.026)
Total Income(Logs) 0.018** 0.030*** 0.006 0.024** 0.038*** 0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
Discuss work/expd/pols 0.055** 0.029 0.013 0.064** 0.033 0.013
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025)
Newspp. 0.103*** 0.089*** 0.103*** 0.114*** 0.103*** 0.092***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015)
Piped water 0.013 -0.006 -0.003 0.017 -0.005 -0.004
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.016)
Own home -0.027 -0.021 -0.020 -0.028 -0.025 -0.020
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Rural -0.021 -0.043*** -0.002 -0.029 -0.056*** -0.005
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017)
Other controls y y y y y y
Observations 6,250 6,216 6,192 6,250 6,216 6,192
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Probit estimates are marginal effects
and their standard errors. Other controls include dummies for region-north, south, east, west and
central(central as the reference category) ; religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others
(Others as the reference category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the reference category).
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Table 1.9 IV estimates: Child Outcomes
2SLS GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.887 -0.747 -0.771 -0.208* -0.351*** -0.169*
(0.563) (0.471) (0.600) (0.113) (0.111) (0.095)
Age 9 0.146*** 0.126*** 0.112*** 0.146*** 0.127*** 0.112***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Age 10 0.240*** 0.206*** 0.179*** 0.237*** 0.205*** 0.178***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Age 11 0.317*** 0.281*** 0.217*** 0.315*** 0.280*** 0.216***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.018)
Female -0.033* -0.051*** -0.035** -0.028** -0.048*** -0.030**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
No.of children -0.005 -0.016 0.004 -0.023*** -0.026*** -0.012*
(0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Marriage age -0.009 -0.006 -0.007 0.001 -0.000 0.002
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
First marriage 0.060 0.105 0.069 0.061 0.105 0.068
(0.085) (0.083) (0.083) (0.064) (0.069) (0.071)
Mother 18-25 yrs -0.066 -0.066 0.015 -0.032 -0.047 0.046
(0.080) (0.077) (0.085) (0.060) (0.064) (0.060)
Mother 26-33 yrs -0.001 -0.020 0.016 0.017 -0.008 0.035
(0.051) (0.046) (0.050) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035)
Mother 34-41 yrs 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.012 0.013
(0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Prim.Educ mother 0.056 0.016 0.021 0.075*** 0.027 0.036
(0.041) (0.035) (0.036) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
Sec.Educ mother 0.087 0.077 0.039 0.148*** 0.113*** 0.092***
(0.058) (0.050) (0.059) (0.023) (0.024) (0.021)
High.Educ mother 0.117 0.111* 0.066 0.186*** 0.151*** 0.125***
(0.072) (0.062) (0.070) (0.032) (0.035) (0.029)
Same village -0.121** -0.098** -0.076 -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.025
(0.054) (0.046) (0.056) (0.022) (0.023) (0.020)
Same caste 0.006 -0.070 -0.005 -0.007 -0.078** -0.019
(0.052) (0.046) (0.045) (0.038) (0.037) (0.032)
Husband-related 0.059 0.026 0.012 0.002 -0.007 -0.038**
(0.054) (0.046) (0.055) (0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Econ. status better -0.067 -0.049 -0.047 -0.026 -0.024 -0.009
(0.041) (0.036) (0.044) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Econ. status worse -0.094 -0.111** -0.081 -0.028 -0.073*** -0.023
(0.065) (0.055) (0.066) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)
Father 23-33 yrs 0.072 0.051 0.006 -0.032 -0.007 -0.089
(0.171) (0.162) (0.159) (0.107) (0.119) (0.088)
Father 34-44 yrs 0.083 0.062 0.002 -0.014 0.008 -0.087
(0.166) (0.158) (0.153) (0.104) (0.116) (0.086)
Father 45-55 yrs 0.150 0.122 0.060 0.041 0.062 -0.037
(0.170) (0.159) (0.158) (0.103) (0.115) (0.085)
Prim.Educ father 0.017 0.000 0.016 0.039 0.013 0.035
(0.036) (0.032) (0.036) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Sec.Educ father 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.100*** 0.091***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
High.Educ father 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.147*** 0.144***
(0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025)
Total Income(Logs) -0.021 0.007 -0.023 0.003 0.021** -0.001
(0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Discuss work/expd/pols 0.020 0.014 -0.026 0.049* 0.031 -0.001
(0.041) (0.036) (0.040) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Newspp. 0.136*** 0.105*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.098*** 0.109***
(0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Piped water -0.001 -0.019 -0.015 0.010 -0.013 -0.004
(0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Own home -0.043 -0.052* -0.013 -0.041* -0.052** -0.013
(0.029) (0.027) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
Rural -0.000 -0.013 0.004 -0.010 -0.018 -0.005
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)
Other controls y y y y y y
Observations 4,901 4,880 4,863 4,901 4,880 4,863
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Other controls include dummies
for region-north, south, east, west and central (central as the reference category); religion-
Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others (others as the reference category); caste-General,
SC, ST, OBC and Others (general as the reference category).
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Table 1.10 Reduced form: Child Outcomes, OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Reading Math Writing
Sex Ratio 81_91 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female Pols. 1991 -0.004 -0.005 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Sex Ratio 1981 0.001 0.002** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sex Ratio 19812 -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female Pols. 1980 -0.009 -0.001 -0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Observations 4,927 4,906 4,889
All other controls y y y
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All
usual controls included- marital history of the mother, child charac-
teristics, parental-specific factors, home environment, demographic
controls.Marital history of the mother includes- age at marriage,
if first marriage, whether husband is from the same village, same
caste, if husband is related and economic status of the natal family
at the time of marriage whether same, better or worse with same as
the reference category. Child characteristics such as age dummies
and gender. Parental-specific factors such as their age at the time
of survey, highest attained education, number of children, total
household income (in logs), if house is owned and has piped water
facility. Home environment includes- if mother reads newspaper
and if parents discuss work, expenditure or politics. Demographic
controls include residence-whether rural or urban, dummies for
region-north, south, east, west and central (central as the reference
category); religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others
(others as the reference category); caste-General, SC, ST, OBC
and Others (general as the reference category).
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Table 1.11 Robustness Checks 1, IV Estimates: Mother’s Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-marr Any 5 All 5
Panel A
NCM 0.138 0.430*** 0.152 0.098 0.329*** 0.331*** 0.034
(0.107) (0.109) (0.106) (0.100) (0.087) (0.081) (0.083)
Observations 5,093 5,092 5,097 5,097 5,085 5,093 5,094
F-stat 11.85
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-marr Any 5 All 5
Panel B
NCM 0.220* 0.531*** 0.110 0.082 0.143 0.143 0.004
(0.130) (0.131) (0.126) (0.118) (0.105) (0.096) (0.094)
Observations 5,311 5,310 5,315 5,315 5,303 5,311
F-stat 10.26
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All usual controls included in all the robustness
exercises- marital history of the mother, couple-specific factors, demographic controls. Marital history of
the mother includes- age at marriage, if first marriage, whether husband is from the same village, same
caste, if husband is related and economic status of the natal family at the time of marriage whether
same, better or worse with same as the reference category. Couple-specific factors include highest level
of education attained, age at the time of survey, number of children. Demographic controls include
residence-whether rural or urban, dummies for region-north, south, east, west and central(central as
the reference category) ; religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others (Others as the reference
category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the reference category).
Table 1.12 Robustness Checks 1, IV estimates: Child Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.133 -0.291*** -0.082 -0.127 -0.308*** -0.111
(0.098) (0.096) (0.086) (0.118) (0.115) (0.093)
Observations 5,017 4,992 4,977 5,243 5,219 5,200
F-stat 11.79 10.14
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All usual controls included- marital history of
the mother, child characteristics, parental-specific factors, home environment, demographic controls.
Table 1.13 Robustness Checks 2, IV estimates: Mothers Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-marr Any 5 All 5
NCM 0.021 0.230** 0.130 -0.081 -0.068 -0.094 -0.090
(0.116) (0.113) (0.113) (0.107) (0.089) (0.086) (0.086)
State FE’s y y y y y y y
Observations 6,197 6,196 6,201 6,201 6,188 6,197 6,197
F-stat - - - 11.06 - - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All usual controls included- marital history of
the mother, couple-specific factors, demographic controls.
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Table 1.14 Robustness Checks 2, IV estimates: Child Outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.040 -0.149 -0.013
(0.102) (0.104) (0.086)
State FE’s y y y
Observations 6,088 6,057 6,037
F-stat - 10.80 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All
usual controls included- marital history of the mother, child charac-
teristics, parental-specific factors, home environment, demographic
controls.
Table 1.15 Robustness checks 3: Falsification Test
(1) (2)
Variables Age at menarche Age at menarche
Sex ratio 1991 -0.001
(0.002)
Sex ratio 19912 0.000
(0.000)
Female politicians 1991 0.010
(0.016)
Sex ratio 1981 -0.003
(0.002)
Sex ratio 19812 0.000
(0.000)
Female politicians 1980 0.042
(0.027)
Observations 5,128 5,349
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All
usual controls included-marital history of the mother, child charac-
teristics, parental-specific factors, home environment, demographic
controls.
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Table 1.16 Heterogeneous Effects: Child Outcomes, IV estimates
PANEL A
Girls Boys
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.304** -0.379*** -0.238* -0.033 -0.233** 0.074
(0.128) (0.132) (0.128) (0.116) (0.110) (0.091)
Observations 2,882 2,865 2,862 3,257 3,242 3,222
PANEL B
SC ST OBC General
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.002 -0.391** -0.058 -0.221 -0.745 -0.115 -0.207* -0.268** -0.000 -0.249 -0.000 -0.139
(0.149) (0.164) (0.154) (0.603) (0.643) (0.551) (0.120) (0.123) (0.117) (0.252) (0.236) (0.229)
Observations 1,436 1,431 1,425 492 488 486 2,450 2,434 2,427 1,761 1,754 1,746
PANEL C
Rural Urban
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.100 -0.348*** -0.134 -0.095 -0.182 0.177
(0.113) (0.105) (0.096) (0.138) (0.143) (0.128)
Observations 4,116 4,098 4,077 2,059 2,045 2,043
PANEL D
LowSES MedSES HighSE(S
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.156 -0.613*** -0.221 -0.161 -0.232* 0.060 0.013 -0.064 0.122
(0.217) (0.231) (0.231) (0.136) (0.137) (0.131) (0.136) (0.136) (0.117)
Observations 1,050 1,045 1,040 2,788 2,774 2,764 2,301 2,288 2,280
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. All
usual controls included as in the IV regressions- marital history of the mother, child characteristics,
parental-specific factors, home environment, demographic controls. Marital history of the mother
includes- age at marriage, if first marriage, whether husband is from the same village, same caste, if
husband is related and economic status of the natal family at the time of marriage whether same,
better or worse with same as the reference category. Child characteristics such as age dummies and
gender. Parental-specific factors such as their age at the time of survey, highest attained education,
number of children, total household income (in logs), if house is owned and has piped water facility.
Home environment includes- if mother reads newspaper and if parents discuss work, expenditure or
politics. Demographic controls include residence-whether rural or urban, dummies for region-north,
south, east, west and central (central as the reference category) ;religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian,
Sikh and Others (Others as the reference category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the
reference category).
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Appendix A.1
Table 1.17 OLS estimates: Mothers Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-marr Any 5 All 5
NCM 0.082*** 0.059*** 0.039** 0.037** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.045***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
State-Year FE’s y y y y y y y
District FE’s y y y y y y y
Observations 6,363 6,361 6,367 6,367 6,354 6,363 6,363
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. This is Table 1.4 now controlling for state-year
and district fixed effects. All usual controls as in Table 1.4 included- marital history of the mother,
couple-specific factors, demographic controls.
Table 1.18 OLS estimates: Child Outcomes
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Reading Math Writing Reading Math Writing
NCM -0.027* -0.035** -0.028* -0.046** -0.053** -0.035*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018)
State-Year FE’s y y y y y y
District FE’s y y y y y y
Observations 6,250 6,216 6,192 6,020 6,032 5,829
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. This is Table 1.7 now controlling for state-year
and district fixed effects. All usual controls as in Table 1.7 included- marital history of the mother, child
characteristics, parental-specific factors, home environment, demographic controls.
In Tables 1.19, 1.20, 1.21 and 1.22, I present results obtained for Mother’s and
children’s outcomes for a fully-consensual marriages (FCM )and partial-consensual mar-
riages (PCM ). A fully-consensual case is where the female respondent had complete say
in the choice of her spouse or married to the person of her choice. A partial-consensual
case is where both the parents and the respondent together have a say in choosing her
spouse.
These results show that the probability of being in a fully-consensual marriage
has a negative and strong impact on the response to questions of violence if the wife
leaves and if she does not cook food properly. I find a significant and positive effect
on children of these mother to score higher in writing. While if the mother is in a
partial-consensual marriage then the propensity to respond affirmatively to responses
on violence significantly decreases for all cases, and strongly increases the children’s
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propensity to score higher in reading and mathematics.
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Table 1.19 IV Estimates 2: Mother’s Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-Marital All 5 Any 5
FCM -0.464*** -0.175 -0.132 -0.329** 0.118 -0.009 -0.235*
(0.152) (0.137) (0.140) (0.137) (0.132) (0.130) (0.121)
Marriage age -0.001 -0.005** -0.000 -0.004** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
First marriage -0.046 -0.008 -0.046 -0.132* 0.025 0.035 -0.028
(0.075) (0.060) (0.064) (0.068) (0.045) (0.045) (0.049)
Mother 18-25 yrs 0.130** 0.091* 0.116** 0.100* -0.017 -0.024 0.104**
(0.056) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.040) (0.038) (0.046)
Mother 26-33 yrs 0.052 0.054 0.114*** 0.043 0.014 0.000 0.078***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027)
Mother 34-41 yrs 0.062** 0.060** 0.102*** 0.072*** 0.019 0.014 0.092***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023)
No.of children 0.008 0.016*** 0.013** 0.007 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.005
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Prim.Educ mother 0.008 0.022 0.026 -0.008 -0.017 -0.029* 0.032
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024)
Sec.Educ mother -0.088*** -0.043** -0.042** -0.044** -0.027** -0.041*** -0.023
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
High.Educ mother -0.164*** -0.086*** -0.059* -0.044 -0.048* -0.069*** -0.042*
(0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023)
Same village -0.030 -0.056*** -0.024 -0.005 -0.064*** -0.044*** -0.022
(0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Same caste -0.032 -0.023 -0.045 -0.009 0.047 0.048 -0.061*
(0.042) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Husband-related -0.014 0.011 -0.033 -0.035* 0.107*** 0.078*** -0.024
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Econ. status better 0.050*** 0.025 0.032* 0.032* 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.023
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.011) (0.015)
Econ. status worse 0.065** 0.099*** 0.042 0.042 0.067*** 0.053*** 0.061***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.016) (0.015) (0.023)
Father 23-33 yrs 0.049 -0.041 0.021 0.118 0.008 0.035 0.074
(0.102) (0.093) (0.095) (0.083) (0.055) (0.054) (0.057)
Father 34-44 yrs 0.028 -0.058 -0.012 0.086 -0.033 -0.007 0.058
(0.100) (0.091) (0.093) (0.081) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Father 45-55 yrs 0.035 -0.050 0.024 0.080 -0.045 -0.035 0.075
(0.099) (0.091) (0.092) (0.080) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
Prim.Educ father -0.057** -0.037 -0.015 -0.029 0.005 0.007 -0.035*
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.021)
Sec.Educ father -0.018 -0.047*** -0.036* -0.048** -0.000 0.005 -0.049***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
High.Educ father 0.005 -0.008 -0.019 -0.034 0.024 0.025 -0.032
(0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
Total Income(Logs) -0.050*** -0.017** -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.022***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Rural 0.021 0.012 0.029* 0.034** 0.003 -0.005 0.022*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Other controls y y y y y y y
Observations 6,062 6,060 6,066 6,066 6,053 6,062 6,062
F-stat - - - 11.11 - - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FCM: Fully Consensual Marriage. Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Other controls include dummies
for region-north, south, east, west and central(central as the reference category) ; religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and
Others (Others as the reference category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the reference category).
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Table 1.20 IV estimates 2: Child Outcomes
Variables Reading Math Writing
FCM -0.129 0.077 0.274**
(0.140) (0.134) (0.127)
Age 9 0.145*** 0.126*** 0.109***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Age 10 0.231*** 0.207*** 0.172***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Age 11 0.308*** 0.277*** 0.207***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Female -0.019 -0.043*** -0.028**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
No.of children -0.033*** -0.035*** -0.019***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Marriage age 0.004** 0.004** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First marriage 0.015 0.089 0.079
(0.058) (0.058) (0.066)
Mother 18-25 yrs -0.013 -0.027 0.027
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052)
Mother 26-33 yrs 0.007 -0.011 0.033
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030)
Mother 34-41 yrs 0.010 0.013 0.013
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Prim.Educ mother 0.088*** 0.048* 0.061***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Sec.Educ mother 0.164*** 0.145*** 0.110***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
High.Educ mother 0.203*** 0.183*** 0.135***
(0.026) (0.028) (0.024)
Same village -0.048** -0.035* -0.039**
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Same caste 0.004 -0.048 0.024
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031)
Husband-related -0.014 -0.014 -0.036**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
Econ. status better -0.015 -0.006 -0.001
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Econ. status worse -0.006 -0.027 -0.017
(0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
Father 23-33 yrs 0.008 0.017 -0.082
(0.084) (0.091) (0.079)
Father 34-44 yrs 0.024 0.030 -0.076
(0.082) (0.089) (0.077)
Father 45-55 yrs 0.068 0.064 -0.030
(0.081) (0.088) (0.076)
Prim.Educ father 0.049** 0.023 0.046**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
Sec.Educ father 0.102*** 0.089*** 0.088***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
High.Educ father 0.134*** 0.145*** 0.146***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)
Total Income(Logs) 0.014* 0.031*** 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Discuss work/expd/pols 0.054** 0.030 0.007
(0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Newspp. 0.107*** 0.082*** 0.096***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Piped water 0.014 -0.007 -0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Own home -0.027 -0.023 -0.019
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Rural -0.017 -0.042** -0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Other controls y y y
Observations 5,958 5,927 5,904
F-stat - 10.90 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
FCM: Fully Consensual Marriage. Standard errors clustered at household
level in parentheses. Other controls include dummies for region-north,
south, east, west and central (central as the reference category); religion-
Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others (Others as the reference
category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the reference
category).
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Table 1.21 IV Estimates 3: Mother’s Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Leave Cash/jwry Neglect home Badcook Extra-Marital All 5 Any 5
PCM -0.272** -0.564*** -0.337*** -0.272** -0.482*** -0.463*** -0.117
(0.121) (0.138) (0.123) (0.110) (0.101) (0.093) (0.091)
Marriage age 0.002 0.003 0.004* -0.001 -0.000 0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First marriage 0.027 0.072 0.003 -0.071 0.068 0.087* 0.007
(0.066) (0.062) (0.064) (0.065) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
Mother 18-25 yrs 0.119** 0.064 0.104* 0.084 -0.039 -0.048 0.096**
(0.055) (0.059) (0.056) (0.054) (0.043) (0.042) (0.045)
Mother 26-33 yrs 0.079** 0.079** 0.126*** 0.061* 0.026 0.018 0.088***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.032) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Mother 34-41 yrs 0.071** 0.067** 0.106*** 0.079*** 0.018 0.016 0.096***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.028) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
No.of children 0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.000 0.006 0.006 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Prim.Educ mother 0.026 0.058* 0.048* 0.012 0.009 -0.002 0.041*
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.024)
Sec.Educ mother -0.067*** 0.007 -0.013 -0.020 0.021 0.005 -0.014
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
High.Educ mother -0.137*** -0.020 -0.021 -0.015 0.012 -0.012 -0.031
(0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026)
Same village -0.045** -0.045** -0.019 -0.013 -0.040** -0.028 -0.030*
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Same caste 0.014 0.003 -0.023 0.023 0.049 0.060* -0.039
(0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Husband-related -0.017 -0.009 -0.042* -0.041** 0.079*** 0.053*** -0.023
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Econ. status better 0.057*** 0.046** 0.046** 0.040** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.026*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Econ. status worse 0.078*** 0.126*** 0.056** 0.052* 0.099*** 0.084*** 0.060***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.029) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
Father 23-33 yrs -0.018 -0.137 -0.037 0.059 -0.064 -0.041 0.044
(0.106) (0.107) (0.101) (0.091) (0.074) (0.071) (0.057)
Father 34-44 yrs -0.028 -0.145 -0.064 0.035 -0.097 -0.074 0.032
(0.104) (0.105) (0.099) (0.089) (0.072) (0.070) (0.054)
Father 45-55 yrs -0.005 -0.127 -0.022 0.041 -0.105 -0.094 0.056
(0.103) (0.105) (0.098) (0.087) (0.071) (0.069) (0.053)
Prim.Educ father -0.047* -0.018 -0.002 -0.020 0.020 0.022 -0.032
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021)
Sec.Educ father -0.021 -0.049** -0.038** -0.052*** 0.001 0.005 -0.053***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015)
High.Educ father 0.002 -0.013 -0.023 -0.038 0.022 0.022 -0.035*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019) (0.021)
Total Income(Logs) -0.035*** 0.007 -0.023** -0.021** -0.002 -0.005 -0.015**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
Rural 0.035** 0.028 0.038** 0.044*** 0.011 0.005 0.029**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Other controls y y y y y y y
Observations 6,249 6,247 6,253 6,253 6,240 6,249 6,249
F-stat - - - 8.86 - - -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
PCM: Partial Consensual Marriage. Standard errors clustered at household level in parentheses. Other controls include
dummies for region-north, south, east, west and central (central as the reference category); religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian,
Sikh and Others (Others as the reference category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the reference category).
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Table 1.22 IV estimates 3: Child Outcomes
Variables Reading Math Writing
PCM 0.250** 0.311*** 0.062
(0.122) (0.114) (0.101)
Age 9 0.153*** 0.134*** 0.115***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Age 10 0.233*** 0.206*** 0.170***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Age 11 0.318*** 0.286*** 0.209***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017)
Female -0.018 -0.042*** -0.027**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
No.of children -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.020***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Marriage age 0.000 0.000 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
First marriage 0.000 0.051 0.046
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Mother 18-25 yrs -0.000 -0.019 0.030
(0.052) (0.055) (0.051)
Mother 26-33 yrs -0.001 -0.029 0.015
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030)
Mother 34-41 yrs 0.007 0.008 0.009
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026)
Prim.Educ mother 0.083*** 0.035 0.062***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Sec.Educ mother 0.137*** 0.114*** 0.105***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.020)
High.Educ mother 0.171*** 0.144*** 0.133***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.027)
Same village -0.063*** -0.041** -0.024
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Same caste 0.010 -0.072** 0.001
(0.029) (0.030) (0.026)
Husband-related -0.000 0.003 -0.035**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Econ. status better -0.025 -0.020 -0.003
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Econ. status worse -0.011 -0.041* -0.020
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
Father 23-33 yrs 0.040 0.059 -0.064
(0.094) (0.104) (0.080)
Father 34-44 yrs 0.057 0.069 -0.060
(0.092) (0.102) (0.078)
Father 45-55 yrs 0.098 0.097 -0.026
(0.090) (0.101) (0.077)
Prim.Educ father 0.042* 0.015 0.048**
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Sec.Educ father 0.103*** 0.092*** 0.096***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
High.Educ father 0.137*** 0.146*** 0.150***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.022)
Total Income(Logs) 0.006 0.016* 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Discuss work/expd/pols 0.044* 0.015 0.006
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Newspp. 0.110*** 0.093*** 0.100***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Piped water 0.009 -0.015 -0.003
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Own home -0.030 -0.028 -0.021
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019)
Rural -0.022 -0.050*** -0.005
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015)
Other controls y y y
Observations 6,139 6,107 6,084
F-stat - 8.82 -
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
PCM: Partial Consensual Marriage. Standard errors clustered at house-
hold level in parentheses. Other controls include dummies for region-
north, south, east, west and central (central as the reference category);
religion-Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and Others (Others as the refer-
ence category); caste-SC, ST, OBC and Others (Others as the reference
category, which includes those in general category as well).
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Table 1.23 Regional Differences in Type of Marriage
Type of Marriage North South East West Central Total
Full-consensual 0.022 0.055 0.094 0.055 0.009 395
Partial-consensual 0.462 0.829 0.437 0.712 0.401 4,802
Non-consensual 0.516 0.116 0.468 0.234 0.590 3,616
Total 1,973 1,627 1,897 1,253 2,130
Table 1.24 Sex Ratio Statistics by Region
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Region
Sex Ratio 1981
849.812 52.837 671 933 North
944.599 40.678 886 1144 South
854.215 80.548 523 1020 East
900.436 43.759 772 1204 West
866.085 62.838 411 971 Central
Sex Ratio 1991
864.781 36.759 736 929 North
956.882 39.093 886 1141 South
872.747 61.754 581 1003 East
901.387 70.086 388 1115 West
879.746 37.984 744 992 Central
Sex Ratio 2001
863.649 40.998 587 927 North
972.905 39.908 893 1147 South
898.939 50.72 327 1043 East
908.806 47.003 757 1173 West
891.722 42.701 664 991 Central
N=8,880
Chapter 2
Assortative Mating, Marital
Stability and the Role of Business
Cycles
2.1 Introduction
Various literatures have identified the strong negative correlation between divorce and
a wide range of outcomes. Among them are Kitson and Morgan (1990), Amato (2000).
In particular divorced individuals have lower economic well-being , lower psychological
welfare and perform worse on health aspects.1 Families, especially children are greatly
affected by the consequences of divorce as shown by Allison and Furstenberg (1989);
Gruber (2004). These studies have found that children of divorced parents tend to
have lower educational attainment, lower incomes, marry earlier, separate often and
have higher probability of committing suicide. The effects of marital dissolution on
behaviour, psychological distress and academic performance are pervasive and long
lasting. And these effects are larger for children who are very young at the time of
dissolution as shown by Allison and Furstenberg (1989).
In light of this, efforts have been made to identify causes of marital instability.
One of the causes is macro-level indicators such as unemployment or insufficient
1Aasve et al. (2007), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) , Richards et al. (1997)
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earnings as documented by Cherlin (1992) and others2, men’s declining labour market
opportunities (Oppenheimer 1997 and Ruggles 1997), rising inflation (Nunley, 2010)
and weakening consumer confidence (Fischer and Liefbroer, 2006). A recession can
affect marital stability in two main ways. First, economic hardship caused by factors
such as job loss, home foreclosures, wage declines, adds financial stress and marital
unhappiness which could subsequently increase the risk of marital dissolution3. Second,
economic barriers make divorce costly due to legal fees, rising cost of housing and
childcare costs resulting from decreasing economies of scale. These associated costs
of divorce may bring couples together to improve their relationship and become re-
silient (Ogburn and Thomas 1922; Wilcox 2009; Amato and Beattie 2011; Cohen 2014).
This paper contributes to one strand of the economic literature that studies whether
certain combinations of spouses characteristics can explain the likelihood of divorce.
Previous literature, mainly by Becker (1974); Becker et al. (1977); Ermisch (2003) has
documented that in a marriage market, the competition for spouse leads to sorting
of mates by education, wealth, attractiveness leading to positive (mating of likes)
versus negative (mating of unlikes) mating. Shared gains from marriage depend on
the traits of each spouse. A lot of work in this area can be found in the sociological
literature. Both disciplines have focused on four dimensions which are: age at marriage,
education, ethnicity and religious denomination and evidence shows that assortative
mating along these lines is important for a successful duration of marriage.4
In this study, I test the relation between spouses characteristics and the probability
of dissolution using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1968-2011. In addition
to this, I test if this relation between spouses varies with the state of the economy.
This analysis addresses two questions: Do spouses with similar traits have a lower
probability of exiting their marriage? Does this vary with being in a recession or not?
Obtaining answers to these questions could be a step in the attempt to understand
2Conger et al. (1990); Liem and Liem (1990)
3See Conger and Elder (1994); Hardie and Lucas. (2010); White and Rogers (2000); Bumpass
et al. (1991); Jensen and Smith (1990) Jalovaara (2003) and Hansen (2005)
4See Becker et al. (1977); Kalmijn (1998); Weiss and Willis (1997); Frimmel et al. (2013)
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factors affecting marital stability. More importantly, determining if assortatively mated
couples are affected by business cycle fluctuations, could be an important component
in understanding stability of marriages. This will enhance discerning factors affecting
divorce, in particular the well-being of the vulnerable population.
This paper presents descriptive evidence to suggest factors affecting marital disso-
lution. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to uncover the relation
between assortative mating and the risk of dissolution taking into account the role of
business cycles. The findings suggest that higher education at marriage and mixed
ethnicity greatly increases the couples hazard of ending their marriages. In contrast,
race and religiousness have a very stabilizing effect on the hazard of dissolution.
Two papers closely related to the current study are that of Weiss and Willis (1997);
Frimmel et al. (2013). The latter, shows that changes in assortative mating patterns
along the four dimensions are not responsible for the increasing marital instability in
Austria. The former, in the context of search theory, investigates the role of surprises
consisting of changes in predicted earning capacity of either spouse using the National
Longitudinal Survey of 1972 for the United States.
2.2 Literature Review
The body of research has long speculated the influence of economic changes on social
conditions. It was noted by Willcox as early as 1893 that divorce rate is influenced by
business conditions.5 Low divorce rates observed in 1873-79 and 1884-86 were periods
of depression in trade for the United States. However, there is little empirical evidence
on whether such a link exists. Amato and Beattie (2011) conduct state-level analysis
of divorce rates on unemployment rates using vital statistics from 1960-2005 at five
year intervals, controlling for state and year fixed effects. The authors find evidence
of pro-cyclical divorce in the period starting after 1980. They find the magnitude of
their estimated effect to be very large and statistically significant although with large
5 Willcox (1893)
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standard errors possibly due to the few years of data in their analysis (Hellerstein and
Morrill, 2010). Arkes and Shen (2013) use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY)1979 to study pro-cyclicality of divorce for this cohort and do not find evidence
of pro-cyclicality. Hellerstein and Morrill (2010) using data from the Bureau of Labour
Statistics for 1976-2009, examine the impact of macroeconomic conditions on marital
stability by approximating macroeconomic conditions with the state unemployment
rates. Controlling for state and year fixed effects and state-specific time dummies,
they find that divorce is pro-cyclical over the period in their study. Their results
are robust to two alternative measures of macroeconomic conditions, namely log per
capita income and state per capita GDP.
Some studies have examined how economic factors affect divorce rates using macro-
level economic variables to avoid endogeneity of economic outcomes. South and
Messner, 1986 estimated a time series model for divorce rates for the period 1948-79.
He found that higher national unemployment rate and lower Gross National Product
growth are associated with higher divorce rates suggesting counter-cyclical divorce
rates. Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) use data from the Netherlands and also find a neg-
ative relationship between consumer confidence and marital dissolution rates, implying
counter-cyclicality of dissolution rates. In contrast, Ruggles (1997) using data from
eleven censuses, 1880 to 1990, found that higher female labour force participation and
greater growth in nonfarm employment were related to higher divorce rates indicating
pro-cyclical divorce rates. Another study by Ono (1998) measured marriage histories
over the period 1950-87 using the Current Population Survey data from 1980, 1985
and 1990. This study found a positive effect of husbands’ and wives’ national median
income on probability of separation, again suggesting pro-cyclical divorce rates. Using
data from the British Household Panel Survey (1991-98) Böheim and Ermisch (2001)
study the role of economic circumstances on the marital dissolution. They show that
unexpected improvements in finances substantially reduces the dissolution risk, their
results strongly support the importance of new information in decisions concerning
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partnership dissolution.
A potential shortcoming of South and Messner (1986) as noted by Arkes and
Shen (2013) is that there were no cohort or period controls included other than the
Korean and Vietnam wars, so there could be a problem of incidental correlation
between unemployment rate and any cohort or period effect. The two authors have
also pointed out that Ruggles (1997) and Ono (1998) did not use any geographical
controls, thus their results have possibly been affected by unobserved heterogeneity.
This would imply that areas with higher incomes had higher divorce rates due to
spurious correlation of certain factors with income. Hellerstein and Morrill (2010)
have argued that by using national level time series data, South and Messner (1986)
and Fischer and Liefbroer (2006) are unable to identify spurious correlations and are
unable to control for changes in divorce rates and the economy.
The increase in divorces in prosperity and decline in depression is interesting.
The relevant literature concludes that it is theoretically ambiguous whether and how
divorce rates vary with the business cycle. There is no clear prediction if marital
dissolution rates should be pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical or even if they should vary
systematically over the business cycle (Hellerstein and Morrill, 2010). It has been
argued that recession leads to rising stress levels and therefore increases the risk of
marital dissolution. On the other hand, due to the increase in economic costs of
divorce, couples may choose to keep their differences aside and either put off their
decision to divorce completely or postpone it to later time. 6
The factors affecting dissolution also depend on the traits of each spouse. In
general, people have a tendency to choose partners with a similar social background.
Sociologists such as Hendrickx et al. (1991), Kalmijn (1998) and Mare (1991) have
studied assortative mating with respect to social backgrounds such as education, class,
religion, ethnicity, age, among others.7 Economic theory, following Becker et al. (1977)
6Amato and Beattie (2011)
7The three authors have predominantly focused on assortative mating in people’s first marriages
or cohabiting unions
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and Weiss and Willis (1997), regards marriage as a voluntary partnership for the
purpose of joint production and consumption including the production of children.
The marriage market determines the assignment of partners and the sharing gains
of marriage (Becker, 1993). The expected gains from marriage depend on the traits
of each spouse. The interaction between these characteristics induces assortative
mating. Economists have shown that an efficient marriage market is characterized
by the match of spouses with similar characteristics such as intelligence, physical
attractiveness (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007). Such a matching process of likes, known
as positive assortative mating increases complementarities in household production
and may boost intergenerational persistence of wealth, income, education and other
economic outcomes. On the other hand, negative assortative mating, matching of
unlikes is optimal for traits that are substitutes in household production, for example,
wage earning power. Positive assortative mating refers to a positive correlation in
sorting between the values of traits of husbands and wives.
2.3 Data and estimation strategy
For the analysis in this paper, I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
of United States (PSID) covering the period of 1968-2011. The long time span of the
dataset allows for analyses of business cycles that have occurred between 1968-2011,
which is particularly useful for the current study. The marriage history file of the
PSID provides records for individuals of marriage-eligible age which contain all known
cumulative data about the timing and circumstances of his or her marriages up to
and including 2011. This file contains details about marriage events of eligible people
living in a PSID family at the time of the interview in any wave between 1985 and the
most recent wave in 2011. This includes marriages prior to 1985 as provided through
restrospective reports. Data obtained on variables such as number of marriages,
beginning and end dates for the first and most recent marriages, marital status of
the individual at the time of the most recent interview. The number of individuals
reporting more than two marriages is 3844, 2663 report all their marriages and 1181
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do not.
This analysis is restricted only to individuals in their first marriages, thus there
are 8,329 couple, of these, 1,687 have been married before the start of the survey in
1968 and the remaining 6,642 enter their first marriage in or after 1968. So, there is a
stock sample (those married before start of survey in 1968) with follow up and a flow
sample (those married in or after 1968). In order to take account of length-biased
sampling, there is a need to condition on the fact that the couples who have survived
sufficiently long in the state to be at risk of being sampled in the stock and it has
to be done for both completed and censored spells (Jenkins, 2005). Marriage start
and end dates are known for everyone in our sample. In the analysis, only those from
the flow sample are considered, so I follow 6,642 first marriages that have taken place
between 1968 and 2011. Furthermore, 81 of these marriages ended in widowhood,
23.52% of the marriages ended in divorce or separation and 75.26% survived.
The risk set, which is the set of couples who are at the risk of an event occurrence
at each point in time is 6,642 couples. The hazard rate is the conditional probability
that a marriage will end in a particular time, t for a particular couple, given that
the couple is at risk at that time. Figure 1 shows the hazard function for the sample
considered. In this sample, individuals are couples and time is measured in years
starting from 1968, the start of the PSID up till the survey in 2011.8 I refer to these
observations as couple-years since they are in a person-period format. Thus, couples
who ended their marriage in year 1969 contribute 1 couple-year, those who ended their
marriage in 1974 contribute 6 couple-years and so on.
For the 6,642 couples there are a total of 78,303 couple-years. This total is the sum
of the number at risk of ending their marriages in each of the 43 years. Those couples
whose marriages did not end by 2011, or those who dropped out of the study and
those where one of the spouses had become widowed are censored and they contribute
what is known about them, that is, they did not end their marriages in any of the
8The last survey available at the time of writing this paper was 2011
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years in which they were observed. These observations are right censored since their
marriages did not end till the last time that they were observed. 81 marriages ended in
widowhood, which means that 2,155 of the couple-years ended in widowhood. Those
couples who ended their marriages are followed until the divorce or separation after
which they are not followed, so they are out of the sample. 17.75% of them ended in
divorce or separation and remaining approximately 80% remain intact till the end of
survey year, in 2011.
Assortative Mating: I use information on age at marriage, educational level
attained, religious preferences and ethnicity because according to the literature, these
are the variables on which spouses choose to sort themselves into marriage resulting
in assortative mating. Age at marriage is divided into five categories: couples where
(i) husband is younger by 1 year or upto (and including) 4 years older than the wife
(reference category); (ii) husband is older by 5 to 10 years; (iii) husband is older by
11 or more years; (iv) wife is older by 2 to 6 years; (v) wife is older by more than 7
years. In creating these age categories, I assume that assortatively mated couples are
likely to be similar in age, while negatively matched couples tend to be having higher
age differences. Husbands younger than wives by one year is, I believe, a negligible
difference and close to being equal, as compared to husband being younger than wife
by two years or more. For the main analysis, these categories are grouped as follows:
(i) husband and wife are in the same educational category; (ii) husband is in a higher
educational category than the wife; (iii) husband is in a lower category than the wife.
Later, I relax the assumption on level of education attained and categorize it as: both
are high school drop-outs (reference group), both are high school graduates, both at-
tended some college, both are college graduates or have some postgraduate experience.
In addition to these categories, I include: husband is in a higher educational category
than the wife (H>W); husband is in a lower category than the wife (H<W).
Beginning in 1997, questions about birth location, race and ethnicity were asked.
I use the information on ethnicity and categorize couples as: (i) both are americans,
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including african-americans or mexican americans (base group); (ii) both are from
other national origins (such as french, irish, scottish, iranian etc.) or both have
nonspecific hispanic identity such as latinos, chicanos; (iii) both have racial ethnicity
such as white or caucasian, black or religious ethnicity, for example jewish, baptist
and others which includes country people; (iv) husband and wife belong to different
ethnic groups or have mixed ethnicity. In terms of religious preferences, there are
five divisions: (i) both are catholics; (ii) both are jewish; (iii) both belong to other
christian denominations such as protestant, lutheran, baptist etc; (iv) both belong
to other religions such as muslim (base group); (v) husband and wife have different
religious preferences or have mixed religious preferences.
Controls: Dummies are included for year of marriage which are divided into
decades from 1968-1979, 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2011. Controls are added
for state fixed effects and a dummy variable represents the passing of the Unilateral
divorce laws. The traditional "fault" model of termination of marriage lasted in the
United States until the 1970’s. Then a new wave of no-fault unilateral divorce laws
swept across the country, mainly during the course of 1970’s that allowed people to seek
a divorce without the consent of their spouse, although the process of removing fault
grounds for spouses to ask for divorce had already began before the 1950s (Gruber,
2004). Figure 2.4 shows the adoption of unilateral divorce laws by states. Table
2.1 presents descriptive statistics for this sample. Weighted summary statistics are
presented in the Appendix A.2.
On average, marriages last for 21 years in this sample. The survival time of
marriage, in other words, the elapsed duration since the start of the marriage spell is
approximately 10 years. Over the decades, the number of people getting married has
declined, in 1968, 51% of marriages took place which went down to 13% in the 1990s
and even further declined in the 2000s. 75% of couples are positively matched on age,
55% of couples are matched on education. In terms of education, the number of couples
where both spouses are high school graduates (20%) and those where both are college
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year of marriage 1980.947 9.691 1968 2011 78303
Year of marriage end 2002.161 9.173 1969 2011 78303
Survival time of marriage 9.810 8.497 0 43 78303
Marriage duration 21.171 11.177 1 43 78303
Age:
H ≥ W (-1/4) 0.747 0.435 0 1 72659
H > W (5+) 0.163 0.37 0 1 72659
W > H (2+) 0.089 0.285 0 1 72659
Education:
HS− 0.085 0.279 0 1 71223
HS+ 0.198 0.398 0 1 71223
SC 0.084 0.277 0 1 71223
C+ 0.180 0.384 0 1 71223
H > W 0.208 0.406 0 1 71223
W > H 0.245 0.43 0 1 71223
Ethnicity:
Both American+ 0.135 0.342 0 1 44934
Both Other national orig.+ 0.562 0.496 0 1 44934
Both Racial etc. 0.250 0.433 0 1 44934
Mixed Ethnicity 0.053 0.224 0 1 44934
Religion:
Both Catholics 0.294 0.455 0 1 72199
Both Jewish 0.023 0.151 0 1 72199
Both Other Christian denoms 0.657 0.475 0 1 72199
Both Other religions 0.010 0.099 0 1 72199
Mixed Religion 0.016 0.124 0 1 72199
Year of marriage:
1968-79 0.512 0.5 0 1 78303
1980-89 0.297 0.457 0 1 78303
1990-99 0.133 0.339 0 1 78303
2000-11 0.058 0.234 0 1 78303
Economy:
Severe 0.102 0.302 0 1 78303
Mild 0.1 0.3 0 1 78303
Boom 0.164 0.370 0 1 78303
Region:
North-East 0.162 0.368 0 1 63015
Mid-West 0.234 0.423 0 1 63015
South 0.427 0.495 0 1 63015
West 0.178 0.382 0 1 63015
graduates or higher (18%) is closely similar. Majority of the couples are composed of
both spouses belonging to or having other national origins such as French, German,
Iranian and 25% of them identify themselves as having racial ethnic background,
while only 13% identify themselves to be Americans which in this sample includes
Mexican-Americans, Afro-Americans. Christianity is the major religious group in
the United States, with 65% of couples altogether belonging to different Christian
denominations, while 30% are reported to be Catholic.
Data on business cycles is obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER), officially charged with declaring a recession for the United States. Whether
a recession is severe or mild or whether it has ended is based on the decision of the
business cycle dating committee members and press releases made by the NBER.
These decisions are based primarily on three broad categories:
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• Length, duration of recession in months;
• Depth, based on indicators(%) which are Real Gross National Product, Industrial
production, Non-farm employment and Unemployment rate.
• Width of the recession, that is, % of the industries that experience employment
decline.
A period of recession is from Peak to Trough as shown in Table 2.2. The peak
represents a boom in the economy, so the quarters leading to a peak are coded as 1,
representing a boom. For example, just before the recession of 1973(Q4)–1975(Q1),
the US economy had a experienced a period of high growth, which is shown by the
peak in the fourth quarter of 1973, so the variable boom is coded 1 for the year equal
to 1973. During the period of the survey, between 1968–20119, some recessions were
severe and others were mild. For example, for the first recession in the Table 2.2,
the variable mild is coded as 1 for year equal to 1970 since evidence10 shows that
there was a mild recession in 1970. And similarly for the recession of 1973-75, the
variable severe is equal to 1 if the year is 1974. If the period of recession which started
previously goes further than the first quarter of any given year, then that year is a
recession year depending on whether it was severe or mild. For instance, the recent
financial recession started in the last quarter of 2007 and lasted up till the second
quarter of 2009, so the variable severe is equal to 1 for year 2009.
Table 2.2 Business cycle dates
Peak Trough Duration in Months Severe Mild Boom
December, 1969(IV) November, 1970 (IV) 11 1970 1969
November, 1973(IV) March, 1975 (I) 16 1974 1973
January, 1980(I) July, 1980 (III) 6 1980 1979
July, 1981(III) November, 1982 (IV) 16 1981, 1982
July, 1990(III) March, 1991(I) 8 1990 1989
March, 2001(I) November, 2001 (IV) 8 2001
December, 2007 (IV) June, 2009 (II) 18 2009 2007
Source: NBER Business cycle dates
9Note that the PSID was an annual survey from 1968-1997, thereafter it became biennial.
10US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions available at http://www.nber.org/cycles.html
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Methodology
To investigate which factors affect the probability of observing an end to a marriage, I
use the yearly data obtained from the PSID covering 1968-2011 to estimate a discrete
time duration model with time-varying covariates. The specification considered is a
proportional hazard model with a piecewise-constant baseline hazard. I use a baseline
hazard with 11 parameters, λ∗j (j = 1,2,....11). Therefore, I assume that the hazard is
constant for durations of marriage spells of every 2 years until the thirty-first year of
marriage. The baseline has been divided as 0-2,3-5,...,24-26, 27-30 and 31-43. This is
because the hazard is shown to be increasing in the first few years after marriage and
as marriage progresses but remains constant or changes very little after the thirty-first
year as shown in the Figure 2.1 below.
I also incorporate unobserved individual heterogeneity through the inclusion of
a multiplicative error term in the hazard function, for which a gamma distribution
with mean 1 and variance σ2 is assumed. Accounting for unobserved individual het-
erogeneity is important because differences between individuals in their hazards that
are unaccounted for by the explanatory variables, will tend to produce evidence for a
declining hazard, otherwise known as negative duration dependence11 (Heckman and
Singer 1982; Lancaster 1990; Allison 1982).
The hazard function for couple i in period t is specified as being proportional to
exp(f(Xi,Wt, Zit)) , where the following specification for f(Xi,Wt, Zit) is adopted
f(Xi,Wt, Zit) = βxXi + βtWt + βzZit (2.1)
Xi is a vector that includes binary variables related to the wife’s characteristics
such as age, education, ethnicity and religious preferences; binary indicators for the
couple characteristics which reflect their assortative mating behaviour, whether they
are positively or negatively matched in each of the four dimensions and the geographi-
cal location given by the state fixed effects. Wt is a vector of time dummies which
11The probability of leaving the marriage declines over time.
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indicate the year of marriage for each couple and binary variables to indicate the
business cycles, whether it was a boom or a mild/ severe recession. Zit is a vector of
interaction terms, where the variables representing business cycles are interacted with
couples assortative mating variables on age at marriage, level of education, ethnicity
and religious preferences.
Estimation of the parameters of interest can be performed by using standard
likelihood methods. Every couple is observed for a single marriage spell. The model
used here can be seen as a sequence of binary choice problems defined on the sur-
viving population at each duration, therefore each marriage spell originates several
observations. Treating each pair as (i,t) as a different observation, leads to 78,303
observations from 6,642 marriage spells.
For couple i, define τit as the elapsed duration since the start of the spell in period
t and let Ti be the total duration of the spell. Under the assumption of a proportional
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hazard model with a piecewise-constant baseline hazard and unobserved heterogeneity,
the hazard function at τit is given by (Jenkins, 2005, p. 39)
λ(τit|Xi,Wt, Zit, vi) = λτitexp(f(Xi,Wt, Zit))vi
where vi is the unobserved component for couple i and λτit = λ∗j for τit ≤ 10 and
λτit = λ∗11 for τit ≥ 11. 12 Standard results imply that the survival function for Ti can
be written as
S(Ti|Xi,Wt, Zit, vi) = exp(−vi
Ti∑
t=1
λτitexp((f(Xi,Wt, Zit))))
Assuming that the unobserved component has a gamma distribution with mean 1
and variance σ2, vi can be integrated out of S(Ti|Xi,Wt, Zit, vi) which results in
S(Ti|Xi,Wt, Zit, vi) =
1 + σ2 Ti∑
t=1
λτitexp(f(Xi,Wt, Zit)))−σ
−2

Therefore, the contribution to the log-likelihood function from couple i can be
written as
ln(Li) = ln[S(Ti − 1|Xi,Wt, Zit)− ciS(Ti|Xi,Wt, Zit)]
where ci is a dummy variable that equals 1 for completed spells and is 0 for (right)
censored ones.
Adding an unobserved heterogeneity term captures match quality, however it places
strong assumption as it is assumes vi to be uncorrelated with the Xi, Wt and Zit. So,
vi enters as a random effect into the model and there is no way to test if these random
effects are correlated with the regressors. Using a frailty model explicitly formulates the
nature of dependence of related failure times, in this case, occurrences of dissolution.
Frailty models condition out the individual-specific effects to make accurate inferences.
Provided that the frailty distribution is correctly specified, this approach is expected
to be more efficient (Lin, 1994). Results are presented assuming two types of frailty
12because the elapsed duration since the start of the marriage spell is approximately 10 years, and
λτit = λ∗11 for τit ≥ 11 if the survival time is greater than 10
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distributions, namely the gamma and the gaussian (normal) distribution. However,
results obtained from both sets of regressions, that is, the one assuming distribution
for the frailty and the one without, are similar. This suggests that results with the
inclusion of the unobserved heterogeneity term, vi are invariant to those without vi’s.
2.4 Results
The analysis is based on sample period 1968-2011. Starting from 1985, marriage his-
tory files are available which provide retrospective information about couples marital
life. I concentrate only on first marriages which constitute 76% of the sample. First
marriages are those where both spouses are reported to be in their first marriages.
In all the tables presented, hazard ratios are reported instead of coefficients. These
should be interpreted as the proportional effect on the hazard of dissolution by a one
unit change in the regressor. A figure greater than 1, indicates an increase in the
hazard of divorce and a figure lower than 1, indicates a decrease in the hazard.
The first set of results, shown in Table 2.3, are complementary log-log specifi-
cations estimated by maximum likelihood. I include state fixed effects and year of
marriage fixed effects in all regressions. Column (1) and (2) present hazard ratios,
without conditioning on the state of the economy. In Column (2) I control for the
number of children. Columns (3)-(6) condition on business cycles as well as, aug-
ment it by adding interaction terms where every indicator on assortative mating
(age, education, ethnicity and religion) is systematically interacted with the state
of the economy, represented by dummy variables for severe, mild recession or peri-
ods of economic growth.This gives a sense of coefficient stability over the set of controls.
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Main Effects
Estimates in Table 2.3, show that the hazard of dissolution increases, by over 30%, if
the wife is more educated than her husband, compared to couples that have similar
educational levels. I do not find any effects of differences in age at marriage between
spouses. Nonetheless, spouses who belong to the same racial groups, for instance, if
both are caucasian, blacks or jewish, face a decline in dissolution hazard. On the other
hand, those couples who identify themselves as being from a mixed ethnic background
are shown to face a sharp increase in the risk of marriage termination. Furthermore,
religion plays a very stabilizing effect, in particular, couples where both spouses are
Catholic, Jewish or from other Christian denominations are likely to experience a
significantly lower hazard of marital dissolution. This decrease in the hazard is much
higher, over 90% for couples who are reportedly Catholic, followed by Jewish and
other Christian groups, in comparison to couples from other religious faiths. These
estimates are significant in the specifications, even after controlling for the number
of children and state of the economy, and size of the estimates remains relatively stable.
A number of mechanisms could generate these results. Couples where the wife
is more educated than her husband, women are inclined to have more bargaining
power, tend to be more independent especially financially as they can increase their
labor supply and reduce their home-production time due to advancement in household
technology in the 1950’s and 1960’s. Moreover, with the invention of the pill, women
could accumulate human capital without disrupting their education and labor market
plans and prospects.13 These factors can have further consequences leading to marriage
break-down.
Fixed variables such as ethnicity and religion strongly influence dissolution risk
in all instances. A large proportion of all marriages are to individuals of the same
ethnicity and religion. The coefficients in Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show that the couples of
mixed ethnicities are more likely to dissolve their marriages while those of the same
13See Gray (1998) ; Stevenson and Wolfers (2007)
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racial ethnicity are less likely to do so. Bumpass et al. (1991), Lehrer and Chiswick
(1993), Tzeng (1992), Böheim and Ermisch (2001), Heaton (2002), have also previously
found the same. Moreover, if both spouses are Catholics, they are likely to experience
the largest decrease in dissolution risk, by 93%, perhaps because the Catholic church
does not allow divorce. This decline in the hazard is followed by those reportedly
Jewish, 82% and those belonging to various other Christian denominations who face
a decrease of 72%. These findings are consistent with the relevant literature such as
that of Lehrer and Chiswick (1993); Weiss and Willis (1997); Kalmijn et al. (2005),
Rosenfeld (2008); Frimmel et al. (2013). However, this finding is in contrast with
Böheim and Ermisch (2001), who found that spouses with similar religious faiths have
a higher dissolution rate than those who differ in their beliefs.
Consistent with the theoretical explanations of Becker et al. (1977), the risk of
dissolution declines with woman’s age at the time of the marriage as shown in Tables
2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. This is consistent with the findings of Böheim and Ermisch (2001).
Women who are married when they are in twenties and thirties face a lower hazard of
dissolution compared to those married in their teens. Also, women who are college
graduates or higher face a lower risk. This study does not find any effects of the
number of children, while the passing of the unilateral divorce law increases the risk
of marital break-up.
Interaction Effects
Since evidence shows that marital break-up often causes negative externalities, there is
strong policy interest in monitoring divorces and their consequences. It is of particular
interest and maybe a matter of policy concern to know if marriages, formed by spouses
of specific characteristics, are negatively or positively affected by recessionary and/or
expansionary episodes. Heterogeneity in the effect of business cycles is analyzed using
dummy variables representing an economic boom. To examine whether sensitivity
of marital dissolution to business cycle shocks depends on spouses characteristics,
2.4 Results | 83
the dummy variables for assortative mating categories are interacted with the shocks.
Columns (3)-(6) of Table 2.3 show a positive effect of periods of enhanced economic
growth, in decreasing the risk of marriage dissolution. However, this effect also varies
with couples where both spouses have mixed ethnicities as seen from Column (4).
Thus, spouses of mixed ethnic groups have a higher hazard of dissolution, nevertheless,
they still face a higher risk even in a period of economic expansion, all else equal.
Column (3) shows that, if the wife is older than her husband by 2-6 years, then the
risk of marital break-up is greater and depends on the period of severe recession. Both
spouses are Jewish decreases the dissolution hazard by 90% all else equal, however,
the overall effect of Jewish couples is determined by the presence of a severe recession,
where the magnitude of the risk is large and so the standard errors. In general, the
magnitude and the standard errors on estimates of mixed ethnicities and mixed religion
are large.
Table 2.4 presents results for a Gaussian frailty model. These estimates are similar
to the ones presented before with regards to all the variables in the regression specifi-
cations. The next set of results in Table 2.5 shows estimates using a Gamma frailty
model. These also corroborate the earlier findings and confirm the stability of the
main results obtained in Table 2.3. The Likelihood-Ratio test of gamma variance as
well as that of ρ are statistically significant. If the statistic is zero, the random effects
estimator does not differ significantly from the pooled estimator. However, in the case
of estimates presented using the Gamma frailty model, not all specifications could be
executed for the purposes of the current analysis, in particular, Table 2.5 does not
show regressions which included interaction terms on ethnicity, this is due to technical
difficulties encountered at various times.
Further Regressions
In Table 2.6, I present estimates using a full set of interactions of the characteristics
of the couple. Level of education attained is categorized as: both are high school
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drop-outs (reference group), both are high school graduates, both attended some
college, both are college graduates or have some postgraduate experience. In addition
to these categories, I include: husband is in a higher educational category than the
wife (H>W); husband is in a lower category than the wife (H<W). Also, business cycle
is now represented by a binary indicator which is equal to 1 in periods of economic
expansion and 0 otherwise. These results show that the hazard of dissolution decreases
by almost 60% if the spouses are both college graduates or even higher, compared to
when they are both high school dropouts. Certainly this would make sense since more
educated couples are perhaps able to make better choices in life, particularly in terms
of who to marry. In terms of age, spouses where the wife is older than the husband by
2 or more years tend to face a lower dissolution hazard by almost 25-30%. This bears
resemblance to the findings in Table 2.3 where a similar effect of a decrease in hazard
was observed when wife is older than her husband by 2-6 years.
With regards to ethnicity, couples where both spouses who belong to other national
origin such as French, Irish, Italian etc. face an incline in dissolution hazard. Similarly,
couples who identify themselves as being from a mixed ethnic background are shown
to face a sharp increase in the risk of marriage termination, almost ten times higher
as compared to couples where both spouses are reportedly Americans. In contrast,
spouses belonging to same racial groups, for instance, if both are caucasian, blacks
or jewish, face a decline in dissolution hazard. Furthermore, religious preferences
play a vital role, in particular, if spouses belong to other Christian denominations
(i.e various non-Catholic groups), belong to other religious faiths, or from a mixed
religious background, then they are likely to experience a significantly higher risk
of divorce or separation, in comparison to those couples where both spouses share
Catholic beliefs. This risk is highest for couples with mixed religious faiths, then for
those belonging to other religions and lastly, for those of other Christian denominations.
In addition, as a further exercise, Table 2.8 shows results without controlling for
the number of children, unilateral divorce. The number of children and unilateral
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divorce were dropped simply to exclude post-marital controls and keep the analysis
using information at the time of marriage. These results are presented as, those with
and without the inclusion of the ethnicity sample. Estimation was also done including
a higher number of baseline hazard parameters, but there was no significant change
in the results that are already shown here (results not shown). Couples belonging to
racial background have a lower risk of dissolving by about 53%. Those belonging to
mixed ethnic backgrounds are very strongly prone to dissolution, the magnitude of
this effect is extremely high, and so are the standard errors. This effect stays even in
the presence of a boom. The hazard also increases with the date of couples marriage,
for example, couples married in the 1980’s or later face a greater risk as compared to
those married in the 1970’s.
To conclude, the main effect of the business cycle only comes through the binary
variable representing boom. A period of economic growth reduces the risk of divorce,
but this risk is higher for couples with mixed ethnicities. A question may arise on
the role of cohabitation. However, cohabitation in the US has never really been
perceived as an important issue especially in the decades of 1970-90’s during which
cohabitation was not a very big phenomena in the US. Stevenson and Wolfers (2007)
have shown that marriage appears to be more cherished in the US with 4.7% of adult
population in nonmarital cohabitation.14 Kiernan et al. (2011) have shown that the
proportion of cohabiting parents is lower in the US than in the UK, using data for
1998-2000 of the Fragile Families Study (FFS). These authors have shown that in the
US, marriage seems to carry greater economic returns and that cohabiting mothers
in the US do not see a sizeable benefit to their partnership unless it is through marriage.
2.5 Conclusions
Using a rich panel data set from the United States for the period of 1968-2011, I test
the relation between spouses characteristics and the hazard of marital dissolution.
14figure based on US Census Bureau (2007)
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Four dimensions of assortative mating are considered, in accordance with the previous
literature which are: age at marriage, educational attainment, ethnicity and religion.
This paper provides descriptive evidence and tests the association between these
couple-specific traits and the risk of marital dissolution, and more importantly whether
this association varies if the economy is in a recession or boom. In doing so, it happens
to be the first paper to examine the role of business cycles in the given context, but
it is also the first to provide suggestive evidence for the United States, in my knowledge.
Results show that fixed variables such as ethnicity and religion strongly influence
the risk of marital dissolution. Couples in which both spouses reportedly belong to
the same racial or ethnic backgrounds, have same religious affiliations have a much
lower risk of marriage break-down. Higher education of the wife also increases the
hazard of dissolution. Nevertheless, if both spouses are college graduates or have
higher educational attainment then their risk of marital breakdown is lower. Although
it does not lend much credence to the novel aspect of the paper, but, the only robust
effect of the business cycles is the stabilising effect of a boom. The risk of separation
greatly increases for spouses of mixed ethnicity even in the presence of an economic
expansion. There are no observed effects of periods of recession and their interaction
with assortative mating.
There are, however, a few limitations to this study. First, I have not controlled for
household income. It can be argued that labor supply has an important impact on
divorce risk and that specialization within a household may differ with the changes in
labour supply. However, controlling for education is a reasonably good proxy for the
earning capacity of an individual and their roles at home. Second, unobserved quality
of match amongst couples, is likely to be correlated with their observed characteristics
at the time of marriage. This selection can promote their decision to marry in the first
place and affect their chances of dissolution. Processes leading to marriage formation
and why individuals decide to marry have been previously analysed, extensively by
Becker et al. (1977). The paper does not address this concern at all, nevertheless, at
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this stage, this paper provides only suggestive first hand evidence on a topic that was
unexplored earlier, and thus contributes to the broad literature on marital instability.
Insofar, the interest was in using the data, from when the couple enters the survey
after marriage, based on the information they have about each other, to predict their
risk of marital dissolution. Future avenues of this research may look to examine the
issues arising from selection effects, as well as further possibilities.
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Table 2.3 Dissolution Risk: Baseline results
Without any frailty distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Education: H&W
H>W 0.925 0.921 0.920 0.975 0.914 0.927 0.990
(0.112) (0.117) (0.119) (0.150) (0.122) (0.120) (0.156)
H<W 1.364*** 1.350** 1.364** 1.235 1.375** 1.367*** 1.256
(0.154) (0.162) (0.166) (0.183) (0.171) (0.165) (0.190)
Age: H&W
H>W (5-10 yrs) 1.026 0.935 0.901 0.942 0.952 0.942 0.902
(0.136) (0.132) (0.161) (0.135) (0.139) (0.135) (0.162)
H>W (11+ yrs) 1.083 1.055 1.031 1.093 1.086 1.089 1.012
(0.373) (0.409) (0.553) (0.430) (0.441) (0.428) (0.555)
W>H (2-6 yrs) 0.879 0.821 0.671* 0.818 0.805 0.812 0.676*
(0.144) (0.144) (0.156) (0.146) (0.148) (0.145) (0.160)
W>H (7+ yrs) 0.481 0.468 0.799 0.499 0.475 0.496 0.797
(0.265) (0.296) (0.607) (0.318) (0.312) (0.316) (0.612)
Ethnicity: H&W
Both Other National orig. 1.403 1.331 1.322 1.302 1.101 1.287 1.061
(0.372) (0.371) (0.376) (0.370) (0.347) (0.366) (0.335)
Both Racial 0.460** 0.389*** 0.373*** 0.367*** 0.325*** 0.363*** 0.323***
(0.153) (0.136) (0.133) (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
Both Mixed 11.396*** 11.461*** 11.346*** 11.150*** 9.640*** 11.117*** 9.738***
(2.970) (3.161) (3.184) (3.110) (2.979) (3.095) (3.028)
Religion: H&W
Both Catholic 0.090*** 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.058***
(0.059) (0.051) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) (0.049) (0.047)
Both Jewish 0.167* 0.132* 0.144* 0.135* 0.125* 0.072** 0.070**
(0.167) (0.138) (0.154) (0.144) (0.139) (0.084) (0.086)
Both Other Christian denoms 0.367* 0.304** 0.329* 0.319* 0.274** 0.231** 0.204**
(0.207) (0.177) (0.195) (0.189) (0.169) (0.156) (0.143)
Both Mixed 1.728 1.771 1.959 1.872 1.815 1.322 1.397
(0.856) (0.918) (1.033) (0.986) (0.985) (0.819) (0.898)
No. of children 0.996 0.992 0.994 0.991 0.994 0.990
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Unilateral Divorce 1.491 1.573* 1.629* 1.624* 1.687* 1.636* 1.704*
(0.396) (0.426) (0.446) (0.444) (0.474) (0.448) (0.479)
Economy:
Severe 0.775 0.820 0.531 0.616 0.344
(0.132) (0.170) (0.222) (0.531) (0.334)
Mild 1.277* 1.173 1.114 1.069 0.834
(0.187) (0.229) (0.432) (1.173) (0.970)
Boom 0.437*** 0.455*** 0.216*** 0.151* 0.074**
(0.072) (0.091) (0.097) (0.167) (0.088)
Interactions:
Severe*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.192 1.283
(0.481) (0.525)
Severe*Age: H >W (11+ yrs) 0.873 0.873
(0.997) (1.004)
Severe*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 2.077* 2.122*
(0.866) (0.906)
Severe*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.916 0.867
(1.139) (1.095)
Mild*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 0.520 0.540
(0.239) (0.250)
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
Without any frailty distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Mild*Age: H >W (11+ yrs) 2.136 2.258
(1.880) (2.004)
Mild*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.154 1.225
(0.553) (0.596)
Mild*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Boom*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.694 1.678
(0.574) (0.576)
Boom*Age: H >W (11+yrs) 0.742 0.717
(0.842) (0.817)
Boom*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.447 1.232
(0.636) (0.561)
Boom*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Severe*Educ: H >W 0.829 0.789
(0.301) (0.293)
Severe*Educ: W >H 1.277 1.283
(0.382) (0.393)
Mild*Educ: H >W 0.736 0.746
(0.270) (0.276)
Mild*Educ: W >H 1.303 1.402
(0.378) (0.414)
Boom*Educ: H >W 0.981 0.877
(0.324) (0.296)
Boom*Educ: W >H 1.219 1.061
(0.352) (0.313)
Severe*Ethnic: Both National orig. 1.587 1.698
(0.707) (0.766)
Severe*Ethnic: Both Racial etc 1.282 1.188
(0.782) (0.733)
Severe*Ethnic: Both Mixed 2.294 2.171
(1.263) (1.213)
Mild*Ethnic: Both National orig. 1.320 1.397
(0.564) (0.608)
Mild*Ethnic: Both Racial etc 0.854 0.856
(0.529) (0.532)
Mild*Ethnic: Both Mixed 0.859 0.869
(0.394) (0.404)
Boom*Ethnic: Both National orig. 1.840 1.949
(0.870) (0.932)
Boom*Ethnic: Both Racial etc 2.387 2.473
(1.391) (1.443)
Boom*Ethnic: Both Mixed 5.582*** 5.351***
(2.893) (2.824)
Severe*Religion: Both Catholic 1.265 1.142
(1.187) (1.084)
Severe*Religion: Both Jewish 7.195* 7.506*
(8.364) (8.863)
Severe*Religion: Both Christian denoms. 1.338 1.286
(1.168) (1.136)
Severe*Religion: Both Mixed 1.388 0.944
(1.593) (1.119)
Mild*Religion: Both Catholic 1.201 1.169
(1.399) (1.369)
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Without any frailty distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Mild*Religion: Both Jewish 1.568 1.866
(2.462) (2.946)
Mild*Religion: Both Christian denoms. 1.136 1.314
(1.259) (1.466)
Mild*Religion: Both Mixed 1.011 1.098
(1.188) (1.305)
Boom*Religion: Both Catholic 2.339 2.128
(2.744) (2.509)
Boom*Religion: Both Jewish 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Boom*Religion: Both Christian denoms. 3.294 2.771
(3.672) (3.106)
Boom*Religion: Both Mixed 6.742 3.816
(8.189) (4.720)
Wife’s Characteristics
Age: 20-29 0.683*** 0.670*** 0.673*** 0.677*** 0.665*** 0.675*** 0.661***
(0.079) (0.081) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084)
Age: 30-39 0.627** 0.677* 0.684* 0.684* 0.675* 0.687* 0.668*
(0.129) (0.151) (0.154) (0.155) (0.157) (0.155) (0.155)
Age: 40+ 1.058 2.178 2.308 2.294 2.483* 2.289 2.460*
(0.521) (1.091) (1.176) (1.167) (1.300) (1.165) (1.289)
Educ: HS+ 0.789 0.786 0.777 0.778 0.789 0.784 0.790
(0.143) (0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.157) (0.151) (0.157)
Educ: SC 0.658** 0.666** 0.657** 0.660** 0.669* 0.661** 0.671*
(0.129) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.145) (0.138) (0.146)
Educ: C+ 0.374*** 0.369*** 0.364*** 0.366*** 0.365*** 0.369*** 0.365***
(0.081) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.091) (0.087) (0.091)
Ethnic: Other national orig. 1.027 1.111 1.141 1.149 1.158 1.157 1.171
(0.229) (0.263) (0.277) (0.279) (0.295) (0.280) (0.298)
Ethnic: Hispanic orig 0.239** 0.279** 0.277** 0.278** 0.274* 0.280* 0.273*
(0.152) (0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181)
Ethnic: Racial 1.003 1.118 1.156 1.177 1.146 1.181 1.146
(0.280) (0.325) (0.345) (0.351) (0.359) (0.352) (0.359)
Ethnic: Others 2.131** 2.084* 2.293** 2.284** 2.168* 2.279** 2.239*
(0.786) (0.826) (0.927) (0.922) (0.912) (0.920) (0.942)
Religion: Catholic 0.799 0.671 0.685 0.686 0.686 0.714 0.664
(0.711) (0.614) (0.646) (0.646) (0.681) (0.674) (0.661)
Religion: Jewish 0.418* 0.447 0.464 0.450 0.486 0.470 0.486
(0.206) (0.229) (0.244) (0.236) (0.266) (0.246) (0.267)
Religion: Other Christian denoms. 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.228** 0.216*** 0.207*** 0.219*** 0.202***
(0.105) (0.110) (0.132) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124)
Couple-years: N 43,764 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222
Number of id 3,520 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012
Log likelihood -2672 -2459 -2435 -2440 -2431 -2436 -2419
Standard errors Eform in parentheses. Other controls include: baseline hazard parameters, year of marriage and state fixed effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4 Dissolution Risk: Gaussian Frailty
Gaussian Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Education: H&W
H>W 0.921 0.920 0.975 0.914 0.927 0.990
(0.117) (0.119) (0.150) (0.122) (0.120) (0.156)
H<W 1.350** 1.364** 1.235 1.375** 1.367*** 1.256
(0.162) (0.166) (0.183) (0.171) (0.165) (0.190)
Age: H&W
H>W (5-10 yrs) 0.935 0.901 0.942 0.952 0.942 0.902
(0.132) (0.161) (0.135) (0.139) (0.135) (0.162)
H>W (11+ yrs) 1.055 1.031 1.093 1.086 1.089 1.012
(0.409) (0.553) (0.430) (0.441) (0.428) (0.555)
W>H (2-6 yrs) 0.821 0.671* 0.818 0.805 0.812 0.676*
(0.144) (0.156) (0.146) (0.148) (0.145) (0.160)
W>H (7+ yrs) 0.468 0.799 0.499 0.475 0.496 0.797
(0.296) (0.607) (0.318) (0.312) (0.316) (0.612)
Ethnicity: H&W
Both Other National orig. 1.331 1.322 1.302 1.101 1.287 1.061
(0.371) (0.376) (0.370) (0.347) (0.366) (0.335)
Both Racial 0.389*** 0.373*** 0.367*** 0.325*** 0.363*** 0.323***
(0.136) (0.133) (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130)
Both Mixed 11.461*** 11.346*** 11.150*** 9.640*** 11.117*** 9.738***
(3.161) (3.184) (3.110) (2.979) (3.095) (3.028)
Religion: H&W
Both Catholic 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.063*** 0.058***
(0.051) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) (0.049) (0.047)
Both Jewish 0.132* 0.144* 0.135* 0.125* 0.072** 0.070**
(0.138) (0.154) (0.144) (0.139) (0.084) (0.086)
Both Other Christian denoms 0.304** 0.329* 0.319* 0.274** 0.231** 0.204**
(0.177) (0.195) (0.189) (0.169) (0.156) (0.143)
Both Mixed 1.771 1.959 1.872 1.815 1.322 1.397
(0.918) (1.033) (0.986) (0.985) (0.819) (0.898)
No. of children 0.996 0.992 0.994 0.991 0.994 0.990
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Unilateral Divorce 1.573* 1.629* 1.624* 1.687* 1.636* 1.704*
(0.426) (0.446) (0.444) (0.474) (0.448) (0.479)
Economy:
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Gaussian Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Severe 0.775 0.820 0.531 0.616 0.344
(0.132) (0.170) (0.222) (0.531) (0.334)
Mild 1.277* 1.173 1.114 1.069 0.834
(0.187) (0.229) (0.432) (1.173) (0.970)
Boom 0.437*** 0.455*** 0.216*** 0.151* 0.074**
(0.072) (0.091) (0.097) (0.167) (0.088)
Interactions:
Severe*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.192 1.283
(0.481) (0.525)
Severe*Age: H >W (11+ yrs) 0.873 0.873
(0.997) (1.004)
Severe*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 2.077* 2.122*
(0.866) (0.906)
Severe*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.916 0.867
(1.139) (1.095)
Mild*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 0.520 0.540
(0.239) (0.250)
Mild*Age: H >W (11+ yrs) 2.136 2.258
(1.880) (2.004)
Mild*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.154 1.225
(0.553) (0.596)
Mild*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
Boom*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.694 1.678
(0.574) (0.576)
Boom*Age: H >W (11+yrs) 0.742 0.717
(0.842) (0.817)
Boom*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.447 1.232
(0.636) (0.561)
Boom*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Severe*Educ: H >W 0.829 0.789
(0.301) (0.293)
Severe*Educ: W >H 1.277 1.283
(0.382) (0.393)
Mild*Educ: H >W 0.736 0.746
(0.270) (0.276)
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Gaussian Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Mild*Educ: W >H 1.303 1.402
(0.378) (0.414)
Boom*Educ: H >W 0.981 0.877
(0.324) (0.296)
Boom*Educ: W >H 1.219 1.061
(0.352) (0.313)
Severe*Ethnic: Both National orig. 1.587 1.698
(0.707) (0.766)
Severe*Ethnic: Both Racial etc 1.282 1.188
(0.782) (0.733)
Severe*Ethnic: Both Mixed 2.294 2.171
(1.263) (1.213)
Mild*Ethnic: Both National orig. 1.320 1.397
(0.564) (0.608)
Mild*Ethnic: Both Racial etc 0.854 0.856
(0.529) (0.532)
Mild*Ethnic: Both Mixed 0.859 0.869
(0.394) (0.404)
Boom*Ethnic: Both National orig. 1.840 1.949
(0.870) (0.932)
Boom*Ethnic: Both Racial etc 2.387 2.473
(1.391) (1.443)
Boom*Ethnic: Both Mixed 5.582*** 5.351***
(2.893) (2.824)
Severe*Religion: Both Catholic 1.265 1.142
(1.187) (1.084)
Severe*Religion: Both Jewish 7.195* 7.506*
(8.364) (8.863)
Severe*Religion: Both Christian denoms. 1.338 1.286
(1.168) (1.136)
Severe*Religion: Both Mixed 1.388 0.944
(1.593) (1.119)
Mild*Religion: Both Catholic 1.201 1.169
(1.399) (1.369)
Mild*Religion: Both Jewish 1.568 1.866
(2.462) (2.946)
Mild*Religion: Both Christian denoms. 1.136 1.314
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Gaussian Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Marital Dissolution
(1.259) (1.466)
Mild*Religion: Both Mixed 1.011 1.098
(1.188) (1.305)
Boom*Religion: Both Catholic 2.339 2.128
(2.744) (2.509)
Boom*Religion: Both Jewish 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Boom*Religion: Both Christian denoms. 3.294 2.771
(3.672) (3.106)
Boom*Religion: Both Mixed 6.742 3.816
(8.189) (4.720)
Wife’s Characteristics
Age: 20-29 0.670*** 0.673*** 0.677*** 0.665*** 0.675*** 0.661***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084)
Age: 30-39 0.677* 0.684* 0.684* 0.675* 0.687* 0.668*
(0.151) (0.154) (0.155) (0.157) (0.155) (0.155)
Age: 40+ 2.178 2.308 2.294 2.483* 2.289 2.460*
(1.091) (1.176) (1.167) (1.300) (1.165) (1.289)
Educ: HS+ 0.786 0.777 0.778 0.789 0.784 0.790
(0.149) (0.150) (0.149) (0.157) (0.151) (0.157)
Educ: SC 0.666** 0.657** 0.660** 0.669* 0.661** 0.671*
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.145) (0.138) (0.146)
Educ: C+ 0.369*** 0.364*** 0.366*** 0.365*** 0.369*** 0.365***
(0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.091) (0.087) (0.091)
Ethnic: Other national orig. 1.111 1.141 1.149 1.158 1.157 1.171
(0.263) (0.277) (0.279) (0.295) (0.280) (0.298)
Ethnic: Hispanic orig 0.279** 0.277** 0.278** 0.274* 0.280* 0.273*
(0.180) (0.181) (0.181) (0.181) (0.182) (0.181)
Ethnic: Racial 1.118 1.156 1.177 1.146 1.181 1.146
(0.325) (0.345) (0.351) (0.359) (0.352) (0.359)
Ethnic: Others 2.084* 2.293** 2.284** 2.168* 2.279** 2.239*
(0.826) (0.927) (0.922) (0.912) (0.920) (0.942)
Religion: Catholic 0.671 0.685 0.686 0.686 0.714 0.664
(0.614) (0.646) (0.646) (0.681) (0.674) (0.661)
Religion: Jewish 0.447 0.464 0.450 0.486 0.470 0.486
(0.229) (0.244) (0.236) (0.266) (0.246) (0.267)
Religion: Other Christian denoms. 0.196*** 0.228** 0.216*** 0.207*** 0.219*** 0.202***
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Gaussian Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Marital Dissolution
(0.110) (0.132) (0.125) (0.126) (0.126) (0.124)
Couple-years: N 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222
Number of id 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012
Log likelihood -2459 -2435 -2440 -2431 -2436 -2419
LR test of rho=0 1.157 1.908 1.909 2.886 1.915 2.843
Standard errors Eform in parentheses. Other controls include: baseline hazard parameters, year of marriage and state fixed effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.5 Dissolution Risk: Gamma Frailty Distribution
Gamma Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Dissolution hazard
Age: 20-29 0.676*** 0.678*** 0.684***
(0.080) (0.078) (0.079)
Age: 30-39 0.690 0.697* 0.697*
(0.156) (0.151) (0.152)
Age: 40+ 2.231* 2.365* 2.350*
(1.087) (1.160) (1.151)
Educ: HS+ 0.808 0.799 0.800
(0.149) (0.147) (0.148)
Educ: SC 0.711 0.702* 0.703*
(0.169) (0.140) (0.141)
Educ: C+ 0.404*** 0.399*** 0.400***
(0.111) (0.088) (0.089)
Ethnic: Other national orig. 1.108 1.133 1.142
(0.243) (0.255) (0.257)
Ethnic: Hispanic orig 0.292* 0.291* 0.291*
(0.185) (0.185) (0.185)
Ethnic: Racial 1.110 1.134 1.156
(0.310) (0.316) (0.323)
Ethnic: Others 1.762 1.951* 1.945*
(0.808) (0.765) (0.767)
Religion: Catholic 0.713 0.729 0.730
(0.604) (0.627) (0.628)
Religion: Jewish 0.406 0.430* 0.420*
(0.235) (0.211) (0.207)
Religion: Other Christian denoms 0.192*** 0.225*** 0.214***
(0.104) (0.119) (0.114)
Education: H&W
H>W 0.936 0.936 0.981
(0.117) (0.116) (0.146)
H<W 1.316* 1.331** 1.200
(0.199) (0.153) (0.172)
Age: H&W
H>W (5-10 yrs) 0.918 0.884 0.929
(0.158) (0.154) (0.131)
H>W (11+ yrs) 1.051 1.008 1.081
(0.394) (0.525) (0.407)
W>H (2-6 yrs) 0.841 0.690* 0.835
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Gamma Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Dissolution hazard
(0.142) (0.155) (0.143)
W>H (7+ yrs) 0.465 0.781 0.499
(0.308) (0.580) (0.310)
Ethnicity: H&W
Both Other National orig. 1.311 1.307 1.285
(0.346) (0.349) (0.344)
Both Racial 0.408*** 0.395*** 0.388***
(0.135) (0.133) (0.131)
Both Mixed 10.412*** 10.335*** 10.185***
(3.838) (2.589) (2.611)
Religion: H&W
Both Catholic 0.074*** 0.083*** 0.079***
(0.047) (0.054) (0.051)
Both Jewish 0.124** 0.135** 0.128**
(0.123) (0.135) (0.127)
Both Other Christian denoms 0.323* 0.347* 0.335*
(0.187) (0.193) (0.187)
Both Mixed 1.577 1.743 1.673
(0.883) (0.873) (0.843)
No. of children 0.997 0.994 0.996
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Unilateral Divorce 1.527 1.584* 1.581*
(0.423) (0.416) (0.417)
Economy:
Severe 0.791 0.835
(0.134) (0.172)
Mild 1.233 1.102
(0.183) (0.220)
Boom 0.448*** 0.464***
(0.074) (0.093)
Interactions:
Severe*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.203
(0.483)
Severe*Age: H >W (11+ yrs) 0.886
(1.008)
Severe*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 2.041*
(0.842)
Severe*Age: H <W (7+yrs) 0.937
(1.164)
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Gamma Frailty Distribution
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Dissolution hazard
Mild*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 0.539
(0.248)
Mild*Age: H >W (11+ yrs) 2.170
(1.908)
Mild*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.186
(0.568)
Mild*Age: H <W (7+yrs) 0.000
(0.001)
Boom*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.716
(0.577)
Boom*Age: H >W (11+yrs) 0.754
(0.853)
Boom*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.420
(0.619)
Boom*Age: H <W (7+yrs) 0.000
(0.000)
Severe*Educ: H >W 0.837
(0.302)
Severe*Educ: W >H 1.278
(0.380)
Mild*Educ: H >W 0.789
(0.291)
Mild*Educ: W >H 1.373
(0.402)
Boom*Educ: H >W 0.988
(0.325)
Boom*Educ: W >H 1.226
(0.352)
Couple-years: N 40,222 40,222 40,222
Log likelihood -2449 -2427 -2431
LR test of Gamma var=0 20.71 18.50 18.72
Standard errors Eform in parentheses. Other controls include: baseline hazard parameters, year of marriage and state fixed effects
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6 Dissolution Risk: II
Without any frailty distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Education: H&W
Both: HS+ 1.209 1.198 1.191 1.153 1.200 1.199 1.151
(0.364) (0.369) (0.369) (0.379) (0.375) (0.371) (0.383)
Both: SC 1.074 1.011 1.007 1.002 1.012 1.012 0.997
(0.335) (0.326) (0.327) (0.346) (0.331) (0.328) (0.347)
Both: C+ 0.433*** 0.425*** 0.428** 0.484** 0.430** 0.433** 0.467**
(0.138) (0.140) (0.142) (0.169) (0.144) (0.143) (0.165)
H>W 1.043 1.027 1.026 1.040 1.026 1.035 1.037
(0.312) (0.315) (0.316) (0.340) (0.319) (0.318) (0.342)
W>H 1.064 1.049 1.048 1.048 1.057 1.056 1.054
(0.313) (0.317) (0.319) (0.339) (0.325) (0.321) (0.344)
Age: H&W
H>W (5-10 yrs) 1.074 0.990 0.906 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.915
(0.136) (0.134) (0.136) (0.135) (0.137) (0.135) (0.138)
H>W (11+ yrs) 1.071 1.127 1.244 1.159 1.152 1.166 1.234
(0.361) (0.427) (0.507) (0.441) (0.444) (0.444) (0.507)
W>H (2-6 yrs) 0.790 0.746* 0.717* 0.748* 0.740* 0.746* 0.729*
(0.123) (0.125) (0.131) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.134)
W>H (7+ yrs) 0.486 0.497 0.668 0.512 0.509 0.519 0.678
(0.256) (0.311) (0.425) (0.321) (0.325) (0.326) (0.433)
Ethnicity: H&W
Both Other National orig. 1.458*** 1.489*** 1.500*** 1.503*** 1.426** 1.491*** 1.413**
(0.213) (0.229) (0.232) (0.232) (0.233) (0.230) (0.231)
Both Racial 0.509*** 0.466*** 0.465*** 0.466*** 0.415*** 0.465*** 0.413***
(0.095) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.090) (0.093) (0.089)
Mixed Ethnicity 11.451*** 12.018*** 11.932*** 11.920*** 10.592*** 11.861*** 10.681***
(2.174) (2.468) (2.496) (2.471) (2.326) (2.474) (2.367)
Religion: H&W
Both Jewish 2.108** 1.672 1.682 1.657 1.676 1.825 1.795
(0.752) (0.689) (0.698) (0.685) (0.699) (0.764) (0.758)
Both Other Christian denoms 1.858*** 1.985*** 2.004*** 2.000*** 2.004*** 1.911*** 1.960***
(0.270) (0.309) (0.314) (0.313) (0.316) (0.316) (0.328)
Both Other religions (Hindu, Muslims) 2.254** 2.679*** 2.784*** 2.773*** 2.848*** 3.194*** 3.212***
(0.835) (1.016) (1.061) (1.056) (1.093) (1.287) (1.306)
Mixed Religion 7.389*** 9.319*** 9.749*** 9.580*** 9.906*** 8.670*** 9.620***
(2.058) (2.821) (2.971) (2.902) (3.063) (2.711) (3.096)
Boom 0.453*** 0.513 0.265*** 0.181 0.104
(0.069) (0.392) (0.115) (0.193) (0.145)
Interactions:
Boom*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.710* 1.674
(0.557) (0.555)
Boom*Age: H >W (11+yrs) 0.662 0.665
(0.717) (0.729)
Boom*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 1.315 1.109
(0.549) (0.480)
Boom*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Boom*Both HS+ 1.313 1.309
(1.058) (1.095)
Boom*Both SC 1.038 1.056
(0.871) (0.920)
Boom*Both C+ 0.407 0.466
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Without any frailty distribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Marital Dissolution
(0.365) (0.431)
Boom*H>W 0.939 0.910
(0.758) (0.761)
Boom*W>H 1.022 0.954
(0.809) (0.783)
Boom*Both Other Nat. orig. 1.527 1.692
(0.704) (0.790)
Boom*Both racial 2.185 2.270
(1.240) (1.292)
Boom*Mixed Ethnicity 4.584*** 4.448***
(2.296) (2.288)
Boom*Both Catholics 2.103 2.034
(2.376) (2.313)
Boom*Both Jewish 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Boom*Both other Christians 2.821 2.435
(3.027) (2.621)
Boom*Mixed Religion 5.929 2.988
(6.950) (3.582)
No. of children 1.014 1.013 1.013 1.011 1.014 1.012
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Unilateral Divorce 1.369 1.416 1.458 1.461 1.477 1.451 1.482
(0.355) (0.376) (0.390) (0.390) (0.399) (0.387) (0.401)
Year of Marriage FE’s y y y y y y y
State FE’s y y y y y y y
Baseline parameters y y y y y y y
Couple-years: N 43,764 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222 40,222
Number of id 3,520 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012 3,012
Log likelihood -2695 -2483 -2464 -2464 -2459 -2464 -2453
Coefficients to be interpreted as hazard ratios. Standard errors Eform in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7 Determinants of dissolution risk, Robustness checks
Without Ethnicity Include Ethnicity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Marital Dissolution
Education: H&W
Both: HS+ 1.279 1.244 1.216 1.164
(0.250) (0.247) (0.364) (0.374)
Both: SC 1.292 1.268 1.079 1.073
(0.275) (0.276) (0.335) (0.358)
Both: C+ 0.383*** 0.427*** 0.434*** 0.468**
(0.087) (0.098) (0.137) (0.158)
H>W 1.077 1.042 1.045 1.033
(0.210) (0.208) (0.310) (0.330)
W>H 1.246 1.222 1.065 1.053
(0.237) (0.237) (0.312) (0.332)
Age: H&W
H>W (5-10 yrs) 0.895 0.888 1.073 1.021
(0.102) (0.105) (0.135) (0.141)
H>W (11+ yrs) 1.385 1.357 1.079 0.999
(0.396) (0.405) (0.361) (0.380)
W>H (2-6 yrs) 0.974 0.998 0.790 0.769
(0.135) (0.142) (0.122) (0.130)
W>H (7+ yrs) 0.876 1.081 0.481 0.641
(0.329) (0.404) (0.252) (0.340)
Ethnicity: H&W
Both Other National orig. 1.456*** 1.409**
(0.212) (0.219)
Both Racial 0.512*** 0.472***
(0.095) (0.094)
Both Mixed 11.281*** 10.069***
(2.106) (2.024)
Religion: H&W
Both Jewish 1.629 1.737 2.132** 2.368**
(0.554) (0.586) (0.756) (0.861)
Both Other Christian denoms 2.001*** 1.963*** 1.847*** 1.872***
(0.238) (0.238) (0.267) (0.292)
Both Other religions (Hindu, Muslims) 1.396 1.556 2.235** 2.713**
(0.528) (0.609) (0.825) (1.072)
Both Mixed 16.389*** 15.130*** 7.315*** 7.479***
(4.276) (3.900) (2.012) (2.171)
Boom 0.235 0.108
(0.281) (0.150)
Interactions:
Boom*Age: H >W (5-10 yrs) 1.096 1.428
(0.310) (0.464)
Boom*Age: H >W (11+yrs) 1.239 1.555
(0.818) (1.283)
Boom*Age: H <W (2-6 yrs) 0.815 1.130
(0.295) (0.462)
Boom*Age: H <W (7+ yrs) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Boom*Both HS+ 1.204 1.364
(0.700) (1.144)
Boom*Both SC 1.099 1.032
(0.670) (0.902)
Boom*Both C+ 0.445 0.558
(0.306) (0.506)
Boom*H>W 1.278 1.054
(0.739) (0.880)
Boom*W>H 1.097 1.088
(0.621) (0.894)
Boom*Both Other Nat. orig. 1.445
(0.630)
Boom*Both racial 1.749
(0.947)
Boom*Both mixed 3.933***
(1.920)
Boom*Both Catholics 1.985 2.346
(2.186) (2.638)
Boom*Both Jewish 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Boom*Both other Christians 2.209 2.324
(2.363) (2.497)
Boom*Both mixed 3.055 3.534
(3.517) (4.231)
Year of Marriage:
1980-89 4.045*** 4.129*** 2.743*** 3.032***
(0.541) (0.553) (0.372) (0.431)
1990-99 7.688*** 8.251*** 9.241*** 11.638***
(1.189) (1.293) (1.434) (2.017)
2000-11 8.198*** 10.982*** 14.713*** 24.158***
(1.377) (1.925) (2.704) (5.041)
Baseline parameters y y y y
State FE’s y y y y
Couple-years: N 70,114 70,114 43,764 43,764
Number of id 5,658 5,658 3,520 3,520
Log likelihood -4963 -4935 -2696 -2663
Coefficients to be interpreted as hazard ratios. Standard errors Eform in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix A.2
Figure 2.2 shows the probability density function for the elapsed time from the begin-
ning of the marriage spell, this is censored at t=43.
Figure 2.3 is the kernel density estimate of the total length of marriage in years.
The probability mass function indicates that most couples have marriages lasting
approximately 18 years.
Fig. 2.2 Probability Density Function
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1=North East: Division 1: New England- Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Vermont
Division 2: Mid-Atlantic- New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania
2=MidWest: Division 3: East North Central- Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin
Division 4: West North Central- Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota
3=South: Division 5: South Atlantic- Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Virginia, Washington D.C, West Virginia
Division 6: East South Central- Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee
Division 7: West South Central- Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas
4=West: Division 8: Mountain- Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming
Division 9: Pacific- Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington
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Fig. 2.3 Kernel Density Estimate of Length of Marriage
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Fig. 2.4 Unilateral Divorce Law adoption by State
taken from Rasul (2005)
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Table 2.8 Weighted Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Year of marriage 1980.936 9.897 1968 2011 24961
Year of marriage end 2006.994 8.136 1970 2011 24961
Survival time of marriage 11.594 9.597 0 43 24961
Marriage duration 26.043 11.608 1 43 24961
Age:
H ≥ W (-1/4) 0.785 0.411 0 1 22605
H > W (5+) 0.134 0.34 0 1 22605
W > H (2+) 0.081 0.273 0 1 22605
Education:
Both HS− 0.037 0.188 0 1 22335
Both HS+ 0.168 0.374 0 1 22335
Both SC 0.078 0.269 0 1 22335
Both C+ 0.296 0.456 0 1 22335
H > W 0.205 0.404 0 1 22335
W > H 0.216 0.412 0 1 22335
Ethnicity:
Both American+ 0.087 0.282 0 1 20743
Both Other national orig.+ 0.659 0.474 0 1 20743
Both Racial etc. 0.203 0.402 0 1 20743
Mixed Ethnicity 0.051 0.22 0 1 20743
Religion:
Both Catholics 0.285 0.451 0 1 22460
Both Jewish 0.029 0.169 0 1 22460
Both Other Christian denoms 0.668 0.471 0 1 22460
Both Other religions 0.006 0.077 0 1 22460
Mixed Religion 0.012 0.108 0 1 22460
Year of marriage:
1968-79 0.516 0.5 0 1 24961
1980-89 0.275 0.447 0 1 24961
1990-99 0.152 0.359 0 1 24961
2000-11 0.056 0.231 0 1 24961
Economy:
Severe 0.106 0.308 0 1 24961
Mild 0.101 0.302 0 1 24961
Boom 0.180 0.384 0 1 24961
Region:
North-East 0.224 0.417 0 1 22009
Mid-West 0.289 0.453 0 1 22009
South 0.28 0.449 0 1 22009
West 0.207 0.405 0 1 22009
Chapter 3
Parental Education and Child
Development: Long and Short
term Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
Parents and the family environment play a key role in the behaviour and decisions
taken by adolescents. Evidence from the effect of childhood socio-economic circum-
stances on later life chances of children, suggests that family attributes matter much
more than neighbourhoods or schools. Interventions in early childhood can be very
effective than later in the life cycle of any individual.1
One aspect of parental input that has not been studied in depth is educational
homogamy of spouses. For most individuals, educational attainment is their first
major socio-economic status that is defined separately from the resources of their
parents and has a major impact on subsequent life outcomes which affects the well-
being of their children. Educational similarity has been cited as one of the most
important components of social capital shaping economic mobility in contemporary
America (Butler et al., 2008). Increased labour force participation of women and the
1Carneiro and Heckman (2003);Mayer (1997); Brooks-Gunn et al. (1997); Currie and Thomas
(2012);Karoly et al. (2005)
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steady improvement in educational attainment for women has revolutionized the mate
selection process. This would suggest that men and women will increasingly select
those compatible with their own educational attainment levels, that is, educational
homogamy as a trend has increased over the period 1970-90s as a result of rise in
women’s educational attainment (Qian, 1998).
This paper is motivated by the idea that educational similarity of parents has
positive consequences for their children by fostering cooperation between parents and
the adoption of more effective investment strategies that can be classified as a form
of within-family social capital (Beck and Sancho, 2009). This homogeneity of the
parental generation is likely to generate social returns on the offsprings’ generation
if the intergenerational educational link is causal, due to parental nurture than just
reflecting a parental selection effect.
This paper, for the first time, examines the effect of educational homogamy on
college enrolment and graduation outcomes in the United States of America. In doing
so, it provides new evidence using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) dataset,
a longitudinal survey from 1968–2013. In establishing a causal impact of educational
homogamy, the identification strategy makes use of two divorce laws, namely the
Unilateral divorce law and the Joint child custody law, which swept the United States
in the seventies and the eighties. Within the first stage itself, this paper examines the
effect of these reforms on homogamy, thereby it opens up a novel research path. Thus,
adding to previous research by Voena (2015), Wolfers (2006), Stevenson (2007), Rasul
(2003), 2005, Genadek et al. (2007), Böheim et al. (2012) which have studied the impact
of divorce laws on family behaviour, marriage and divorce rates, marriage-specific
capital and labour supply of women. Having said that, the outcome of interest in this
study is educational homogamy, this is also new and deserves attention. On the one
hand is the agenda that is analysed in the current paper, that individuals who are
matching are more alike and this certainly has implications for their kids. On the
other hand (beyond the scope of this paper), these more alike parents might also have
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implications on a series of other dimensions, for example, they might be moving in
an environment that is more unequal because more equal parents might have equal
resources which may have repercussions for their kids. Since these children grow up in
an environment different from other kids, the prevailing inequality in the society may
affect these kids in a negative way. This follows from the recent works of Eika et al.
(2014) and Greenwood et al. (2014).
Findings presented in this paper show that parental education leads to an increase
in the likelihood of college enrolment of young adults, but there are no effects on
college graduation. The results identify the effect of parental education for a group of
parents who at the time of their own marriage or before, must have been potentially
affected by the passing of these laws and may have experienced the changing nature
of family life in America.
This begs the question: How does educational homogamy affect kids’ outcomes?
The expectation is that it affects child outcomes due to the role of common objectives,
views, lifestyle and agreements that parents are able to achieve over intra-household
investments or allocation of resources. Therefore, it affects children positively through
the series of investments that are made consensually by both parents in line with
their decisions. Another possibility is that, perhaps fathers in homogamous couples
contribute more to household chores or spend more time with children in various daily
activities, than fathers in heterogamous marriages. As a result, their views are more
in line with their wives and consequently, children benefit from investments made by
their parents.
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3.2 Literature Review
Human Capital
Human capital accumulation is a dynamic process wherein the skills acquired
in one stage of the life cycle affect both the initial conditions and the technology
of learning at the next stage. Human capital is produced over an individual’s life
cycle, by families, schools and firms and a major determinant of successful schools
are successful families (Carneiro and Heckman, 2003). Shonkoff and Phillips (2000)
emphasize that different stages of the life cycle are critical to the formation of different
types of abilities. Carneiro and Heckman (2003) argue human capital is synergistic,
since early investments raise the productivity (lower the costs) of later investments as
they are harvested over a longer horizon than those made later in a child’s life. Thus,
later learning is facilitated by skills (cognitive and non-cognitive) acquired early in life.
Cunha and Heckman (2007); Knudsen et al. (2006) have demonstrated the im-
portance of early environmental conditions on the evolution of adolescent and adult
cognitive and non-cognitive skills. These skills are vital determinants of educational
attainment, crime, earnings and participation in risky behaviours (Heckman et al.,
2006). The emerging developmental literature considers environmental influences on
development over the entire life cycle of the child and into adulthood. The recent
literature on personality and preference formation by Borghans et al. (2007), Cunha
and Heckman (2007) and Cunha et al. (2010) establishes causal impacts of parental
inputs and other environmental factors on cognitive and non-cognitive skills. Using
the British Household Panel Survey, Ermisch and Francesconi (2001) examine the
impact of family background on the educational attainments of British youth born
during 1974-81. They find that young adults who are brought up in single-parent
households and belong to families in the bottom income quartile have significantly
lower educational attainments, while those whose parents are homeowners have higher
educational attainments.
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Child development literature has documented the importance of early childhood
conditions, parental investments in terms of time, parenting standards and practices
on child skill formation and health, labour market and behavioural outcomes of chil-
dren(Fiorini and Keane 2014, Del Bono et al. 2012, Bono et al. 2014, Cunha and
Heckman 2007,Knudsen et al. 2006, Coleman et al. 1966, Heckman 2007). A lot of evi-
dence has focused on income as a major determinant of college outcomes of individuals.
However, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) suggest that factors operating during the early
childhood years and culminating in adolescence in the form of crystallized cognitive
abilities, attitudes, and social skills play far more important roles than tuition or
family credit constraints during the college years.
Parental Education
There is a substantial literature which shows that individuals form partnerships
with other individuals having similar levels of education (Kalmijn and Flap 2001; Lau-
mann et al. 1994; Mare 1991; Nielsen and Svarer 2006). There could be many reasons
for this phenomenon, one of these, could be due to low search frictions in marriage
markets such as educational institutions (Goldin 1992; Lewis and Oppenheimer 2001;
Gautier et al. 2005; Nielsen and Svarer 2006). Therefore, educational homogamy is a
result of individuals who prefer to be with those of a similar level, or same type of
education than with a different level of education. Another is that, preference-based
partnership choice could occur due to the interdependence between risk sharing and
marriage (Nielsen and Svarer, 2006). Rosenzweig and Stark (1989), Micevska (2002),
Chen et al. (2003) and Hess (2004), among others, have studied partnership formation
and dissolution with the presence of idiosyncratic income risk. Risk averse agents can
benefit from forming marriage with others to insure against unforeseen changes in
income. Furthermore, individuals may view educational attainment of spouses are
complements in the household production function.
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In recent years, there has been evidence of increased assortative mating of couples
in various dimensions but most importantly in education. Educational homogamy
of spouses would imply that human capital becomes concentrated within families.
Educationally homogamous couples also tend to have similar preferences for time
allocation; and, perhaps, are more likely to experience less specialization as their
marginal productivities from home or market work would converge. Since education
can also embody other attributes that may or may not be related directly to human
capital, such as concern for child’s future (Sayer et al., 2004), it would mean that child
quality would be an important aspect of parenting. Consequently, it may well be that
educationally homogamous parents would have less frictions over aspects of parenting
and quality of life of their children.
Andersen and Bonke (2007) use Danish Time Use Surveys for 2001 to examine
parental time investment in children, focusing on educational background, marital
homogamy, and spouses’ relative bargaining power. They find that developmental
care time is correlated with parents’ education, and that marital homogamy reduces
couple specialization, but only among the highly educated. Their findings suggest the
persistence of important inequalities which emerge through behavioural differences
across the educational distribution among households. Over the years, there has been
a surge in higher educational attainment among women which is associated with low
levels of hypergamy (women marrying up) and more marital homogamy (equal levels)
at the top (Rose, 2004). At the same time, one can observe the concentration of low
education in couples (Fernández et al. 2005; Schwartz and Mare 2005). Homogamy, as
suggested by Oppenheimer (1997), is likely to produce greater similarity in terms of
partners’ tastes and preferences for time-allocation and in terms of their abilities in
household production and child care as found by Nielsen and Svarer (2006).
Homogamous couples are expected to have fewer gains from specialization in home
production and child care than heterogamous couples. Consequently, child care among
homogamous couples would be more gender symmetric. In addition, homogamous
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couples are more likely to pool their resources compared to hypergamous couples
(Bonke and Poulsen, 2007). According to Lundberg and Rose (2002) this would imply
that fathers are likely to increase, and mothers decrease, their time dedicated to home
production; most likely at the expense or to the benefit of market work, respectively. If
homogamous couples specialize less in child care then there should be greater similarity
in spousal time use and their relative dedication to child development activities (Bonke
and Poulsen, 2007).
Beck and Sancho (2009) using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study, show a positive association between parental educational homogamy and chil-
dren’s school readiness. Their results confirm that educationally homogamous couples
are more likely to report high levels of mutual support and cooperation in childrearing,
suggesting less friction in the organization of family life. In regard to developmental
activities of children, they found that intra-couple differences in the amount of time
each parent spent with the child are less pronounced in homogamous couples.
Parental care increases by level of education (Leibowitz 1974; 1977; Hill and
Stafford 1974, 1980; Bianchi et al. 2004; Sayer et al. 2004; Lausten and Deding 2006).
Although this may seem puzzling since highly educated parents could face time oppor-
tunity costs (Andersen and Bonke, 2007), but education embodies attributes that are
not necessarily directly related to human capital, such as greater concern for child’s
life chances (Sayer et al., 2004). Therefore, child quality would be given particular
priority in parenting which could be achieved by decreasing time dedicated to other
activities such as leisure or housework by making use of purchased household help if
their income allowed it (Andersen and Bonke, 2007).
As mentioned earlier, one of the consequences of educational assortative mating
is that it increases disparities between families, in their capacity to invest in the
well-being and human capital of their children. This suggests that the total resources
available for investment in children would reflect each partner’s economic, cultural
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and social contributions or even the lack of it. On the contrary, educational sorting
is an indicator of similarity in partners’ preferences and so it would be plausible to
expect that couples where both spouses have similar levels of schooling would suffer
less frictions as investors in their childrens’ human capital. Their relative compatibility
may interact positively with the level of available household resources and may lead to
more efficient investments in their offspring (Beck and Sancho, 2009). On the whole,
both arguments may hold true and be relevant for the organization of family life
and investments in children. In this paper, the interest centers on relative parental
similarity.
3.3 Data and Methods
The analysis is divided into two parts and uses different subsets of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) of the United States from 1968-2013. The long time span of
this dataset and the subsets of data within it, allow for the study of long term and short
term outcomes of a child’s educational path. The main dataset provides information
on various aspects of a household for every household member contained as part of the
family or individual datafile. Along with these main files are the Marriage history files
(1985-2013), Parent identification file, and Child development supplement (1997-2007)
which are used in this paper. The marriage history file of the PSID provides records
for individuals of marriageable age which contain all known cumulative data about
the timing and circumstances of his or her marriages up to and including 2013. This
file contains details about marriage events of eligible people living in a PSID family at
the time of the interview in any wave between 1985-2013. It also includes marriages
prior to 1985 as provided through retrospective reports. Data obtained on variables
such as number of marriages, beginning and end dates for the first and most recent
marriages, marital status of the individual at the time of the most recent interview.
I have made use of the Marriage History files (1985-2013) along with the main
data files to match married individuals and then matched them with the Parent
3.3 Data and Methods | 113
Identification datafile to obtain the child-parent datafile. To examine college outcomes
of children, I have restricted the sample to children who are between the age of 18-28,
which corresponds to 5,932 observations. This is the timeline which I allow for a child
to enrol in college and complete college graduation because majority of children enrol
in college and/or complete graduation during this age. For college enrolment, those
between 18-25 years are chosen and for college graduation are those between 22-28 years.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the sample which consists of 5,932 person-
years. The average age of young adults in this analysis is 23 years and 47% are males.
On average, these individuals have approximately 14 years of education which indicates
that they are going through college. Parents, on average, report being married in
the year 1962, which is before the survey started. Men are reported to be married
by age 27 while women at 24, giving birth almost a year later. The sample consists
of biological mothers and fathers. It does not include adoptive or foster parents, for
simplicity.
College Enrolment and College Graduation: The PSID does not directly
ask for college outcomes, but only asks for completed years of schooling. I classify
those who have attained less than 12 years of completed schooling as high school
dropouts; those who have attained 12 years of education are said to be high school
graduates; those with 13 to 15 years of education are defined as as having achieved
some college education. Lastly, individuals with 16 or more years of schooling are
college graduates. I measure college enrolment as having completed more than 12
years of schooling. College graduation is measured as having completed 16 or more
years of education.2 For college enrolment, every individual is observed from the age
of 18 to 25, during this time period if they are enrolled in college then it is equal to 1
2Using years of education will contain measurement error as individuals in the US report enrollment
in college but a lot of them take time (over the required four years) to graduate which could lead to
the variable on college graduation being inaccurately measured.
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Childs age 22.823 3.151 18 28 5932
Childs gender 0.477 0.5 0 1 5932
Childs race:Latina 0.028 0.166 0 1 5345
Childs race:White 0.828 0.378 0 1 5345
Childs race:Black 0.144 0.351 0 1 5345
Birth year of child 1967.192 10.565 1940 1993 5932
Education 13.817 1.961 7 17 5661
College Enroll 0.362 0.481 0 1 4047
College Grad 0.13 0.336 0 1 1597
HH Size 3.006 1.346 1 18 5376
Own home 1.124 0.39 0 2 5493
Income 10.477 0.875 0.693 14.509 3983
Mothers education 12.116 2.264 2 17 5881
Fathers education 12.29 2.876 2 17 5892
Mother HS– 0.248 0.432 0 1 5881
Mother HS+ 0.47 0.499 0 1 5881
Mother SC 0.161 0.368 0 1 5881
Mother C+ 0.121 0.326 0 1 5881
Father HS– 0.252 0.434 0 1 5892
Father HS+ 0.379 0.485 0 1 5892
Father SC 0.16 0.366 0 1 5892
Father C+ 0.21 0.407 0 1 5892
Husband&Wife: Similar education 0.536 0.499 0 1 5880
Husband&Wife: Wife>Husb 0.183 0.387 0 1 5880
Husband&Wife: Husb>Wife 0.282 0.45 0 1 5880
Mothers age at childbirth 25.279 5.011 14 48 5912
Fathers age at childbirth 27.84 5.849 14 65 5921
Marriage Year 1962.533 11.872 1932 1995 4546
Marriage/Response Year 1964.04 10.767 1932 1995 5932
Fathers age at marriage 27.262 9.465 11 75 5891
Mothers age at marriage 24.683 9.317 13 78 5891
Order of marriage:Father 1.283 0.587 1 5 5926
Order of marriage:Mother 1.269 0.579 1 5 5908
Joint Child Custody 0.04 0.195 0 1 5932
Unilateral Divorce Law 0.217 0.412 0 1 5932
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and 0 if they are not in college. Similarly, for college graduation, every individual is
observed from the age of 22 to 28, if they have successfully graduated from college
then they receive 1 and 0 if they are still enrolled in college and have not graduated.3
Therefore, the sample consists of 5,932 person-years. Out of these, 36% are reported
to be enrolled in college (4,047 person-years), while 13% (1,597 person-years) are
reported to have graduated, respectively.
Educational Homogamy and Other Covariates Parental education is also
categorized as high school dropouts (HS–), high school graduates (HS+), some college
level education (SC) and college graduates (C+). The number of women reported to
be high school graduates is 47% which is 10% points greater than that of men. There
is no difference reported in the number of men and women who went to college, both
equivalent to 16%. Although the number of women who graduated from college is
12%, much lower than men (21%). The primary variable of interest in this study is
educational homogamy. This variable is a binary indicator equals 1 if both, mother
and father are high school dropouts or both are high school graduates or both have
some college education or both are college graduates and/or higher. It is equal to 0 if
either of them falls into a different educational category. Also, as generated from the
process of parental education is educational hypogamy, which is also a binary indi-
cator, equal to 1 if the mother’s education belongs to a higher category than the father.
Other covariates included in the analysis are divided as household characteristics
which include household size, household income measured in dollars (in logs) and
whether the house is owned, rented or neither. Child characteristics such as age,
gender, year of birth and race, if child is latino, white or black. Parental characteristics
are parental education, their age at marriage, age at childbirth, order of marriage and
year of marriage.
3There are data issues encountered here in following these individuals, if some do and others do
not live at home. Please see Appendix A.3 for details
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3.3.1 Identification Strategy
The key empirical issue in this paper is controlling for the endogeneity of educational
homogamy. This problem could arise due to a number of reasons. First, omitted
variable bias could arise because parents’ decision to invest in their own education is
affected by their own observable and unobservable characteristics. Some of these char-
acteristics may be correlated with parental skills and others are genetically transmitted
from parents to children, leading to a correlation between parents’ and children’s edu-
cation. These factors could include individual personalities, parental ability, attributes
that maybe indirectly related to human capital, such as greater concern for child’s life
chances and any other perceptions regarding child development and welfare. Second,
measurement error due to the inability to fully observe all the variables all the time can
lead to endogeneity of the primary variable of interest. The inner ability or personal
traits that causes a person to achieve a certain level of education can also affect or
influence his or her choice of spouse. To correct for endogeneity, I exploit the variation
in the timing of two laws that affected marriages and child welfare in the United States.
3.3.2 Institutional Framework
There are two laws used in this paper: the Unilateral Divorce law which was imple-
mented between 1935-1985 and the Joint Custody law between 1973-2003 throughout
the United States.
Unilateral Divorce Law: The new no-fault unilateral divorce laws allowed
people to seek a divorce without the consent of their spouse. The most significant part
of this reform that swept the United States took place during the 1970s, although the
process of removing fault grounds for spouses to ask for divorce had already began
before the 1950s (Gruber, 2004). The first state to pass this law was Alaska in 1935.
Between 1968 and 1988, 29 states changed their legal systems from mutual consent
divorce to a unilateral system (Wolfers, 2006). Unilateral divorce may affects a child’s
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well-being through different channels.
One of the possible ways is through a change in the bargaining position between
husband and wife as argued by Chiappori et al. (2002). If unilateral divorce weakens
the bargaining position of women within marriage, then children maybe negatively
affected, irrespective of the occurrence of divorce. It is plausible to assume that if
both the husband and wife are educationally homogamous, then there may not be a
shift in the bargaining position as either party would be having an equal bargaining
power, more egalitarian relations in the household. If the couple is educationally
hypogamous (wife has more education than husband) or even hypergamous (husband
has more education than wife) then it would be plausible to assume that bargaining
power might shift to the parent who is more educated, has better employment and
perhaps has more resources to provide for the needs of the child.
Several authors have analysed marriage as a commitment device that fosters
cooperation and promotes them to make relationship-specific investments, such as
investments in children, in terms of number of children and quality of children (Brinig
and Crafton 1994; Matouschek and Rasul 2008; Stevenson 2007). Since unilateral
divorce is a threat to marriage, it would also affect couples incentives to invest in their
marriage.4 However, if the couple is educationally homogamous and, therefore, is likely
to have similar preferences regarding investments in children, then presumably the
reform would not undermine their incentives to invest in their children to a considerable
extent. Nonetheless, if it was the case that the wife has more education than her
husband or vice versa, then perhaps their incentives to invest in marriage-specific
capital are not aligned with each other and, the threat to marriage is higher.
Another consequence of the divorce law reform is that it affects the selection into
marriage. It can lead to either positive or negative selection into marriage. Since this
reform decreases the cost of marriage, couples of low match quality would now be
willing to try out marriage because the reduction in divorce costs alleviates the cost
4See Delpiano and Giolito (2008)
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of marriage without affecting its benefits, thereby increasing marriage and divorce
propensity (Alesina and Giuliano, 2007a). On the other hand, Matouschek and Rasul
(2008) argue that couples with low match quality may not marry, thus, decreasing
marriage and divorce propensity. The two authors along with (Wolfers, 2006) have
empirically shown positive selection into marriage. Either way, negative or positive
selection into marriage could play a crucial role in the early stages of those children
born after the unilateral divorce law took place (Delpiano and Giolito, 2008)
Joint Child Custody Law: The joint custody laws were enacted to improve
the well-being of children whose parents divorce. Figure 3.1 in Appendix A.3 shows
the timing of the implementation of joint custody laws in the US. A joint custody
provision allows courts to handle those disputes which cannot be settled privately. If
the child custody decision must be made in the court, judges have the discretion to
rule in favour of joint custody if it conforms to the best interests of the child (Buehler
and Gerard, 1995). Depending on family specific circumstances, joint custody can fall
under the protocol of (i) joint legal custody in which parents share in the decisions
of child upbringing but the child’s residence is with one of the parents or (ii) joint
physical custody in which both parents share in child rearing decisions and also share
physical custody of the child. Under either joint-custody settlement, courts expect
divorced parents to maintain a cooperative relationship while raising their children
(Brinig and Buckley, 1998; Nunley and Seals, 2011).
If the distribution of the marital surplus after divorce occurs is altered by child
custody reforms, then cooperative bargaining models of family behaviour predict
changes in married couples’ investment in children. There is ample empirical evidence
that changes in family laws and government programs that provide transfers to one
spouse shape the bargaining process over the course of marriage (Chiappori et al. 2002;
Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Genadek et al. 2007; Gitter and Barham 2008; Gray
1998; Lundberg et al. 1997; Stevenson 2007; 2008; Ward-Batts 2008). States that
change the default custodial allocation from maternal preference to shared custody
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decrease (increase) the expected post-divorce time mother (fathers) spend with their
children.
According to Brinig and Allen (2000), women are more likely to file for divorce
based on the expectation of sole child custody. This would indicate that joint custody
reforms raised the cost of divorce form mothers and, consequently, places mothers in an
inferior bargaining position within marriage (Nunley and Seals, 2011). It is well known
in the empirical literature on intra-household resource allocation, that there is a higher
rate of investment or spending on children when mothers have greater bargaining
power in the household (Attanasio and Lechene 2002; Bobonis 2009; Lundberg et al.
1997; Maitra 2004; Thomas 1990; Ward-Batts 2008). Child investment may decline if
the reform shifts bargaining power away from mother, who value child quality more
on average as predicted by Rasul (2006) model. However, it could provide fathers
an additional incentive to invest in their children because they could then reap a
greater proportion of the post-divorce benefits from child investment through increased
visitation rights.
Nunley and Seals (2011) argue that if spouses have homogeneous preferences for
child quality, joint custody is the optimal post-divorce custody allocation because it
maximizes investment in the public good, which is children, during marriage. Their
findings show that if spouses have an equally high valuation of child quality then a
rise in probability that a child attends private school would be observed when a state
adopts joint custody. Böheim et al. (2012) examine the effects of the introduction of
joint custody after divorce on family behaviour within and outside marriage using
Austrian data. Their results show that the reform significantly reduced divorce and
female employment rates and significantly increased marriage and marital birth rates.
3.3.3 Model Specification: College Outcomes
To examine the causal relationship between college outcomes of young adults and edu-
cational homogamy and hypogamy, I estimate the following equation, where Hgjk with
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superscript g equal to 1 indicates educational homogamy and g equal to 2 represents
hypogamy.
CollegeOutcomesit = β1H1jk + β2H2jk + β3Xi + Y earofbirthi + Statess + ζit (3.1)
where H1jk is a binary indicator, equal to 1 if couple j, where husband and wife, both
are either high school dropouts, high school graduates, have some college education or
are college graduates or higher, at time k, where k is the year of marriage or the year
they were first observed in the sample. H2jk is a binary indicator for hypogamy, it is
equal to 1 if, for couple j, if the wife has more education than the husband. The base
group is where the husband has more education than his wife.
Xi is the vector of household characteristics such as family’s total disposable
income (in logs) measured in dollars, household size; house ownership - if owned,
rented or neither, with neither as the reference category. Also included in Xi are child
characteristics such as child’s sex; race - whether white, black or latina, with latina
as the base category; parental controls which are mother’s education- if mother is
high school dropout, high school graduate, has some college education or is a college
graduate, with high school dropout as the base group. It also includes parents age at
childbirth which are divided as follows: 17 or below, between 18-29, 30-39 and over 40
years of age for mother and father respectively. Women would postpone motherhood
if they face steep opportunity costs (Hotz et al., 1997) or if they want to educate
themselves further. Mothers education and age at childbirth should help capture the
mother’s career dedication. Also included are dummy variables for birth cohorts and
states where the individual grew up. Birth cohorts are dummy variables for those born
in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and between 1980-93 where the base group comprises of
those born in the 1940s. ζit are the unobservable factors that affect college enrolment
and graduation outcomes. Additionally, controls for trends in reported education is
included, by controlling for the year the survey was conducted.
3.3 Data and Methods | 121
There are two types of college outcomes in consideration: College enrolment,
denoted by Enrollit and College graduation, Gradit. So, equation (3.1) is estimated
with Enrollit as the first dependent variable and then with Gradit as the second
dependent variable. Subscript i stands for individual i=1, 2, 3,....., n and t denotes
the age-group for enrolment (18-25) and age-group for graduation (22-28) over which
they are observed. This leads to N=5,932 or person-years since every individual is
observed from 18 years of age to 25 to be enrolled in college and from 22 years of
age to 28 to have graduated from college. Assuming that Hgjk is independent of ζit
leads to biased estimates of the effect of educational homogamy and hypogamy on
the educational choices of young adults. To instrument for educational homogamy
and hypogamy, I rely on the couples’ year of marriage or year they were first observed
together (in case the former is missing), to determine whether the unilateral divorce
and joint child custody laws were in place before their marriage. For each couple I
estimate the following first stage equation.
Hgjk = α1UDks + α2JCCks + α3Xj + Statess + ϵjk (3.2)
Educational homogamy and hypogamy is regressed on the two instruments, Uni-
lateral divorce (UDks) and Joint Child Custody law (JCCks); and vector Xj, which
includes mother’s education, couple’s ages at marriage, order of the current marriage
and their year of marriage. UDks is a binary indicator equal to 1, if unilateral divorce
law was passed in state s before the year of marriage k of couple j. Similarly, JCCks is
also a binary variable, equal to 1, if joint custody law was passed in state s before the
time of marriage k of couple j. The two equations, for g = 1, 2 are estimated simulta-
neously and the predicted educational homogamy and hypogamy of each couple is then
used to estimate equation (3.1). Standard errors are obtained by a 500-replication
bootstrap of the two-step procedure. The following IV equation is estimated:
CollegeOutcomesit = β1Hˆ1jk + β2Hˆ2jk + β3Xi + Y earofbirthi + Statess + ζit (3.3)
where Hˆ1jk and Hˆ2jk are the fitted values on educational homogamy and hypogamy,
obtained from the first stage equation (3.2). By theory, the instruments, UDks and
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Table 3.2 First Stage Results: Multinomial Logit Marginal Effects
Variables Educational Homogamy Educational Hypogamy
(H=W) (W>H)
Joint Child Custody Law 0.1723* 0.0178
(0.0902) (0.0395)
Unilateral Divorce Law -0.1252** 0.0622**
(0.0627) (0.0290)
Age at marriage: Husband -0.0003 -0.0008
(0.0031) (0.0015)
Age at marriage: Wife -0.0002 0.0021*
(0.0032) (0.0013)
Order of Marriage: Husband -0.0461 0.0342
(0.0511) (0.0220)
Order of Marriage: Wife -0.0342 -0.0126
(0.0480) (0.0218)
Year of Marriage 0.0006 -0.0027**
(0.0024) (0.0011)
Wife’s education -0.0016 0.0322***
(0.0087) (0.0033)
State dummies x x
Wald Test (chi2) Statistic 10.4140 10.4140
Pseudo-Loglikelihood -614.3482 -614.3482
Observations 706 706
Standard errors clustered at mother level in parentheses
JCCks must be correlated with educational homogamy and hypogamy, but must
not have an independent effect on college outcomes except through homogamy and
hypogamy. Table 3.2 presents marginal effects of the multinomial logit model. It
shows the effect of unilateral divorce and joint custody laws on educational homogamy
and hypogamy. Unilateral divorce and joint custody laws are important determinants
of homogamy and hypogamy. The instruments are jointly and individually significant
at the 5% and 10% level and the first stage Wald statistic is 10.414 indicating that
the instruments perform fairly well. The sample in the first stage results consists of
one observation per couple so a cross-section of 706 couples. In all regressions state
fixed effects have been controlled for because local variables often matter for college
decisions of individuals; although individuals might move to different locations for
their studies, perhaps to avoid high tuition fees. However, moving can be costly and
Currie and Moretti (2003) report evidence that the majority of students do not move
to a different state to go to college (see also Hoxby (1997).
If the law has passed before marriage, then the binary variable indicating joint cus-
tody laws and unilateral divorce is equal to 1, otherwise it is equal to 0. This identifies
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selection into marriage. Those who want to get married will get married either way
but those who don’t want to get married may not. However, the unilateral divorce
by making it easier to end a marriage can prompt even low matches to now try out
marriage. Once married, the laws do influence the risk of marital dissolution since the
laws make it easier for any married couple to divorce and seek custody for their children.
More and more individuals in recent decades are married to those who are similar
to their own educational attainment levels, among other factors. If one believes that
educational homogeneity of spouses represents a better match or a high match type
couple and hypogamy implies a low match, then it is certainly plausible that with
the introduction of unilateral divorce laws which made divorce easier, a high match
quality couple might wait to choose selection into marriage, while many low match
type couples would be willing to try marriage, because now the cost of exiting the
marriage is low. So, the passing of the unilateral divorce law may delay the incidence
of marriage for a high match couple leading to a decrease in marriage of homogamous
couples. On the other hand, unilateral divorce may increase the probability of a low
match type couple to be married, thus showing a positive effect on hypogamy.
The change in attitudes towards marriage and the behaviour of married couples
requires time and does not happen immediately resulting in a delayed impact of joint
custody reforms as shown by Halla (2013). The passing of joint custody reform has a
positive effect on homogamy as shown in Table 3.2. A reason for this could be that
joint custody positively affects those couples who have homogenous preferences for
child quality because it maximizes investment in children during marriage, as argued
by Nunley and Seals (2011).
These sets of laws affect family formation or dissolution in one dimension, and
in another dimension, they affect the allocation of resources of these parents upon
dissolution, with their children. These set of laws affect family behaviour regardless of
whether it is during marriage or after marriage. The expectation is that any change
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in the default law on divorces will change the behaviour within marriages, and will
change the way resources are allocated to children after divorce. Therefore, these laws
will have an impact on how people select into marriage.
3.4 Results
Results in Table 3.3 show OLS estimates in columns (1)-(2) and Probit marginal
effects in columns (3)-(4). Both sets of estimates show a negative effect of educational
homogamy (H=W)and hypogamy (W>H) on college enrollment and graduation, com-
pared to the case where husband is more educated than the wife. These effect sizes
are higher for Probit estimates than for OLS. Keeping the focus on OLS estimates,
educationally homogamous couples decrease the probability of college enrollment and
graduation by 7.5% points and 11.2% points, respectively. Educational hypogamy also
decreases enrollment and graduation by 10.4% points and 13% points. A negative effect
is an unexpected result because conventional reasoning suggests that homogenous
preferences especially in terms of education, would increase the likelihood of children
attaining higher education. This may be driven by the pooling of couples where the
spouses are both low educated with those where both are high educated. Therefore,
in Table 3.11 I present OLS estimates where in columns (1)-(4) this restriction has
been relaxed.
In estimates displayed in columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.11, I include all the interaction
terms on mothers and fathers educational homogamy levels such as: both are high
school dropouts, both are high school graduates, both have some college education and
both are college graduates or higher. Columns (1-2) control for mothers education while
columns (3-4) do not. Results show no effect of parental educational homogamy at any
level, on college enrollment of their children, when mothers education is controlled (col-
umn 1). The probability of college graduation decreases by 14% points for couples who
are high school graduates, 12% points for those with some college education and by 14%
points for couples who are college graduates or higher. Without controlling for mothers
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education, estimates show a decrease of 17% points in college enrollment of children
whose parents are high school dropouts. However, the probability of enrollment rises
by almost 12% points for children whose parents are themselves college graduates or
higher. College graduation decreases by 14% points for children whose parents are
high school graduates. Overall, a negative effect of educational homogamy can be
observed on college graduation rates of young adults in this study. While enrollment
of young people is positively affected by couples who were themselves college graduates.
One of the reasons for decline in college graduation could be due to the fact that in
the 1960’s and 1970’s the federal government and some states had taken an initiative
to increase access to college, in order to provide opportunities to people from less
advantaged backgrounds since education is linked to economic mobility (Scott et al.,
2006). Therefore, public colleges played an important role to achieve this need, so
by the end of the 20th century 78% of college students were enrolled in state schools
(Mortenson, 2000). Around the same time, college graduation rates started to decline
and public support for financing higher education had declined. Five-year graduation
rates in 1980’s and 1990’s dropped from 58% to 52% (Mortenson, 1998).
Table 3.4 shows IV-2SLS results, where the fitted values obtained from the first
stage regression estimates in Table 3.2 have been plugged into the second stage to
obtain IV estimates of β1 and β2 from equation (3.1). Bootstrapped standard errors
have been calculated using 500 replications. The sample is restricted to young adults
who are 18-28 years of age. The sample in the first stage consists of 706 couples and
this is different from the sample of children (5,932 person-years), in the second stage.
Due to this the usual ivregress command in stata cannot be used and estimation
is done by manually adding the fitted values from the first stage into the second
stage. Effects are presented in terms of coefficient estimates and their bootstrapped
standard errors. Columns (1)-(2) of Table 3.4, present estimates for all the young
individuals in the sample and columns (3)-(4) are estimates for those individuals whose
parents are reported to be in the same marriage since the start of the survey. For the
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analysis, I examine young adults whose biological parents are intact and exclude those
from blended families because child investment decisions and other decisions within
marriage would likely be taken by biological parents. 80% of young adults come from
parents who are reportedly in the same marriage since the survey date and out of
these, 85% of the couples are in their first marriages.
The main variable of interest is educational homogamy and results indicate that
there are strong and significant effects of educational homogamy of couples (in com-
parison to the base group), positively affecting college enrolment, under ceteris paribus
conditions, leading to an increase of 12% points in enrolment outcomes of their children,
based on the whole sample. Moreover, if the mother is more educated than the father,
it leads to an increase of 4% points in the likelihood of college enrolment of the child,
controlling for everything else. These results are similar to those in column (3) for
the sample of couples who reported to be in the same marriage since the start of the
survey. Educational homogamy and hypogamy, increase the propensity to enrol in
college by 10% points and 6% points respectively. However, there are no effects on
college graduation outcomes. This could be due to the lack of enough observations on
college graduation. Educational hypogamy, where the education of the wife is higher
than the husband, is also instrumented using the fitted values from the first stage
regressions, but that too, does not affect college graduation.
Compared to the OLS estimates, which are presented in Table 3.3, it can be noted
that the IV estimates are very different.5 First, the signs are negative which indicate a
decrease in the probability of college enrolment and college graduation. This could be
due to the pooling of low educated and high educated couples. Second, the magnitude
of the OLS estimates is different from the IV results shown Table 3.4. The effect
sizes of the IV estimates are much higher than those of OLS mainly since the latter
are negative. Measurement error in the college graduation variable, which arises
due to using years of education, could be a reason why no effects are observed on
5Same as before, columns (1) and (2) for the whole sample and, columns (3) and (4) for the
sample of couples in the same marriage.
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graduation in the IV results. With regards to other estimates, results show that males
are less likely to enrol in college and complete graduation, as compared to females.
Increases in household size can negatively affect the probability of college enrollment
and graduation. Mothers age at childbirth increases the chances of enrolment and
graduation of children (columns (3)-(4)), while fathers age at childbirth decreases the
likelihood of enrolment.
The change in divorce and child welfare laws are most likely to have affected
the marriage or divorce decisions of couples at the margin of forming their families.
Therefore, it will also affect the parenting behaviour of these couples. Any change
in divorce laws has the effect of changing the selection into marriage. Findings from
Rasul (2003) indicate that unilateral divorce caused better selection into marriage, in
particular, the duration of marriages under unilateral divorce than mutual consent,
increased significantly. Figure 3.2 shows that marriage rates of adopting states declined,
this seems to suggests better selection into marriage. Thus, the composition of those
marrying under unilateral divorce differed from earlier marriage cohorts.
Moreover, Halla (2013) has shown a delayed and growing impact of joint custody
reforms. He cites two main reasons for this to happen: First, the process of behavioural
change requires a significant amount of time and cannot take an immediate effect.
Second, the development of joint custody awards follows the years after the reform,
since there is a slow diffusion of information about the law. Once the potential benefits
of the law on life after divorce have become evident, can there be any expected effect
of the law on the incidence of marriage. So, individuals take time to adapt to new
information, update their beliefs and then decide whether to marry or not. Consistent
with this, Böheim et al. (2012) has also shown significantly reduced divorce rates
and increased marriage rates. All of these suggests that couples are choosing better
selection into marriage.
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These laws affect those marginal couples who may think that a different allocation
of resources to children, once divorced, would give a good reason for them to divorce
and thus they may end up terminating their marriage. For example, if the wife
perceives that she will not have joint custody but sole custody upon divorce, then the
husband may not want to give her as much money to support their child. However,
if they were to have joint custody, then he would be willing to take part of the
responsibility in case of divorce. These kind of situations might happen in particular
couples and perhaps not in the case of those couples who would have opted for divorce,
regardless of whether the husband is bearing partial responsibility for children, or
even couples who would never divorce in anyway. Clearly, there are unobservable
factors influencing these different groups of couples, which prompt them to behave in a
certain way. These unobservables could be certain values that men and women attach
to their marriage or partnership, unobserved health condition of the child, attractive
outside marriage options. So there is a Local Average Treatment Effect6 here, stronger
these motivations are the stronger the likelihood of divorce for any couple at the margin.
Heterogeneous Effects
This subsection explores whether there is evidence that estimates for college enrollment
or graduation are different for various subgroups of the population sample.
By Cohorts: Assortative mating, especially along the lines of education, has
emerged to be stronger in recent decades than in earlier decades, so it may be possible
that the results are driven by cohort effects. Therefore, children from younger cohorts
are presumably more likely to have parents where both mother and father have similar
levels of education. Table 3.5 shows the results by cohorts, where the following
IV equation has been estimated and dummy variables for birth cohorts have been
interacted with the fitted values of educational homogamy and hypogamy.
6(Angrist and Imbens, 1994)
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CollegeOutcomesit = γ1Hˆ1jk + γ2Hˆ2jk + γ3Xi + γ4Hˆ1jk ∗ 1970-79 +
+ γ5Hˆ2jk ∗ 1980-93 + γ6Hˆ1jk ∗ 1970-79 + (3.4)
γ7Hˆ2jk ∗ 1980-93 + Y earofbirthi + Statess + ιit
Columns (1) and (2) include interaction terms for those born in the 1970s, columns
(3) and (4) include interaction terms for those born between 1980-1993 and columns (5)
and (6) include interaction terms for both youngest birth cohorts, that is, 1970-1979
and 1980-1993. Educational homogamy and hypogamy increase the probability of
enrolling in college, everything else being equal as can be seen from columns (1)-(4) of
Table 3.5, although the interaction terms themselves are not significant. Column (5)
includes interaction terms where the effect of educational homogamy now varies with
the birth cohort. The partial effect of college educational homogamy on college enroll-
ment increases by 7.4% points on average, if the individual belongs to the youngest
birth cohort 1980-93. Those individuals born in the 1980s are more likely to enrol in
college if their parents have similar educational levels. Furthermore, findings show
that the college enrolment decreases for those born in the 1970s and 1980s if mothers
have more education than fathers. This is slightly puzzling since education of mothers
should in fact increase the educational progress of children as evidence shows that
mothers care relatively more about their children than fathers.
By Gender: An interesting issue is whether boys and girls are affected differently
by the presence of educationally homogamous or hypogamous parents. For the results
in Table 3.6, equation (3.3) is estimated for sons and daughters. Results indicate that,
for daughters, educational homogamy of parents strongly increases the possibility of
college enrolments by 27% points, whilst for sons the effect of educational hypogamy
(mother more educated than the father) has a considerable effect (22% points) in
increasing the chances of college enrolment. Black et al. (2003) on the contrary esti-
mate a positive effect of mother’s education only on their sons. Table 3.6 shows that
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daughters benefit more from educational similarity of their parents while progression
of sons into college is affected by the mothers who are more educated than the fathers.
By Race: Results shown in Table 3.7 are obtained by estimating equation (3.3) for
latinos, whites and blacks separately. The effect of educational homogamy on college
enrolment is positive for latinos and whites but homogamy decreases the probability of
college enrolment for blacks by 55% points. However, if the mother is more educated
than the father then likelihood of college enrolment increases for blacks by almost 40%
points. Therefore, these results show that mothers education plays a crucial role in
children’s higher educational progress and from this analysis it shows that this result
especially holds for black children.
By Mothers education: In Table 3.8, I distinguished two groups of children based
on their mothers education. Columns (1) and (2) present coefficient estimates for or
less, while columns (3) and (4) for mothers who achieved some college education or
more. Individuals from the former group, have a higher likelihood of college enrolment
if their parents have similar educational levels, ceteris paribus and their chances of
enrolment also increase if mother has more education than the father.
By Income: Table 3.9 presents results by household income. Columns (1) and (2)
show estimates for households where income is less than or equal to median income,
while columns (3) and (4) for households with higher than median income, the median
income being $39,000. Findings indicate that propensity for college enrolment increases
if mother is more educated, in both sets of households. However, it is interesting to
note that this propensity is higher for households with less than median income as
compared to those families with higher than median income.
Possible Mechanisms
The results presented in this analysis can be interpreted using the modelling framework
posited by Rasul (2006) which suggests that marriage investment in child quality
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is driven by parental preferences for child investment and their relative bargaining
position within marriage. Fiorini and Keane (2014), Del Bono et al. (2012), Boca et al.
(2014) are studies that bring parental time into the research agenda on child outcomes,
and show that parental time and parenting styles are important determinants of early
child development. In relation to this, relative symmetry in parental behaviours may
also drive the effect of homogamy on child outcomes. Fathers may spend more time
in developmental care with children than their heterogamous counterparts. In what
follows, I provide some evidence of this mechanism.
Using the three waves of Child Development Sample (CDS) from 1997–2007, with a
sample of 2,512 children aged 3 to 15, Table 3.10 provides descriptive statistics (Mean
and the standard deviation in parentheses) for fathers involvement in developmental
care of children. The first column consists of responses from fathers in homogamous
unions (H ∼= W ) while the second and third columns is for fathers in heterogamous
marriages, W > H and H > W respectively.
Evidence shows that fathers from homogamous unions, on average, are more likely
to be involved with children through various activities such as outdoor activities or
playing sports, any indoor games as well as educational activities such as reading books
with them. In terms of household chores, again fathers from homogamous marriages
are slightly more engaged with their children in terms of doing simple activities like
repairing things, cleaning the house or preparing food and doing dishes together. They
also tend to be more emotionally attached and would be inclined to talk about their
past or family life with their children. This provides suggestive evidence that spouses
in homogamous marriages tend to behave similar due to which fathers are perhaps,
more equally involved in child rearing with mothers, and this could potentially drive
the impact of homogamy on child outcomes to be positive.
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3.5 Conclusion
This study examines the role of parental education on college outcomes of young indi-
viduals in the United States using the PSID data for 1968-2013. It offers new evidence
which shows that similarity in parental education leads to an increase in the probability
of college enrolment of young adults. To estimate the causal impact of educational
homogamy on college outcomes, the paper exploits the variation in the timing of
unilateral divorce and joint child custody laws across the United States. The findings
indicate that parental educational homogamy (H ∼= W ) increases the likelihood of
college enrolment of their children, and so does educational hypogamy (W > H),
as compared to the situation where fathers are more educated than mothers (H > W ).
There is a fair amount of heterogeneity in the estimates along birth cohorts, gender,
race, mothers education and income. For example, the positive effect of educational
homogamy is observed among individuals born in the eighties. For females, educational
homogamy significantly increases the chances of college enrolment, while for males,
it is educational hypogamy that promotes their likelihood of enrolment. There are
also racial differences, for latinos and whites the effects of educational homogamy
on enrolment is positive and significant. On the contrary, for blacks, educational
homogamy decreases their propensity to enrol. Educational hypogamy, on the other
hand, positively affects the propensity of enrolment for blacks. Children of mothers
who have less than college education are more likely to enrol in college while no major
effect of family income is observed for educational homogamy. Suggestive evidence
also shows fathers from homogamous marriages tend to be more involved with their
children in household and developmental activities and this is perhaps, one of the
consequences of relative symmetry in parental behaviours which positively affects
children. However, relative bargaining position within marriages could also be a
possible factor, and currently this paper cannot say much on this, but, it can be one
of the few desirable extensions of this study and would require some more data mining
and further research to understand these effects.
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Table 3.3 Baseline Estimates I
OLS Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables College Enrolment College Graduation College Enrolment College Graduation
Educational Homogamy (H ∼= W ) -0.075* -0.112*** -0.232** -0.5093***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.116) (0.148)
Educational Hypogamy (W>H) -0.104** -0.129*** -0.307** -0.7153***
(0.047) (0.038) (0.142) (0.187)
Mothers educ: HS+ 0.104** -0.007 0.345** -0.0686
(0.041) (0.036) (0.138) (0.210)
Mothers educ: SC 0.235*** 0.055 0.711*** 0.3083
(0.052) (0.048) (0.165) (0.238)
Mothers educ: C+ 0.287*** 0.194*** 0.855*** 0.9017***
(0.058) (0.049) (0.185) (0.265)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.271*** 0.103 1.049*** 0.3642
(0.074) (0.111) (0.340) (0.519)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.392*** 0.091 1.398*** 0.2410
(0.092) (0.116) (0.376) (0.544)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.219* 0.352*** 0.821* 1.1002*
(0.115) (0.126) (0.464) (0.585)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 -0.328*** 0.194*** -4.418*** 4.0933***
(0.073) (0.061) (0.370) (0.453)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.399*** 0.226*** -4.637*** 4.2528***
(0.083) (0.069) (0.391) (0.470)
Fathers age at childbirth:40+ -0.228* 0.123 -4.111*** 3.5368***
(0.128) (0.089) (0.477) (0.557)
Child gender:male -0.049 -0.088*** -0.153 -0.4091***
(0.032) (0.023) (0.096) (0.118)
HH income(logs) 0.035* -0.012 0.120* -0.0604
(0.019) (0.020) (0.065) (0.088)
Race: White 0.035 0.086 0.104 0.5150
(0.084) (0.062) (0.292) (0.415)
Race:Blacks 0.163* 0.144** 0.493 0.7643*
(0.096) (0.069) (0.324) (0.452)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.396*** -0.043 -1.214*** -0.3556
(0.129) (0.076) (0.373) (0.334)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.616*** -0.034 -1.906*** -0.2488
(0.141) (0.088) (0.416) (0.395)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.879*** -0.047 -2.712*** -0.2547
(0.158) (0.105) (0.474) (0.498)
Birth year:1980-93 -1.022*** -0.004 -3.185*** -0.0906
(0.181) (0.126) (0.546) (0.587)
Household size -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.124*** -0.1867***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.054)
Own House 0.104 0.029 0.375 0.0805
(0.111) (0.096) (0.358) (0.550)
Rented House 0.010 -0.018 0.092 -0.1209
(0.110) (0.100) (0.358) (0.566)
Year 0.027*** 0.001 0.082*** 0.0017
(0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.015)
State dummies x x x x
Observations 2,669 1,117 2,646 1,057
Robust standard errors clustered at child-level in parentheses.
Columns (1-2) show OLS estimates and
columns (3-4) show Probit marginal effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.4 IV 2SLS Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES College Enrolment College Graduation College Enrolment College Graduation
̂Educ.HomogjH ∼= W 0.1198*** 0.0216 0.0995** -0.0002
(0.034) (0.041) (0.046) (0.070)
̂Educ.HypogjW > H 0.0380* -0.0225 0.0591** 0.0021
(0.022) (0.030) (0.027) (0.039)
Mothers educ: HS+ 0.0138 -0.0266 -0.0002 -0.0504
(0.039) (0.045) (0.041) (0.049)
Mothers educ: SC 0.0756 0.0430 0.0320 -0.0052
(0.061) (0.070) (0.068) (0.083)
Mothers educ: C+ 0.0362 0.1727* -0.0219 0.1464
(0.083) (0.096) (0.088) (0.110)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.2508*** 0.0844 0.3084*** 0.5667*
(0.044) (0.106) (0.041) (0.299)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.3661*** 0.0788 0.4341*** 0.5506*
(0.054) (0.107) (0.053) (0.296)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.1924 0.4389 0.2722* 0.9586*
(0.169) (0.404) (0.150) (0.525)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 -0.2610*** 0.2168*** -0.0669 0.0485
(0.057) (0.072) (0.057) (0.072)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.3230*** 0.2542*** -0.1404** 0.0610
(0.064) (0.080) (0.057) (0.060)
Fathers age at childbirth:40+ -0.1316 0.1394 — —
(0.089) (0.101)
Child gender:male -0.0501*** -0.0770*** -0.0504** -0.0890***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.020) (0.026)
HH income(logs) 0.0439*** -0.0043 0.0470*** -0.0261
(0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.024)
Race: White 0.0329 0.0368 0.0230 -0.0242
(0.059) (0.072) (0.072) (0.087)
Race:Blacks 0.1421** 0.0620 0.1424* -0.0126
(0.064) (0.083) (0.076) (0.094)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.3873*** -0.0361 -0.3871*** -0.0348
(0.080) (0.081) (0.082) (0.084)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.5572*** -0.0227 -0.5146*** -0.0092
(0.087) (0.100) (0.093) (0.107)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.8011*** -0.0249 -0.7519*** -0.0147
(0.100) (0.120) (0.110) (0.130)
Birth year:1980-93 -0.9586*** 0.0269 -0.8835*** 0.0618
(0.115) (0.143) (0.130) (0.156)
Household size -0.0384*** -0.0384*** -0.0385*** -0.0379***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Own House 0.0911 0.0131 0.0962 -0.0391
(0.074) (0.090) (0.089) (0.155)
Rented House 0.0111 -0.0149 -0.0287 -0.0034
(0.080) (0.099) (0.100) (0.163)
Year 0.0262*** 0.0000 0.0238*** 0.0020
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
State dummies x x x x
Observations 2,643 1,109 2,104 855
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
Columns (1-2) for all marriages
Columns (3-4) for couples in first marriages.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6 Heterogenous Effects II: By Gender
– Females – – Males –
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES College Enrollment College Graduation College Enrollment College Graduation
̂Educ.HomogjH ∼= W 0.2722*** -0.0315 -0.0373 0.0477
(0.076) (0.117) (0.078) (0.101)
̂Educ.HypogjW > H -0.0638 0.0673 0.2209*** -0.0656
(0.048) (0.082) (0.043) (0.070)
Mothers educ: HS+ 0.1432** -0.2014 -0.1633** 0.0320
(0.072) (0.127) (0.066) (0.089)
Mothers educ: SC 0.1909* -0.2333 -0.1752* 0.1058
(0.111) (0.210) (0.104) (0.130)
Mothers educ: C+ 0.2631* -0.0508 -0.4298*** 0.2871
(0.147) (0.260) (0.150) (0.195)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.3924*** 0.1075 0.2393** -0.0788
(0.060) (0.148) (0.109) (0.078)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.4760*** 0.0703 0.3845*** —
(0.078) (0.164) (0.128)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.3835 0.5713 0.2832 —
(0.248) (0.410) (0.176)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 -0.1399* 0.0761 -0.1571 0.2312**
(0.078) (0.140) (0.108) (0.115)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.1695** 0.0452 -0.2148** 0.1873**
(0.075) (0.121) (0.093) (0.095)
HH income(logs) 0.1011*** -0.0071 -0.0212 -0.0360
(0.022) (0.040) (0.022) (0.043)
Race: White -0.1562 -0.0943 0.1853** 0.0299
(0.096) (0.144) (0.073) (0.091)
Race: Blacks 0.0021 -0.1234 0.2376*** 0.0285
(0.112) (0.157) (0.084) (0.100)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.3481*** -0.0775 -0.6447*** -0.1755
(0.088) (0.117) (0.196) (0.183)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.5506*** -0.0500 -0.6543*** -0.2369
(0.110) (0.161) (0.213) (0.223)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.7943*** -0.1863 -0.9073*** -0.2096
(0.134) (0.201) (0.225) (0.254)
Birth year:1980-93 -0.9635*** -0.1119 -1.0523*** -0.2403
(0.160) (0.247) (0.253) (0.298)
Household size -0.0462*** -0.0365** -0.0468*** -0.0445***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
Own House 0.2520* -0.3182 -0.0040 0.1149
(0.137) (0.424) (0.095) (0.098)
Rented House 0.1138 -0.1264 -0.0683 0.0616
(0.157) (0.444) (0.106) (0.101)
Year 0.0272*** 0.0092 0.0235*** 0.0040
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006)
State dummies x x x x
Observations 1,115 452 989 403
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8 Heterogenous Effects IV: By Mothers Education
–Mother: HS+ or less– –Mother: SC or more–
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES College Enrolment College Graduation College Enrolment College Graduation
̂Educ.HomogjH ∼= W 0.096* -0.042 0.043 0.078
(0.054) (0.083) (0.115) (0.228)
̂Educ.HypogjW > H 0.070*** -0.014 0.072 0.026
(0.021) (0.038) (0.045) (0.068)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.248*** 0.749** 1.070*** 0.022
(0.052) (0.373) (0.129) (0.134)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.506*** 0.788** 0.926*** —
(0.067) (0.387) (0.142)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.294 1.280** — —
(0.183) (0.545)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 0.018 0.119* -0.359** -0.228
(0.079) (0.065) (0.144) (0.244)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.098 0.060 -0.365*** -0.149
(0.075) (0.062) (0.132) (0.188)
Child gender:male -0.087*** -0.123*** 0.044 -0.104*
(0.027) (0.036) (0.047) (0.063)
HH income(logs) 0.055*** -0.051 0.008 -0.032
(0.021) (0.034) (0.031) (0.050)
Race: White -0.080 0.043 0.251** -0.163
(0.095) (0.089) (0.107) (0.210)
Race:Blacks -0.021 -0.009 0.428*** -0.069
(0.104) (0.089) (0.130) (0.243)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.334*** -0.046 -0.820*** -0.261
(0.102) (0.102) (0.122) (0.216)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.497*** -0.023 -1.193*** -0.251
(0.123) (0.131) (0.155) (0.289)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.734*** -0.115 -1.574*** -0.243
(0.150) (0.157) (0.191) (0.344)
Birth year:1980-93 -0.881*** -0.047 -1.957*** -0.198
(0.179) (0.212) (0.231) (0.461)
Household size -0.025** -0.023 -0.068*** -0.068***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.024)
Own House 0.085 -0.140 0.163 0.177
(0.097) (0.229) (0.152) (0.276)
Rented House 0.021 -0.057 -0.206 0.013
(0.105) (0.235) (0.174) (0.215)
Year 0.025*** 0.003 0.044*** 0.008
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
State dummies x x x x
Observations 1,421 533 603 291
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9 Heterogenous Effects V: By Income
Less/equal to median income Greater than median income
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES College Enrolment College Graduation College Enrolment College Graduation
̂Educ.HomogjH ∼= W 0.113 0.065 -0.002 -0.025
(0.080) (0.101) (0.048) (0.074)
̂Educ.HypogjW > H 0.095** 0.021 0.039* -0.006
(0.038) (0.078) (0.023) (0.040)
Mothers educ: HS -0.030 -0.116 0.085* -0.046
(0.053) (0.084) (0.045) (0.068)
Mothers educ: SC -0.093 -0.163 0.212*** 0.035
(0.102) (0.196) (0.064) (0.099)
Mothers educ: C+ -0.182 -0.022 0.209** 0.130
(0.126) (0.239) (0.089) (0.130)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.197*** -0.413 0.202*** 0.146
(0.056) (0.429) (0.071) (0.168)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.400*** -0.375 0.207** 0.162
(0.080) (0.419) (0.081) (0.167)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.272 — -0.020 0.450
(0.207) (0.122) (0.413)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 0.043 0.201* 0.248* 0.204
(0.075) (0.107) (0.138) (0.127)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.075 0.182* 0.220 0.232*
(0.073) (0.109) (0.141) (0.134)
Child gender:male -0.027 -0.087 -0.094*** -0.093***
(0.032) (0.059) (0.024) (0.032)
Race: White -0.087 -0.240 0.089 -0.011
(0.121) (0.368) (0.062) (0.069)
Race:Blacks 0.047 -0.241 0.184*** 0.017
(0.129) (0.367) (0.070) (0.077)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.376*** 0.001 -0.449*** 0.130*
(0.089) (0.130) (0.071) (0.067)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.560*** 0.023 -0.637*** 0.185*
(0.109) (0.190) (0.082) (0.103)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.722*** 0.169 -0.868*** 0.125
(0.136) (0.248) (0.099) (0.127)
Birth year:1980-93 -0.875*** 0.187 -1.036*** 0.197
(0.191) (0.314) (0.119) (0.159)
Household size -0.026** -0.033* -0.046*** -0.037***
(0.010) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011)
Own House 0.117 -0.046 0.074 0.243***
(0.092) (0.186) (0.109) (0.077)
Rented House 0.003 -0.026 -0.090 0.296***
(0.105) (0.203) (0.111) (0.082)
Year 0.024*** -0.008 0.026*** 0.003
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)
State dummies x x x x
Observations 1,030 347 1,755 753
Bootstrapped Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10 CDS sample 1997-2007: Fathers involvement in activities
(1) (2) (3)
Activities H ∼= W W > H H > W
N 1,284 568 476
Plays sports/outdoor activities 0.571 0.521 0.529
(0.495) (0.5) (0.499)
Helps with Homework 0.564 0.501 0.573
(0.495) (0.5) (0.494)
Reads books 0.571 0.458 0.507
(0.495) (0.498) (0.5)
Plays video games 0.371 0.338 0.353
(0.483) (0.473) (0.478)
Plays board games 0.311 0.245 0.269
(0.463) (0.43) (0.444)
Did arts/crafts 0.188 0.155 0.168
(0.391) (0.362) (0.374)
Built/Repaired something 0.185 0.181 0.17
(0.389) (0.385) (0.376)
Went shopping 0.617 0.629 0.626
(0.486) (0.483) (0.484)
Cleans house together 0.428 0.399 0.388
(0.495) (0.49) (0.487)
Do dishes together 0.222 0.186 0.208
(0.415) (0.389) (0.406)
Talks about family 0.769 0.72 0.749
(0.421) (0.449) (0.433)
Prepared food together 0.443 0.392 0.414
(0.496) (0.488) (0.492)
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Appendix A.3
Data issues in college enrollment and graduation:
For those children aged 18-28 who do not live at home, if the survey shows them to
have enrolled in college after completing high school, i.e the year of education is 13,
14 or 15 it would mean they are enrolled. Then they are coded as enrolled and not
graduated.
If the survey shows missing values after 12 years of education and then shows 16/17
years of education after 4-5 years, it means that the individual enrolled and graduated
from college, so the missing values have been imputed to account for enrollment.
For those children, where years of education are missing after 12 years and remains
missing uptil they are aged 28, no imputations have been done and no information on
enrollment or graduation is recorded for them.
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Fig. 3.1 Joint Custody Laws by State, taken from Halla (2013)
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Fig. 3.2 Marriage and Divorce rates, source: Rasul (2005)
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Table 3.11 Baseline Estimates II, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables College Enrollment College Graduation College Enrollment College Graduation
Educ. Homogamy: Both HS– -0.111 -0.026 -0.169*** -0.059
(0.068) (0.061) (0.052) (0.054)
Educ. Homogamy: Both HS+ -0.062 -0.143*** -0.058 -0.140***
(0.053) (0.038) (0.045) (0.031)
Educ. Homogamy: Both SC -0.060 -0.119* 0.063 -0.071
(0.085) (0.067) (0.075) (0.058)
Educ. Homogamy: Both C+ -0.043 -0.143* 0.118** 0.066
(0.098) (0.076) (0.058) (0.044)
Educ. Hypogamy (W>H) -0.091* -0.145*** -0.014 -0.066*
(0.051) (0.041) (0.045) (0.034)
Mothers educ: HS+ 0.074 0.050
(0.066) (0.050)
Mothers educ: SC 0.206*** 0.099
(0.073) (0.061)
Mothers educ: C+ 0.240** 0.259***
(0.100) (0.078)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.272*** 0.097 0.280*** 0.122
(0.075) (0.109) (0.073) (0.111)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.394*** 0.082 0.411*** 0.117
(0.092) (0.115) (0.091) (0.116)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.229** 0.334*** 0.225** 0.347***
(0.116) (0.126) (0.111) (0.128)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 -0.326*** 0.187*** -0.370*** 0.214***
(0.075) (0.064) (0.068) (0.059)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.395*** 0.216*** -0.431*** 0.246***
(0.085) (0.071) (0.080) (0.067)
Fathers age at childbirth:40+ -0.226* 0.115 -0.281** 0.119
(0.128) (0.090) (0.126) (0.087)
Child gender:male -0.051 -0.086*** -0.061* -0.083***
(0.033) (0.023) (0.033) (0.023)
HH income(logs) 0.034* -0.011 0.046** -0.000
(0.019) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
Race: White 0.033 0.086 0.036 0.084
(0.085) (0.061) (0.085) (0.061)
Race:Blacks 0.162* 0.142** 0.153 0.129*
(0.097) (0.069) (0.098) (0.068)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.392*** -0.039 -0.386*** -0.045
(0.130) (0.074) (0.127) (0.074)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.610*** -0.036 -0.591*** -0.023
(0.142) (0.087) (0.140) (0.086)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.873*** -0.045 -0.840*** -0.022
(0.159) (0.104) (0.158) (0.104)
Birth year:1980-93 -1.017*** -0.002 -0.995*** 0.021
(0.182) (0.125) (0.181) (0.126)
Household size -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.042*** -0.040***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Own House 0.107 0.027 0.109 0.028
(0.110) (0.098) (0.117) (0.098)
Rented House 0.011 -0.015 0.011 -0.009
(0.111) (0.102) (0.116) (0.101)
Year 0.026*** 0.001 0.026*** -0.000
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
State dummies x x x x
Observations 2,669 1,117 2,669 1,117
This is Table3.3 with restriction on homogamy indicator relaxed. Robust standard errors clustered at child-level in parentheses.
Columns (3-4) are without controlling for mothers education.
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Table 3.12 Reduced Form OLS Estimates
(1) (2)
Variables College Enrollment College Graduation
Joint Custody Law -0.095 0.036
(0.065) (0.063)
Unilateral Divorce Law -0.105** 0.027
(0.045) (0.039)
Mothers educ: HS+ 0.084** -0.049
(0.039) (0.032)
Mothers educ: SC 0.213*** 0.005
(0.048) (0.042)
Mothers educ: C+ 0.228*** 0.112***
(0.053) (0.043)
Mothers age at childbirth:18-29 0.284*** 0.076
(0.070) (0.106)
Mothers age at childbirth:30-39 0.407*** 0.067
(0.087) (0.112)
Mothers age at childbirth:40+ 0.283** 0.423***
(0.116) (0.122)
Fathers age at childbirth:18-29 -0.255*** 0.214***
(0.066) (0.057)
Fathers age at childbirth:30-39 -0.325*** 0.257***
(0.074) (0.067)
Fathers age at childbirth:40+ -0.158 0.143*
(0.116) (0.083)
Child gender:male -0.058* -0.077***
(0.032) (0.023)
HH income(logs) 0.043** -0.000
(0.018) (0.020)
Race: White 0.034 0.073
(0.082) (0.063)
Race:Blacks 0.152 0.094
(0.093) (0.071)
Birth year:1950-59 -0.410*** -0.025
(0.131) (0.078)
Birth year:1960-69 -0.625*** -0.001
(0.144) (0.090)
Birth year:1970-79 -0.877*** 0.004
(0.161) (0.107)
Birth year:1980-93 -0.969*** 0.034
(0.183) (0.129)
Household size -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.010) (0.011)
Own House 0.096 0.014
(0.109) (0.098)
Rented House -0.000 -0.013
(0.109) (0.102)
Year 0.028*** -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
State FE’s x x
Observations 2,669 1,117
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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